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The Chinese stock exchanges are an integral part of Chinese and global economy having a 
combined market capitalization of 3697 billion USD at end of year 2012.  Due to their size and 
economic impact it is important that they maintain growth and stability.  Writers have 
maintained that voluntary corporate disclosure can help to achieve growth and stability thus the 
aim of this research is to examine recent Chinese listed companies’ voluntary disclosure practice. 
The purpose of this study is to investigate voluntary disclosure level of top 50 listed Chinese 
companies on Shanghai Stock Exchange during 2008-2012 period. 
 
This study primarily utilizes a quantitative approach.  The author constructs a Voluntary 
Disclosure Index (VDI) based on legislative/regulatory consideration, investor demand, investor 
sophistication and previous studies.  This VDI score is then used to measure companies’ 
voluntary disclosure level. 
 
The results of this study indicate that the overall voluntary disclosure level did not increase 
during 2008-2012, rather it dropped.  Some interesting findings about disclosure level and 
individual disclosure item scores in certain disclosure categories stood out; for example, nearly 
all companies detached their CSR report or sustainability report from their annual reports in 
2010, resulted a sharp decline in voluntary disclosure level in certain related disclosure category.  
Further there was little employment information disclosed particularly of note are the areas of 
minority and gender, and little forward looking corporate focused financial information as 
opposed to general economic expectations was disclosed.  
 
By using more recent data and considering the changes in China’s corporate disclosure 
regulation system in recent years, this study addresses certain gaps from previous Chinese 
studies.  This study also explores some regulatory loopholes in China’s disclosure regulation 
system and certain insufficiencies in investors’ education, thus this study can be of value to 
policy makers.  Overall it is hoped that this study can lead to greater engagement between 
Chinese corporations and investors particularly in the area of voluntary disclosure. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
On the first operational day (19th of December 1990) of the ShangHai Stock 
Exchange (SSE), only eight shares were listed. Total market capitalization of the 
Chinese stock market by the end of 1991 was only 5 billion RMB1, however by 
the end of 2012, the two Chinese stock exchanges Shanghai and Shenzhen 
ranked 7 and 16 among the 21 largest stock exchanges with a combined market 
capitalization of 3697 billion USD (CSRC, 2013). The expansion of the Chinese 
stock market during the last three decades is astonishing. The Chinese stock 
market is now an integral part of the Chinese and global economy, and therefore 
it is vital Chinese stock market maintain a healthy level of growth and 
reasonable stability. Voluntary corporate disclosure as a type of disclosure made 
by corporations over and above mandatory requirements (Qu et al, 2012) can 
help to achieve both growth and stability (Botosan, 1997; FASB, 2001; Healy 
and Palepu, 2001; Botosan and Plumlee 2002; Kristandl and Bontis, 2007; Liang, 
2011), therefore voluntary disclosure is important to the Chinese stock market 
and global economy. 
1.1 Background 
The building and development of the Chinese stock market and its corporate 
information disclosure regulatory/monitoring system has been following the 
principle of “Feeling the riverbed stones while crossing the river”; which means 
to take one step at a time and deal with problems as they occur. This was an 
inevitable choice for the Chinese economy system, for the stock market and for 
its corporate voluntary disclosure system as well. No one had established a 
“socialist market economy” before. There were no models to follow, China’s 
investors and corporations are very different compare to the west, everything 
had to be created and improved along the way as problems occur. Issues 
                                                             
1 The author could not find an official exchange rate between USD and RMB of that time, so no precise 
USD equivalent can be given. It is roughly around 0.4 billion USD. 
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concerning Chinese listed companies’ voluntary disclosure activities have to be 
addressed as the stock market develop as well, therefore it is necessary to 
investigate recent years’ Chinese listed companies’ voluntary disclosure level 
and reveal issues surrounding it. 
1.2 Issues Concerning Voluntary Disclosure in China 
Issues with the information voluntarily disclosed by Chinese corporations 
include: the amount of information disclosed (Qu and Leung, 2006); difficulty to 
understand the information Chinese corporations disclosed (Leung et al, 2005); 
and falsification or fabrication of information (Shi and Weisert, 2002). Studies in 
the area have investigated issues relating to amount of information disclosed 
(Qu et al, 2012; Liang, 2011); explanation of the causes of certain disclosure 
issues such as understandability and falsification (Xiao and Yuan, 2007: Liang, 
2011; Qu and Leung, 2006). Numerous studies have been done regarding the 
relationship between voluntary disclosure levels and certain company properties 
and economic rewards (Qiao, 2003; Wang and Jiang, 2004;Wang, Sewon, and 
Claiborne, 2008); for example, Qiao (2003) found Chinese listed companies’ 
voluntary disclosure level is not related size, which is quite different comparing 
western companies.  
 
However most of the previous empirical studies’ testing periods cover reporting 
periods prior to 2008. Since then, China’s mandatory corporate information 
disclosure system has changed significantly. Thus, there could be a need to 
analyze more recent data. Therefore the author consider there is need to further 
investigate the voluntary disclosure level of Chinese listed companies in recent 




The overriding objective of this study is: to investigate voluntary disclosure 
level of top 50 listed Chinese companies on Shanghai Stock Exchange during 
2008-2012 period. In order to achieve this objective, this study will: review 
previous studies on voluntary disclosure; analyze the Chinese corporate 
disclosure system; analyze government influence in corporate disclosure 
regulation system and in state owned enterprises (SOE); develop an analytical 
framework to aid the understanding of certain voluntary disclosure behavior; 
construct a voluntary disclosure index for listed Chinese companies. 
1.4 Method 
This study mainly adopts a quantitative approach to analyze voluntary 
disclosure level. By examining empirically the voluntary disclosure made by 50 
listed firms2 between the 2008 and 2012 financial reporting periods listed on 
ShangHai Stock Exchange. The author constructs a Voluntary Disclosure Index 
(VDI) based on legislative consideration, investor demand, investor 
sophistication and previous studies. This which contains 6 categories and 31 
disclosure items in total, each items is given a score of 0, 1, 2 or 3. Each 
category’s VD and the overall VDI score is then calculated. 
1.4 Outline 
This study is to be organized as follow. In chapter two, the author conduct a 
literature review of previous international and Chinese studies on voluntary 
disclosure. In chapter three, the author reviews the history of China’s stock 
market information disclosure regulatory framework and the problems 
associated with it. The governance mechanism and the influence of state owned 
                                                             
2 50 companies each year over five year period 
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enterprises (SOE) are reviewed as well as the education and investment behavior 
of Chinese individual investors. In chapter four, the analytical framework is 
developed and in chapter five the author outline detail methodology for the 
construction and calculation of VDI in this study. Chapter six presents the 
empirical results with chapter seven offering a discussion on the results and 
partially reflects on earlier cases as well, chapter eight presents the conclusion. 
1.5 Scope 
This study offers certain insights into corporate disclosure system of listed 
Chinese companies through the combination of literature review, analysis of 
Chinese corporate disclosure regulation system, analysis of the SOE governance 
system and the author’s knowledge of Chinese culture and language3. Utilizing 
constructed voluntary disclosure index, this study measures 50 top Chinese 
listed companies voluntary disclosure level in more recent years. Combining the 
theoretical and empirical findings, this study helps to identify problems 
associated with local listed Chinese companies’ voluntary disclosure activity and 
source of these problems.
                                                             
3 This is not to say the author will use un-scholarly personal “understanding” of China. The author is 




Chapter Two: Literature Review 
This chapter focuses on two sections. The first section reviews international 
studies conducted on voluntary disclosure; with particular emphasis on: theories 
for voluntary disclosure; drivers of voluntary disclosure activities; content of 
voluntary disclosure; factors affecting the extent of voluntary disclosure; 
economic consequences of voluntary disclosure; regulation of voluntary 
disclosure; others. The second section review past Chinese studies undertaken 
on voluntary disclosure; this section is subdivided into two subparts: theoretical 
studies and empirical studies. 
2.1 International Studies 
2.1.1 Theories of Voluntary Disclosure-Agency Theory 
Agency theory has a focus on what is called rational self-interested economic 
behavior of shareholders, creditors and managers (Jesen and Meckling, 1976; 
Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). This theory is widely used in accounting 
literature to provide explanations about some disclosure choices made by the 
managers.  
 
Based on the research of Fama & Miller (1972), agency theory was first 
formally proposed by Jenson & Meckling (1976). The agency theory views 
complex hierarchical organizations as “Nexus of contracts” (Alchian and 
Demsetz 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). These contracts involve agency 
relationship between the principals (shareholders of the firm) and the agents 
(managers), principals would make contracts with agents to perform services on 
the principals’ behalf (Jensn and Meckling, 1976; Bricker and Chandat, 1998). 
Agents are assumed to maximize their own utilities in both pecuniary and 
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non-pecuniary terms; they may not act in the best interests of the principal 
(Holmstrom, 1979; Antle,1984; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). Thus, the spirit 
of contracts designing here is to provide certain incentives to the agent and to 
provide for the agent to share in the outcomes of his/her actions (Bricker and 
Chandat, 1998). However, for the principals to monitor and ensure the agents’ 
execution of contract is indeed in line with such spirit rather than purely 
focusing on the agents’ own interests, there will be costs, these costs are called 
monitoring costs and they lower the benefits agents receive (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Therefore, the agents have an incentive to voluntarily disclose 
information regard to their management activities and results to the principals in 
order to minimize monitoring costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Liang, 2011).  
2.1.2 Theories of Voluntary Disclosure-Legitimacy Theory 
Agency theory reviewed above provides some insights into manager’s choices to 
voluntarily disclose information, but does not consider disclosure behavior in a 
more complicated and embracing social context (Chalmers and Godfrey, 2004). 
Disclosure behavior can be heavily influenced by social environment (Chau and 
Gray, 2002), and China’s social system had undergone huge changes in the past 
three decades in areas like economic condition, social values, 
political/regulatory systems. Therefore, it is reasonable to think these changes in 
China’s social system would have some impact on the disclosure behavior of 
Chinese listed companies.  
 
Legitimacy theory acknowledges that entities are influenced by and will 
influence the society that they operate in, and this theory considers entities 
continually try to make sure or try to say that they operate within bounds and 
norms of the society (Deegan, 2002; O’Donovan, 2002). For an entity to be 
considered as legitimate by the society, it needs to understand the society’s 
expectations, and then identify and manage possible legitimacy gaps (Chalmers 




Things that threaten an entity’s legitimacy can be created by regulatory pressure, 
institutional pressure, social awareness, crises and media exposure (Suchman, 
1995). Voluntarily disclosing information with regard to corporations’ 
environmental and social contribution had been considered by many as means 
utilized by corporations to establish, maintain or repair their legitimacy 
(Campbell et al, 2003; Milne and Patten, 2002; Deegan, 2002; Deegan et al, 
2002; Guthrie et al, 2006). Tilling and Tilt (2010) considered there to be two 
main layers of legitimacy theory. The first layer of legitimacy theory, also 
considered as institutional legitimacy theory focuses on how organizations as a 
whole gain acceptance by society at large (Suchman, 1995). Accounting 
research utilizing this layer generally consider business environment as a given 
and static context within which research is conducted. (Tilling and Tilt, 2010). 
Another layer other than institutional level is organizational legitimacy (Driscoll 
and Crombie, 2001). Legitimacy on this level is considered as a process, 
organizational legitimacy here is not static, it is subject to change (Kaplan and 
Ruland, 1991; Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Pfeffer and Slancik, 1978; Deegan, 
Rankin & Voght, 2000). It is this level that this report draws its understanding of 
legitimacy theory.  
 
To consider entities would try to operate within the bounds and norms of the 
society under legitimacy theory, entities would need to inform society about 
their activities, thus they may voluntarily disclose information that is not 
required by laws and regulations (Guthrie et al, 2006; Milne and Patten, 2002). 
To further consider organizational legitimacy as a process means information 
voluntarily disclosed by entities that aimed at create, maintain or repair 
organizational legitimacy can be changing from time to time. Therefore, 




2.1.3 Theories of Voluntary Disclosure-Institutional Theory 
Carpenter and Feroz (2001) find that in institutional context, organizations adopt 
management practices that are considered as legitimate by others (Carpenter and 
Feroz, 2001; Othman et al, 2011), and institutional environment plays a very 
important role in influencing organizations to adopt accounting/reporting 
practices (Tsamenyi et al, 2006). Chalmers and Godfrey (2004) also point out 
deviations from intra-industry create uncertainty into stakeholders’ minds and 
thus may potentially undermine organizations’ legitimacy.  
 
Dimaggio and Powel (1983) find that as “institutional pressures become visible 
in patterns of diffusion among organizations through isomorphism, many 
organizations adopt similar structures or similar disclosure practices” (Dimaggio 
and Powell, 1983, pg 147). These isomorphisms are then categorized in three 
forms, which are coercive isomorphism, normative isomorphism and mimetic 
isomorphism (Dimaggio and Powell, 1983, pg 150).  
 
Dimaggio and Powel (1983) consider that coercive isomorphism is the result of 
pressures exerted on organizations by other entities that they are dependent and 
by cultural expectations in society that organizations function in. These 
pressures could be felt as force, persuasion or as invitations to join in collusion 
(Dimaggio and Powel, 1983). Under some circumstances, organizational change 
can be a response to government mandate (Dimaggio and Powel, 1983); for 
example, companies adopt certain environmental friendly technologies to 
conform to environmental laws and regulations mandated by government; 
companies report their CSR activities to conform to disclosure regulations. 
Some legal or technical requirements mandated by the state such as financial 
reporting standards that would ensure organizations’ eligibility for state 
contracts or funding shape organization behavior (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; 
Damiggio and Powel, 1983). Some also argued that as state and other large 
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rational organizations extend their dominating influence over wider areas of 
social life, organizational structures increasing reflect regulations that are 
institutionalized by the state (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Meyer and Hannan, 
1979; Damiggio and Powel, 1983).  
 
 The normative source of isomorphism comes primarily from 
professionalization (Damiggio and Powel, 1983). Professionalization here is 
considered as a collective attempt of people of certain occupation to define the 
environment and methods of their job. There are two aspects of 
professionalization which are important to isomorphism; the first one is the 
resting of education and legitimation in a cognitive base; the second one is 
growth of professional network (Damiggio and Powel, 1983).  
Not all institutional isomorphism come from authority, the mimetic isomorphism 
derives from uncertainty. Uncertainty encourages imitation, when goals are 
poorly understood or when the environment creates uncertainty, organizations 
may model themselves based on the behaviors of other organizations (Damiggio 
and Powel, 1983). Organizations attempt to model themselves after other 
organizations in their relevant field which they perceive as more legitimate 
(Meyer, 1981).  
 
In an institutional context, organizations adopt management practices that are 
considered as legitimate by others (Carpenter and Feroz, 2001; Othman et al, 
2011), and institutional environment plays a very important role in influencing 
organizations to adopt accounting/reporting practices (Tsamenyi et al, 2006). 
Information disclosure is a type of management practice, therefore institutional 
theory can offer explanations about some voluntary disclosure changes; for 




2.1.4 Summary of Theory 
The above three sections reviewed three theories that will be used to analyze 
voluntary disclosure choices and behaviors. The agency theory focus on the 
contractual relationship between the managers and the shareholder, and 
considers the agents have an incentive to voluntarily disclose information regard 
to their management activities and results to the principals in order to minimize 
monitoring costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Liang, 2011). The legitimacy 
theory considers business organizations’ disclosure behavior in a more 
complicated and embracing social context (Chalmers and Godfrey, 2005), 
companies may voluntarily disclose information to create, maintain or repair 
their legitimacy. Institutional theory suggests that institutional pressures may 
also shape organizational behavior. Dimaggio and Powel (1983) finds that as 
institutional pressures become visible in patterns of diffusion among 
organizations through isomorphism, many organizations adopt similar structures 
or similar disclosure practices (Dimaggio and Powell, 1983, pg 147).  
 
The three theories provide theoretical support for understanding and analyzing 
of voluntary disclosure in a changing environment over a time period. These 
three theories can lead several more detail fields of voluntary disclosure study, 
they include: motivations for voluntarily disclosing information, the question 
here is what drives organizations to voluntarily disclose information; 
obstructions or de-motivations for voluntary disclosure, what is stopping 
organizations from voluntarily disclosing information; voluntary disclosure 
behaviour change, this field includes contents of voluntary disclosure, the 
quality of these contents, factors affect the content and level of voluntary 
disclosure. Previous voluntary disclosure studies about these more detail fields 
will be reviewed in the following sections. 
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2.1.5 What drives voluntary disclosure activities? 
Healy and Palepu (2001) undertook a comprehensive summary of previous 
studies and revealed there are four possible forces that drive managers’ decision 
to voluntarily disclosure information. The first one is capital market transactions. 
Myers and Majluf (1984) found if information asymmetry remains unsolved, 
firms with such problems will consider making public equity offers costly for 
current shareholders. Merton (1987) had similar findings, that premium 
investors demand mangers to bear information risk if there is information 
asymmetry between managers and investors. Healy and Palepu (1995) 
hypothesized that the way in which investors perceive a firm is very important 
to managers that want to issue public debt or equity or company acquisition in 
stock transaction.  
 
The second is contests over corporate control. This was motivated by 
observations that board of directors and investors often hold managers 
accountable for companies’ current stock performance. Poor stock performance 
could lead to manager turnover( Weisbace, 1988; DeAngelo, 1988). Thus, this 
branch of voluntary disclosure theory hypothesizes that should there be risk of 
job loss due to poor stock performance, managers use disclosure to reduce 
chances of undervaluation of stock performance. However there had been little 
empirical findings to support this reason.  
 
The third is stock compensation, which originated from a fact that many 
mangers receive reward in the form of stock-based compensation, such plans 
would give managers incentives to voluntarily disclose information. Aboody and 
Kasznik (2000) indicate companies purposefully delay disclosure of good news 
and speed up the disclosure of bad news just before stock option award dates to 
reduce risk of misevaluation, and so to insure stock price is a reasonable 




The fourth is litigation cost. Legal actions against managers for inadequate 
disclosure could lead to increase of disclosure. Skinner (1994) suggested and 
found those managers of companies with bad performance have an incentive to 
disclose bad news to reduce the cost of litigation. However, empirical evidence 
from Francis et al (1994) suggest that many companies were actually sued due 
to inaccurate forecasts, they also found 87% of their no-litigation sample 
companies’ stock price dropped after earning decline forecasts, thus they 
concluded voluntary disclosure of forecasting information may not be a 
deterrent to litigation.  
 
Also, scholars like Bens (2002) have been finding evidence suggesting corporate 
disclosure and corporate governance substitute or complement each other. Bens 
(2002) found a positive relation between voluntary disclosure and increasing in 
monitoring activities from shareholders. This suggests good corporate 
governance complement voluntary disclosure. Fan and Wong (2002) examined 
the relation between voluntarily disclosed earning information and ownership 
structure in seven east asia countries. They found concentrated ownership 
structure leads to low informativeness of earning information. Hope and Thomas 
(2008) tested whether or not managers have incentives to act in a way that 
benefit them but damage shareholder’s benefit. They found despite USA MNCs 
no longer needed to disclose earnings by geographic area, some still do disclose 
such information; and the ones do disclose such information experience have 
higher foreign profit margin and higher firm value. Ali et al (2007) found firms 
still controlled by their funding families are more likely to disclose warnings 
when facing bad news. Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) found firms that have 
effective governance mechanisms disclose more management forecast, 
especially ones associate with bad news. This suggests better corporate 
governance could lead to more or/and better corporate voluntary disclosure. 
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2.1.6 What is stopping firms from voluntarily disclosing information? 
Besides the analyzing of what drives firms to voluntarily disclose information, 
some previous studies also covered what is stopping firms from doing so. There 
appears to be two major factors. 
 
The first one is disclosure cost. Managers may attempt to maximize companies’ 
value4 by voluntarily disclosing information, however if the benefit of doing so 
is not sufficiently favorable5 compare to the cost of doing so, then managers 
may choose not to disclose (Jovanovic, 1982; Dye, 1986; Lanen and Verrecchia, 
1987). Managers may well not disclose unfavorable information due to the 
possibility that they can get higher payoffs by costs associate with such 
disclosure (Beyer et all, 2010). One type of disclosure cost have been studied by 
many, this is costs resulting from possible proprietary nature of information 
(Verrechia, 1983; Wagenhofer, 1990, Verrecchia, 2001; Fischer and Verrecchia, 
2004; Suijs, 2005). These studies focus on the balance between the cost of 
disclosing such proprietary information and cost of withhold such information, 
their findings generally indicate disclosure costs that occur due to proprietary 
nature of information could but not always prevent voluntary disclosure. For 
example, Suijs (2005) found managers disclose favorable and unfavorable 
information but does not disclose “intermediate” information if disclosure costs 
are low. 
 
The second aspect is uncertainty in investors’ response. If the investors’ 
response to managers’ decision to disclose or not disclose information is 
unknown to managers, then managers may withhold the decision to disclose 
information (Dye, 1998; Dutta and Trueman, 2002; Fishman and Hagetry 2003; 
Suijs, 2007). In the study of Dutta and Trueman (2002), authors allowed 
                                                             
4 This is referring to firm value as perceived by investors. 
5 There had been little study done to define what is favorable, Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter (2003) define 
it as “ when information reveals firm values are high but with low risk asoociate with it. 
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investors to gain private information with regard to the demand for company’s 
product; and found investors that had the  information that indicates there is a 
high demand for the firm’s product interpret high inventory levels as positive 
information due to the fact that they consider high inventory level as an 
indication of the company’s ability to meet high future demand; however, where 
investors had information which indicates that the demand for company’s 
product is low, high inventory level is seen as bad news, because to those 
investors that means the company have issues in selling their products. The 
result of varied interpretations would cause managers to disclose information 
that is either high or low (Dutta and Trueman, 2002). Suijs (2007) on the other 
hand did not allow tested investors to gain such private information yet still 
found managers who are uncertain about investor response to disclosures 
became cautious when deciding what to disclose, and may limit voluntary 
disclosure. Fishman and Hagetry (2003), framed their model as a firm disclosing 
information about product quality found “unsophisticated investors” just 
“observe” but did not “process” disclosure; and because unsophisticated 
investors would be very suspicious about disclosures6, managers may simply 
choose not to disclose. The core hypothesis of this concept is that the target 
audience for disclosure is important to disclosure strategy, and the 
characteristics can be an explanatory force for companies’ disclosure behavior 
 
From these researches, two key aspects are important. First, investors’ and 
interested parties’ 7  interpretation or how they perceive disclosure and the 
absence of disclosure is important to managers’ decision to voluntarily disclose 
information or not. If investors rationally think managers disclose information 
only if doing so benefits them, then investors interpret disclosure or absence of 
disclosure based on their perception or knowledge of managers’ incentives and 
the company’s basic economics (Beyer et al, 2010). The reality is investors are 
                                                             
6 The term sophisticated investors vary a lot in legal studies and accounting/finance studies, the term will 
be reviewed in details in later chapters. Here suspicious means these unsophisticated investors believes 
only those companies with low value or have problems make a disclosure (Dye, 1998) 
7 Or other relevant parties 
 15 
  
not certain about many things: whether or not managers’ have information they 
can not access; how managers receive information; what exactly are managers’ 
so called incentives. Second, the company does not make the disclosure decision, 
the managers do. And because of this, the costs of disclosure and the benefit of 
disclosure both associate with the manager’s utility or disutility. The utility of 
managers are their reward packages and corporate governance, when 
management reward package and corporate governance structure are being 
designed with the purpose of maximizing investor return, they would 
have/should have taken into account how governance and manager’s personal 
incentives would affect disclosure decision and thus firm value (Core, 2001). 
2.1.7 Content of voluntary disclosure 
One major challenge of voluntary disclosure studies is to decide about the scope 
and depth of voluntary disclosures. Previous researchers adopted two major 
proxies to measure the content of voluntary disclosure, these include8: metrics 
originated from certain database such as the Association for Investment 
Management and Research (AIMR) database (Welker, 1995; Lang and Lundhold, 
2000; Sengupta, 1998; Healy et al, 1999; Brown and Hillegeist, 2007), and some 
self-constructed measures (Botosan, 19979).  
 
Data provided by AIMR gives some general measure on extent of voluntary 
disclosure, but it is a not clear how AIMR select firms to be included in their 
ratings and any possible bias may have occurred during the selection (Healy and 
Palepu, 2001; Lang and Lundhold, 1993). Also, AIMR discontinued the 
disclosure rankings in 1997, so it is no longer usable as empirical measurement 
tool for voluntary disclosure. During 1990s, the Center for International 
Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR) created a listed company annual 
report evaluation system. Their sample included 856 companies from 18 
                                                             
8 But no limit to, due to limitations of this article and the limitations of the researchers (time, length and  
9 There are too many to be listed here, they will be reviewed in following paragraphs 
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different industries in 34 countries. However, this system evaluates all 
information, both mandatory and voluntary. Price Waterhouse & Coopers issued 
a report on The Opacity Index in 2001, this index measures how hard it is for 
investors to acquire various types of information about a company; however, 
this index does not solely focuses on voluntary disclosure. 
 
The self-constructed type of measure system face its challenges too. Since the 
authors create their own metric, it could be created just intended to capture what 
the authors intend to capture. Healy and Palepu (2001) criticized these 
self-created proxies to be of “endogeneity” in nature and “noisy”.  
 
However, many studies that analyzed voluntary disclosure still developed these 
“check-lists” to measure the content of voluntary disclosure. For example, Meek 
et al (1995) investigated the voluntary disclosure of USA, British and European 
firms. They constructed a voluntary disclosure checklist and divided voluntary 
disclosure information into three categories: strategic information; non-financial 
information and financial information. This checklist contains 85 disclosure 
items in total. Another example can be PwC surveyed the 82 largest Swiss 
firms10, the results indicate 70% of managers surveyed consider voluntary 
disclosure should focus on demonstrating the “core competency” and 
“competitive advantage” to better describe the future of the company. A 
summary of some studies developed these “voluntary disclosure check-lists” is 
as below: 
Table 1 Summary of Literature undertaken on the Content of VD 






2001 N/A Divided voluntary disclosure information into six categories in FASB 
(2001)11: business data; management’s analysis of business data; forward 
looking information; information about management and shareholder; 
                                                             
10 Reproduced from He (2003) <Voluntary disclosure of listed companies>, research report presented to 
the ShenZhen Stock Exchange Research Institute. 
11 The full list can easily be found in the report FASB: “Improving Business reporting: Insights into 
Enhancing Voluntary Disclosure”, Steering Committee Report, Business Reporting Research Project; this 
report can be found and accessed by going to www. Fasb.org.  
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2002 Investigated voluntary 
disclosure behavior of 
Japanese companies listed 
in Tokyo stock exchange 
since 1990, 
Japanese companies’ voluntary disclosure information can be divided into 
five categories: background information; summary of historical results; key 
non-financial information; projected information; management discussion 
and analysis (explanations for changes must be provided) 
Newson and 
Deegan 
2002 Surveyed 150 institutional 
investors from USA, 
Canada, Europe and Japan 
Their results indicate listed companies’ voluntary disclosure effort focus on 
companies’ core competencies and achieve the demonstration of 
companies’ competitive advantage through disclosing information regard to 
human capital, strategy, profit forecast and environmental protection 
Chau and Gray 2002 Analyzed HongKong and 
Singapore’s listed 
companies’ voluntary 
disclosure efforts of year 
1997 
They categorized voluntary disclosure information into: general corporate 
information; corporate strategy; acquisitions and disposals; research and 
development; future prospects; information about directors; employee 
information; social policy and value added information; segmental 




2004 analyzed 87 Greek 
companies voluntary 
disclosure efforts 
Divided their voluntary disclosure information into the following category: 
company environment information, this includes economic environment 
company faces, company background, information about board of 
directors; social responsibility information, this includes employment 
information and social policy; financial information, this includes branch 
and subsidiary information, financial ratios, analysis of current financial 
conditions and information about current market conditions 
Peterson and 
Plenborg 
2006 selected 36 Denmark 
companies and analyzed 
their voluntary disclosure 
efforts during 1997-2000 
Divided voluntary disclosure information into the following categories: 
strategic information, competition and future information, product 
information, marketing strategy information and human capital 
information. 
Agca and Onder  2007 Analyzed 51 listed Turkey 
companies 2003 voluntary 
disclosure information 
Categorized voluntary disclosure information as follow: strategic 
information, this includes company background, company strategy, 
research and development, future outlook; non-financial information, this 
includes information about board of directors, staff information, social 
policy information, value-added information; financial information, this 
includes stock price information, foreign currency information and 
financial analysis information 
 
The studies reviewed in this sub section indicates that when studying the scope 
and depth of voluntary disclosure, there seems not to be an universal set of 
disclosure items to look for. Corporate information disclosed that can be 
considered as voluntary seems to vary across time periods, and in different 
countries. Therefore, it is necessary for the author to construct a voluntary 
disclosure checklist for this study. However, the content of voluntary disclosure 
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reviewed in these studies did reveal that information regard to the “core 
competency” of companies seems to be considered as very important voluntary 
disclosure information. This will be useful for construction of a voluntary 
disclosure checklist for this study. 
2.1.8 Quality of Voluntary Disclosure 
While the previous studies focused on self-constructed tools to measure the 
content of voluntary disclosure generally gave a numerical score to measure 
“how much” companies disclosed as well as the quality of their disclosure12, 
some researchers have adopted natural language processing methods to measure 
the quality of disclosures. DeVilliers and Summerheys (2010) measured the 
number of sentences in oil companies annual reports relating their 
environmental information, they found after the gulf of mexico oil spill, major 
International Oil Companies (IOCs) disclosure volume all increased. Li (2008) 
provided evidence about the factors that determine and the implications of 
vocabular properties of company disclosure. In this article, he examined annual 
report readability and other vocabular features of annual reports for current 
performance; he found companies with bad performance provide annual reports 
that are harder to read. The evidence he presented also suggest manager do 
behave in an opportunistic way—they structure annual reports to hide adverse 
information about investors. Li (2010) examined the tone and content of forward 
looking information in American 10-K and 10-Q files, the author found 
companies with better current performance, smaller size and less profit volatility 
generally sound more positive in forward looking statements.  
2.1.9 Factors Affecting the Level of Voluntary Disclosure 
There are many factors that may affect the level of voluntary disclosure, and 
there are many studies undertaken in this area. Chow and Wong (1987), studied 
                                                             
12 For example, 0 for non disclosure of environmental initiatitves, 1 for simply mention such matters and 2 
or qualitative and quantitative information regard to the matter 
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52 manufacturing firms in Mexico, found company size is positively related to 
voluntary disclosure level, but the relationship with financial leverage and 
voluntary disclosure level was not significant. Cooke (1992) used annual reports 
to conduct empirical analysis on Japanese listed companies’ mandatory and 
voluntary disclosure; and found company size, listing condition and industry 
type have significant impact on the level of voluntary disclosure; the article also 
found manufacturing firms and firms listed in multiple locations tend to disclose 
more information. Mckinnon and Dalimuthe (1993) analyzed 65 Australian 
companies and found company size and industry type have significant impact on 
voluntary disclosure level made by the companies, however, they found 
financial leverage has no significant impact on disclosure level. Mitchell et al 
(1995) conducted empirical research on what influences listed companies’ 
voluntary disclosure of segement information, use Australian oil industry as 
sample base, they found company size and financial leverage have significant 
impact on disclosure level. Hossain et al (1995) conducted empirical analysis on 
55 New Zealand listed companies’ voluntary disclosure; the results from their 
cross-sectional regression analysis showed that firm size, foreign listing status 
and leverage significantly relate to the extent of voluntary disclosure; assets in 
place and type of auditors are not strong explanatory variables. Meek et al (1995) 
selected 46 European MNCs, 64 British MNCs and 116 USA MNCs, and 
conducted empirical analysis on factors affecting voluntary disclosure in their 
annual reports; they found company size, the country where the firm is located, 
listing condition and industry type are the most significant influencing factors. 
They also found for voluntarily disclosed strategic information, firm’s location 
and listing condition are the most significant influencing factors, the firms listed 
in foreign countries and European firms are more willing to provide strategic 
information. In their findings, they also indicate British and European firms tend 
to disclose more non-financial information than USA firms; and firms in heavy 
pollution industry like oil or chemical tend to disclose more non-financial 
information as well. Kahra et al (1994) tested factors that influence voluntary 
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disclosure policy and compulsory disclosure policy adopted by non-financial 
companies listed in Helsinki Stock Exchange during the period 1985-1993; they 
found company size, company type, capital structure and company growth 
determine voluntary disclosure policy. Chau and Gray (2002) found insider 
control and family control over firms affect disclosure level. Chen, Denfond and 
Park (2002)’s empirical study revealed firm’s profit stability, fluctuation of share 
price significantly affect the disclosure level.  
 
Voluntary disclosure activities themselves may affect voluntary disclosure. Dye 
and Sridhar (1995) found voluntary disclosure activities of some companies 
would trigger similar activities in other companies, they would cause other firms 
to make similar disclosures. In their initial findings, it would appear disclosures 
happen as if in “herds”, and refer to this as “herding” behavior in that managers 
try to influence the financial market’s perception about the firms (Dye and 
Sridhar, 1995). Some firms’ disclosure may influence market’s perception, lead 
the market into believing other firms in the same industry acquired firm 
value-relevant information which they just haven’t disclosed, and this could 
force other firms to voluntarily disclose information resulting the “herding” 
behavior. (Dye and Sridhar, 1995).  
 
It would appear the most commonly agreed factor found is company size13, the 
second most commonly agreed factor is industry type. Other factors include 
listing condition, leverage, capital growth, corporate control, profit stability, 
fluctuation of share price and voluntary disclosure activities of other companies. 
These factors will be interesting to consider when comparing the VD level 
results of this study to results of other studies. 
2.1.10 Economic Consequences of Voluntary Disclosure 
Healy and Palepu (2001) found there are three general economic consequences 
                                                             
13 7 out of 9 studies reviewed in the first paragraph of this sub section 
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of voluntary disclosure. The first one is improved stock liquidity. Kim and 
Verrecchia (1994) argued that since voluntary disclosure leads to the reduction 
of information asymmetry among investors, corporations that have high level of 
disclosure can have the investors’ confidence in the corporations’ share 
transactions to be at fair price. This leads to better liquidity of the corporations’ 
stock. Gelb and Zarowin (2000) provide empirical evidence when they find that 
corporations which demonstrate a high level of disclosure have good stock price 
even their current earning performance is not great. Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) 
analyzed bid-ask spreads of corporations listed on Neuer Market, and found 
these firms’ bid-ask spreads to be lower than those listed on Frankfurt Exchange, 
they explained the reason as Neuer Market have higher disclosure requirements 
and that more disclosure led to better liquidity of stock. The second one is that 
cost of capital would be reduced. Botosan’s (1997) findings provide some 
support, she found those firms with low analyst following have a negative 
relationship between cost of capital and the amount of information they 
voluntarily disclose. Botosan and Harris (2000) found further evidence when 
they found that there is a negative cross sectional relationship between the cost 
of capital of a firm and firm’s annual report disclosure rankings. However, they 
did also find investor relations’ activities are unrelated to cost of capital. The 
third is the increase of information intermediation.  
 
Lang and Lundholm (1996) argued that voluntary disclosure reduces the 
analysts’ cost for acquiring information, and would lead to increase in the supply 
of information by the analysts. However, the effect of voluntary disclosure level 
on demand for the analysts services is not clearly discussed. Healy et al (1999) 
found corporations that receive an increase in analyst rating for their disclosure 
level also receive more analysts coverage. This adds further support for the third 
economic consequence of voluntary disclosure. 
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2.2 Chinese Studies on Voluntary Disclosure 
Compared to international studies conducted on voluntary disclosure, Chinese 
researchers have only begun to study voluntary disclosure in the last decade. 
The lack of information makes it hard to systematically summary and categorize 
prior Chinese studies in this field similar to the international studies. However it 
is possible to divide these studies into two main types: theoretical and empirical. 
2.2.1Theoretical Chinese Studies on Voluntary Disclosure 
Li and He (2002) discussed possible economical explanations for voluntary 
disclosure behavior, the motives of voluntary disclosure and why it could be 
difficult to voluntarily disclosure information. They summarized and analyzed 
the content of voluntary disclosure made by foreign corporations. They 
recommend China should encourage corporations to voluntarily disclose 
information, and “relevant regulatory agencies” should put more effort into 
monitoring and auditing of voluntary disclosure information. They also 
recommend guidance should be given to corporations about voluntary 
disclosure.  
 
He (2003) reviewed the evolution of information disclosure, the properties of 
voluntary disclosure, the effect of voluntary disclosure; he recommended 
Chinese listed companies should plan for voluntary disclosure and monitoring 
agencies should have certain schemes in regulations and laws to encourage and 
protect voluntary disclosure.  
 
Chen (2004) discussed mandatory and voluntary disclosure of accounting 
information from an economic perspective, her conclusion was that mandatory 
and voluntary disclosure should supplement of each other and there needs to be 
a balance point between the two. Wang (2005) reviewed international studies 
and discussed that voluntary disclosure purely driven by economic incentives 
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could have issues of selective disclosure, delayed disclosure, false disclosure. 
Therefore he consider certain punishment mechanisms need to be built base on 
managers’ fame and law to ensure the quality of voluntarily disclosed 
information.  
 
Liang (2011) conducted a study on China stock market’s regulation mechanisms 
on voluntary disclosure and investors’ education level in relation to voluntary 
disclosure; she found the lack of a “Safe-Harbor” clause and strict punishment 
rules could be the reason behind the lack of voluntary disclosure among Chinese 
firms; she also found that due to the fact China’s stock market is still young 
compare to the west, individual investors lack education and experience, thus 
may not be able to make reasonable decision compare to investors in countries 
had a stock market for decades, this made the firms cautious about what they 
disclose. 
 
The theoretical Chinese studies on voluntary disclosure are mainly based on 
previous international studies. These studies recognize the importance of 
voluntary disclosure from a theoretical perspective, and they analyzed some 
flaws of China’s corporate voluntary disclosure system. However, most of these 
studies pin certain failures of Chinese corporate voluntary disclosure system like 
selective disclosure or disclosure deficiency on the young age of Chinese 
corporate disclosure system. They didn’t examine certain fundamental reasons; 
for example, the regulators of corporate voluntary disclosure activities are also 
the owners of certain corporation which create great conflict of interest. This 
study seeks to fill this gap in the literature. 
Table 2: Summary of Theoretical Chinese studies undertaken on voluntary 
disclosure 
Authors Year Purpose Finding/Recommendation 
Li and He 2002 To explore possible 
economical explanations for 
voluntary disclosure behavior, 
the motives of voluntary 
disclosure and why it could be 
China should encourage 
corporations to voluntarily 
disclose information, and 
“relevant regulatory agencies” 
should put more effort into 
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difficult to voluntarily 
disclosure information 
monitoring and auditing of 
voluntary disclosure 
information. They also 
recommend guidance should be 
given to corporations about 
voluntary disclosure.  
 
He 2003 To the evolution of information 
disclosure, the properties of 
voluntary disclosure, the effect 
of voluntary disclosure 
Concluded Chinese listed 
companies should plan for 
voluntary disclosure and 
monitoring agencies should 
have certain schemes in 
regulations and laws to 
encourage and protect voluntary 
disclosure 
Chen 2004 To discuss mandatory and 
voluntary disclosure of 
accounting information from 
an economic perspective 
Concluded that that mandatory 
and voluntary disclosure should 
supplement of each other and 
there needs to be a balance point 
between the two 
Wang 2005 Reviewed international studies 
and discussed that voluntary 
disclosure purely driven by 
economic incentives 
Consider certain punishment 
mechanisms need to be built 
base on managers’ fame and law 
to ensure the quality of 
voluntarily disclosed 
information 
Liang 2011 Analyze China stock market’s 
regulation mechanisms on 
voluntary disclosure and 
investors’ education level in 
relation to voluntary disclosure 
Lack of a “Safe-Harbor” clause, 
strict punishment rules and 
insufficient investor education 
could be the reasons behind the 
lack of voluntary disclosure 
among Chinese firms;  
 
2.2.2 Empirical Chinese Studies on Voluntary Disclosure 
Qiao (2003) analyzed the 2001 annual reports of Chinese listed companies. He 
constructed a model for listed companies voluntary disclosure in annual report 
and had the following empirical findings: Chinese companies’ voluntary 
disclosure level is not related to company size; the disclosure level is positively 
related to the company’s ability to generate profit; companies listed both in 
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China and overseas tend to voluntarily disclose more information due to tighter 
regulations and these firms want to build a good image for Chinese companies. 
His general findings also indicate that the overall level of voluntary disclosure 
among Chinese companies is low and the quality is poor.  
 
Wang and Jiang (2004) selected 516 companies first listed in Shanghai Stock 
Exchange before 2002 as sample and after controlling company size and 
financial risks, they found voluntary disclosure would lead to reduction in cost 
of equity capital. Li et al (2004) selected 117 companies listed in the A shares as 
sample, analyzed their 2002 annual reports and found voluntary disclosure level 
is not significantly related to the number of independent directors but is 
significantly relate to the size of the company. Zhang et al (2005) first 
constructed a voluntary disclosure index for Chinese listed companies and used 
this index to analyze the credibility of voluntary disclosure made by Chinese 
listed companies during 1998-2003 period. Their results indicate: Chinese 
companies voluntary disclosure level had been increasing; bigger and more 
profitable companies tend to voluntarily disclose more information; corporate 
governance factors are not strong explanatory variables for voluntary disclosure 
level of Chinese companies; companies also listed in foreign countries disclose 
more compare to ones only listed in China. Wang and Yuan (2006) selected 524 
companies listed on ShenZhen Stock Exchange as sample and found the 
voluntary disclosure of “future managerial plans” is significantly related profit 
generating ability and publish time of annual reports, but not significantly relate 
to company size and market competition. Fan (2006) selected 176 firms listed 
on ShenZhen Stock Exchange as sample, analyzed their 2004 data. He analyzed 
the impact of company size, financial leverage, management stock 
compensation schemes, profitability and auditing fees on voluntary disclosure 
level of Chinese companies. His findings indicate Chinese listed companies lack 
both internal and external motivation to voluntarily disclose information. Yu and 
Zhang (2007) empirically analyzed the relationship between the quality of 
 26 
  
voluntary disclosure made by Chinese listed companies and borrowing cost. 
Their findings indicate the two are negatively related, also the greater market 
risk is, the more significant the two are related.  
 
A study by Wang et al (2008) used dataset contains 110 public listed companies 
offer both A and B shares in China found no evidence suggesting companies 
benefit from voluntary disclosure increase in the form of equity/debt capital cost 
reduction. This finding was refined and broadened in the latest study of Lan, 
Wang and Zhang (2013), the authors sampled 1066 Chinese firms listed on 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock exchange which represent 80% of all public listed 
companies in China. They found certain evidence that differs from previous 
studies. First, they found company size, leverage, asset-in-place, ROE and 
ownership diffusion are positively related to voluntary disclosure level; however, 
they found increase in voluntary disclosure does not lead to less cost of equity 
capital and auditor type is negatively relate to voluntary disclosure.  
 
Table 3]: Summary of empirical Chinese studies undertaken on Voluntary 
Disclosure 





To investigate the 
relation between 
Voluntary Disclosure 






Chinese companies’ voluntary disclosure level is not related to 
company size; the disclosure level is positively related to the 
company’s ability to generate profit; companies listed both in 
China and overseas tend to voluntarily disclose more information 
due to tighter regulations and these firms want to build a good 
image for Chinese companies. His general findings also indicate 
that the overall level of voluntary disclosure among Chinese 
companies is low and the quality is poor. 
Wang 
and Jiang 
To investigate if 
voluntary disclosure 
lead to reduction of 
cost of equity capital 





voluntary disclosure would lead to reduction in cost of equity 
capital 
Li et al 






voluntary disclosure level is not significantly related to the 
number of independent directors but is significantly relate to the 
size of the company 
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To construct a VDI 
for Chinese listed 










Chinese companies voluntary disclosure level had been 
increasing; bigger and more profitable companies tend to 
voluntarily disclose more information; corporate governance 
factors are not strong explanatory variables for voluntary 
disclosure level of Chinese companies; companies also listed in 




To investigate the 
relation between 
Voluntary Disclosure 






voluntary disclosure of “future managerial plans” is significantly 
related profit generating ability and publish time of annual reports, 
but not significantly relate to company size and market 
competition 
Fan 
To investigate the 
relation between 
Voluntary Disclosure 






Chinese listed companies lack both internal and external 
motivation to voluntarily disclose information 
Yu and 
Zhang 
To investigate the 
relation between 
Voluntary Disclosure 






Quality of voluntary disclosure made by Chinese listed companies 
and borrowing cost are negatively related 
Wang et 
al 






found no evidence suggesting companies benefit from voluntary 






To investigate the 
relation between 
Voluntary Disclosure 







Company size, leverage, asset-in-place, ROE and ownership 
diffusion are positively related to voluntary disclosure level; 
increase in voluntary disclosure does not lead to less cost of equity 






2.3 Chapter Summary 
This chapter is divided into two main parts, international studies and Chinese 
studies. As for international study part, it breaks down further into seven sectors: 
theory for voluntary disclosure; what drives voluntary disclosure; what stops 
voluntary disclosure; content of voluntary disclosure; quality of voluntary 
disclosure; factors affect the extent of voluntary disclosure and economic 
consequences of voluntary disclosure. The three theories reviewed are agency 
theory, legitimacy theory and institutional theory; these three theories will be 
used to guide this study. There are four possible forces that drive managers’ 
decision to voluntarily disclosure information. The first one is capital market 
transactions; the second one is contests over corporate control; the third is stock 
compensation; the fourth is litigation cost. There appear to be two factors that 
stop managers from voluntarily disclosing information: disclosure costs and 
uncertain investor response. The review on the content of voluntary disclosure 
indicate a need to use content analysis method to construct a voluntary 
disclosure check list for this study and “core competency” should be an 
important information type. As for the quality of voluntary disclosure, majority 
of studies reviewed give a numerical score to various disclosure items to derive 
a final score to measure disclosure quality, but some researchers have adopted 
natural language processing methods to measure the quality of disclosures. 
There are many factors found to have an effect on the extent of voluntary 
disclosure: company size, financial leverage, listing condition, industry type, 
capital structure and the disclosure choice of other companies. There appears to 
be three major economic consequences of voluntary disclosure: improved stock 
liquidity; reduced cost of capital; increase of information intermediation.  
 
As for the Chinese studies conducted by Chinese scholars, it would appear many 
Chinese studies focused on factors affecting the extent of voluntary disclosure 
(Qiao, 2003; Wang, 2004; Li et al, 2004; Zhang et al, 2005: Wang and Yuan, 
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2006; Fan, 2006). Many of the Chinese studies are purely theoretical and 
basically just a summary of previous international studies. Some constructed 
models and voluntary disclosure index applicable only to Chinese companies, 
but many of these studies are very closely modeled on results found in other 
international studies. For example, Zhang etl al (2007) built the voluntary 
disclosure index very closely based on Botosan (1997); Fan (2006) simply 
divided voluntary disclose information into strategic information, non-financial 
information and financial information, which is very similar to the work done by 
Cooke (1992) and Botosan (1997). This presented a problem: though there had 
been ample amount of studies done internationally about the motives, affecting 
factors and economic consequences of voluntary disclosure, but these studies are 
based on a market and system very different from China’s; thus, some findings, 




Chapter Three: Setting the Research Scene 
The expansion of the Chinese stock market in such a short period of time14 
under unique institutional/social environment presents several issues which must 
be examined in order to gain an appropriate understanding about voluntary 
disclosure activities of publicly listed Chinese companies. This chapter 
examines such issues and sets the research scene of this study. 
 
This chapter first gives a brief review of the history of Chinese listed companies’ 
information disclosure system. Secondly, it reviews several unique problems of 
this system and discuss how it might impact voluntary disclosure. Third, this 
chapter discusses a significant part of Chinese economy and of the sample of 
this study, the State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). This third part will give SOE a 
defining boundary, demonstrate its significance and discuss the way these SOEs 
are managed affect voluntary disclosure activities of these SOEs. Fourth, this 
chapter argues Chinese individual investors’ education may not be sufficient and 
Chinese individual investors may prefer certain information over other. Overall, 
this chapter attempts to capture certain unique situations China has that might 
affect Chinese listed companies’ voluntary disclosure activities. 
3.1 Chinese Listed Company VID System 
3.1.1 A Brief History of Chinese Listed Company Information Disclosure System 
In 1993, China Security Regulatory Committee (CSRC) issued Publicly Listed 
Company Information Disclosure—Format and Content, the difference between 
mandatory disclosure and voluntary disclosure began to surface for Chinese 
companies from a regulation perspective. In 1995, the CSRC further issued 
Notice about Strengthen Information Disclosure through Company Law. By the 
                                                             
14 Comparing to the first stock exchange set up in Amsterdam in 1680 
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1st of July 1999, the Securities’ Law of People’s Republic of China finally came, 
besides giving the security market an independent layer of legislation, it also 
established punishment mechanisms for personnel that caused harm to 
individuals, institutions and market by means of information disclosure for the 
first time. When it got to just before 2000, information disclosure regulation 
became more detailed, made the line between mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure clearer for Chinese listed companies comparing to the 1990-1993 
period. In 2005, the State Council, the supreme government authority issued 
<Improve the Quality of Listed Companies>, the document required information 
disclosed by listed companies to have the following quality: True, Accuracy, 
Integrity and On Time. After that, series of laws, administrative regulation, 
department regulation and self-regulations had been developed, they formed a 
system to regulate listed companies’ disclosure activities, this system can be 
demonstrated as below: 







Source: Drawn by the author after the study of relevant laws and systems 
3.1.2 Regulators and how are they doing their job? 
 As can be observed in Figure [1], the preparation of accounting information, 
the governance of companies, the issue of securities and the auditing process are 
governed by their own laws. These laws are then referred to in specific 
disclosure regulations. However, despite these laws are in position, they do not 
offer much of help to individual investors. There had been only one successful 
civil lawsuit over false/misleading financial information during the first decade 
Accounting Law Company Law Security Law Auditing Law 
Enterprise Accounting 
Regulation 





Local Stock Exchange 
Listing Rules 
Publicly Listed Companies 
Information Disclosure Regulation 
CSRC and Local Stock Exchange’s 
regulation on Information Disclosure 
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of the Chinese stock market (Chen et al, 2005). In China, it is virtually 
impossible to have class action lawsuits, thus for individual investors to bring a 
lawsuit against a listed company is costly and such actions would not have a 
high chance of success (Chen et al, 2005). The questions are: who can offer 
investors protection and who is in the best place to do so? It is suggested by 
some scholars that in such situation where the markets are still merging and 
legal system is weak, regulators are effective substitute for weak legal 
enforcements.  
 
The CSRC issues regulations and provides guidance on the format and content 
of information disclosure made by listed companies through various 
documents15, the use of “but not limit to” in these CSRC regulations give 
freedom to voluntary disclosure; the two stock exchanges would publish 
“guiding opinions” that suggest companies should, may, or can voluntarily 
disclosure only certain information in some possible forms. How listed 
companies get monitored and receive guidance for their voluntary disclosure 
through regulators can be demonstrated as below: 









Source: Drawn by author after relevant study 
 
The first and the fundamental purpose of China’s corporate disclosure 
                                                             
15 For detail on these regulations, please go to Appendix [1] 
The State Council, CSRC, Trade Commission: Companies should actively and timely disclose 
any information could materialistically influence decisions made by shareholders and other 
investors and make sure all shareholders have an equal chance of gaining such information 
The overall guiding 
spirit for voluntary 
disclosure of listed 
companies 
The CSRC monitors voluntary disclosures and suggest the format and content of 
various company reports, like annual report 
The local stock exchanges publish guiding opinions give directions 
for voluntary disclosure 
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framework put forward by the CSRC in 1996 was to “improve stock market 
efficiency and offer protection for investors’ interests” (CSRC, 1996). As for the 
content of annual reports, <Standards for the Content and Format of Information 
Disclosure by Companies that Offer Securities to the Public No. 2 - The 
Contents and Formats of Annual Report (Revised in 2012)> (Standards 2) is the 
official regulatory document from CSRC, this document has been amended in 
1998, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2004, 2007 and latest in 2012. There has been several 
major historic developments in these amendments. First of all, the independent 
role of accountants and auditors has been strengthened. Second, commercial 
banks, security trading company, insurance companies have additional 
disclosure regulations attached. Third, heavy pollution industries need to 
disclose environmental rule violations and major environmental damage. Fourth, 
earning distribution information had been explicitly required; usage plan of 
undistributed dividends needs to be issued to the shareholders. Overall, it would 
appear the CSRC had been strongly and constantly suggesting companies to 
voluntarily disclose information relevant to investment decisions: 
“The information required by these documents are barely of minimum 
standards, any information may materialistically impact the investors’ economic 
decision making shall be disclosed no matter if such information is required by 
these documents” (Evident in all Standards 2 official final versions including 
1993, 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2012 and in all temporal drafts) 
“Companies shall voluntarily and timely disclose information that may 
materialistically affect shareholders/stakeholders in addition to mandatory 
disclosure effort, and they shall make sure all shareholders/stakeholders have 
equal access to such information” (Corporate Governance for Listed Companies, 
2001) 
 
Corporate governance has been specially strengthened by the issue of 
<Corporate Governance for Listed Companies> from CSRC, extra guiding 
opinions regard to independent directors were issued in 2001. And as Tomasic 
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and Andrews (2007) suggested, establishment of independent directors 
contribute in a positive way to the credibility of information disclosed by 
corporations.  
 
From 2001 onward, according to People’s Daily, CSRC issues about 20 policies 
each year (People’s Daily, 2005). CSRC “declared” its vertical power over 
regional supervisory panels and institutions of the stock market and claimed its 
major responsibilities are to supervise stock market. According to the news, 
companies that don’t provide the stock market with adequate and transparent 
information on time will face serious penalties from the CSRC (People’s Daily, 
2005). Problems, however still exist. The author will discuss the problems 
below. 
3.1.3 Problems with the monitoring and guidance system 
Problems still exist, the first being that despite that the fact that the CSRC 
claimed its responsibilities were to “monitor, supervise and guide” in various 
CSRC documents regard to information disclosure As in November 2013, Xiao 
Gang, the new head of the CSRC publicly made the following statement16: 
“ We must transform from someone who examine and give approvals to 
someone truly monitor and supervise.” 
 
This statement appears to indicate that the CSRC does not have the supreme 
authority in legislation and legal enforcement regarding information disclosure, 
CSRC simplely examines the information supplied to them and give approval. 
Should a disclosure related case arise, it has to pass through multiple authorities: 
local stock exchange, CSRC, the courts and possibly the State Owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) if the situation involves 
a major SOE. Also, the legal enforcement lies within the criminal law. Resulting 
in extremely low regulation efficiency. In Zhang (2007), the author found it 




takes an average of 729.1 days, maximum of 4094 days for punishment to be 
actually executed. That means it would take an average of two years to proceed 
from initial establishment of a disclosure case to punishment in a disclosure case 
in Chinese stock market; this is supported by Peking University Financial Law 
Research Centre (2006). This could seriously compromise the effectiveness of 
investigation and punishment.  
 
The second problem is the degree of punishment. The CSRC does not have the 
legal authority to punish disclosure violations by means of financial or 
imprisonment. By the year end of 2006, around 65% of all punishments on listed 
companies made during 1994-2006 period fell into the disclosure category17; 
and around 33% of these punishments were “public censure”, and 15% were 
administrative punishment. The power to punish those who damage the interests 
of shareholders/investors and those who hurt the market by means of disclosure 
violation is with the <Criminal Law of People’s Republic of China>. It is stated 
that listed companies that seriously damaged shareholders and other related 
parties’ interests by means of falsification of accounting information or hiding 
significant information or fail to disclose vital information as regulated shall be 
punished. These punishments are carried out against directly responsible 
personnel, they include: No more than 3 years in prison and or fine between 
20,000~200,000 RMB. The degree of punishment is severely low: only direct 
personnel will be punished, this means they can only target a small amount of 
people and usually these cases don’t just involve that few; 200,000 RMB and 3 
year in prison is seriously not enough. If one is to compare how Shell got 
punished for inaccurately reporting of their oil reserve, the Chinese punishments 
are nothing.  
 
The disclosure monitoring system Chinese listed companies need to face is 
confusing for them, the CSRC claimed authority but may be not be able to 
                                                             
17 Data obtained and processes by using the CSRC and SSE data, retrievable from their websites 
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execute regulating power in some circumstance and the two stock exchange and 
CSRC issue separate guiding opinions; the investigation for disclosure activities 
that harmed interested parties is seriously inefficient and the punishment is 
insignificant. Therefore, companies may not have clear and useful guidance on 
voluntary disclosure. And due to low investigation efficiency and low degree of 
punishment, some companies may find it easy to use information disclosure to 
benefit only their own interests, this could damage investors’ faith in quality of 
information disclosed by companies, this could affect companies’ voluntary 
disclosure activities. 
 
More problems are caused by regulations and guiding opinions, the documents 
themselves. Besides those guiding opinions issued by the local stock exchange, 
there is no official guiding or regulating document just for voluntary disclosure 
from the CSRC, not even the slightest hint about how to do it. The < Standards 
for the Content and Format of Information Disclosure by Companies that Offer 
Securities to the Public> No1 to No 6 issued by the CSRC simply just leave 
space for voluntary disclosure by using “but not limit to” and state that 
“Information required by these documents are barely of minimum standards, any 
information may materialistically impact the investors shall be disclosed”, they 
offer no guidance at all. Plus the wording in these six documents is punishingly 
confusing in certain area: 
“Article 22(2) The company Shall disclose the strategic development plan 
of the company. The company Shall do so by disclosing industry barrier, core 
technology…” 
“”Article 9 Within four months from the end of every financial year, the 
company shall publish its full annual reports on the website/websites designated 
by the CSRC… 
 
These two articles are taken from the No.2 of those Standards, the one regulate 
the format and notice the two set of information are both connected to the word 
 37 
  
“Shall”. The first one is considered by many as voluntary disclosure (Meek et al, 
1995, Botosan, 1997, Long, 2008; Gao et al, 2010) and would be difficult to 
disclose as discussed in previous chapter due to proprietary costs and other 
issues; the second one is reasonable enough to be considered as a blunt simple 
instruction. In english, the word “shall” has the specific use of expressing an 
order or instruction, it does not have a weak suggestive nature; yet still in the 
english version of these documents they are used on every disclosure item18; but 
how can they possibly be ordered to disclose their core technology? And in 
empirical evidence perspective, after examination of 250 annual reports, the 
author found some would disclose their strategic development plan (CNPC 
annual report 2010), some would not (KwaiCho MaoTai Co Ltd, 2012). This 
happened not because the Chinese mind interpret the world shall differently, it is 
because in the Chinese version the word that “Shall” was translated from is 
“Ying-Dang(应当)”, the most common translation into English for this is 
“should”; and in the mind of Chinese legal professionals, this word19: 
1. Take into account the legislator’s subjective opinion, is rather a general 
requirement 
2. It represents weak responsibility 
3. Comparing to the word “must”, the use of word “Ying-Dang” is of guiding 
nature.  
4. Ying Dang indicates “conditional responsibility”, which means the execution 
of such responsibilities are conditional and subject to interpretation 
5. Responsibilities associate with Ying Dang sometimes carry no corresponding 
legal consequences. 
 
Even the word “Ying-Dang” was translated into “shall”, to the Chinese manager 
who use that document, the word does not carry the same weight as “shall”. And 
certainly to legal professionals, the world does not mean the same thing “shall 
“means. So basically, all six< Standards for the Content and Format of 
                                                             
18 This is an accurate description after the author read the whole document 
19 Legal Logic and Regulation Logic, Jin, 2010, <China Legal Study> 
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Information Disclosure by Companies that Offer Securities to the Public> are of 
guiding nature based on wording, common understanding and legal logic. Of 
course this would be absurd, because they would have certain basic 
requirements, such as the language, numericals; this creates major confusion for 
the readers and users of these documents. The confusion just discussed may 
further weaken guidance Chinese listed companies receive. 
 
With all these ambiguity though, one particular disclosure item is monitored 
tightly by the CSRC with detailed regulation, that is forecasting information 
especially profit forecasting 20 . The US is also quite strict on forecasting 
information, but they have the “safe harbor rule” from SEC designed to limit or 
eliminate liability as long as good faith is demonstrated. This provides 
protection for forecasting information. Such encouragement does not exist in the 
Chinese stock market but the monitoring is tight for voluntary forecasting 
information, especially profit forecasting.  
 
The last problem is that despite the State Council, Trade Commission and CSRC 
all demand companies actively and timely disclose any information could 
materialistically influence decisions made by shareholders and other investors 
and make sure all shareholders have an equal chance of gaining such 
information, there is no specific “fair disclosure” clause. The Securities Law 
forbids insider trading activities, but selective disclosure does not equal to 
insider trading. This can create loopholes for voluntary disclosure activities in 
legal perspective. 
                                                             
20 In annual reports, if the forecasted profit is 10 % or more lower than actual value, the company must 
detail explain why; if the forecasted profit is 20% or more higher than the actual value, the company must 
detail explain why; if the actual profit is 10%~20% lower than forecasted figure, the company and the 
Charted Accountants they contacted must make an public apology; if the actual profit is 20% or more than 
20% lower than the forecasted figure, the CSRC will investigate and should there be false forecasting or 
forecasting with the intention to mislead investors, punishments will follow 
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3.2 The State Own Enterprises (SOEs) and Ownership Structure 
These SOEs are still significant economic forces in China, and as for the stock 
market, they are some of the biggest players in the stock market21. There are 
many things unique and interesting about SOEs, but for the purpose of this study, 
focus will be placed only on:  
1. Definition of SOE 
2. Influence of government on SOEs and 
3. The reward systems in SOEs 
3.2.1 Definition of SOE 
The official definition for Chinese SOEs from the Chinese government is simple: 
enterprises wholly owned by the state (Chinese National Bureau of Statistics, 
2002). In the official Chinese statistics, SOEs only include wholly stated funded 
companies; companies that have majority of their shares owned by government 
are excluded from this definition. However, the author thinks that since China 
has joined the World Trade Organization and taking up an important role in 
global economy, a more internationalized definition should be adopted. In WTO 
(2010), the WTO provided extension for the definition of Chinese SOEs in their 
trade policy review based on the concern of “Controlling influence”. The 
extension is state-Controlled Enterprises (SCEs); the importance of the variation 
is that it extent the substantive coverage of SOEs to those enterprises which: 
    “…the State, or another SOE, holds more than 50% of equity; or, if the 
share of the equity is less than 50%, the State or another SOE has controlling 
influence on its management and operation…” 
 
However, it is unfortunate that the World Trade Organization (WTO) did not 
define what exactly this “controlling influence” is, nor did they give a clear set 
of conditions to identify such influence. Luckily, after the author reviewed 250 
                                                             
21 Please refer to Appendix [2] for a brief review on the influential power of SOEs in China 
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annual reports during the 2008-2012 period, the term “Actual Controlling Party 
(Shi Ji Kong Zhi Ren-实际控制人)” was found in every report. This term 
appears to resemble the spirit of the WTO term “controlling influence”, for 
example: 
“The company’s controlling shareholder Kweichow Moutai Co., Ltd is a 
company controlled by Kweichow Provincial SASAC” (Kweichow Moutai22 
Joint Stock Company, Annual report 2010, pg 7) 
 
And usually a flowchart demonstrates the shareholding and controlling structure 
would follow such statement, for example: 
Figure 3 Controlling Structure of an SOE 
Source: Kweichow Moutai JSC 
annual report 2010 
There are two general types of SOEs if one is to classify them by who the 
controlling party is, the ones owned by central government and the ones owned 
by local governments. The departments or agents manage the centrally 
controlled SOEs include the State Owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC); China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC); China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC); China 
Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC); and they are monitored/regulated 
also by Ministry of Science and Technology, Ministry of Commerce and many 
others ministries one for each industry type. The local SOEs report to their 
central equivalents, these “entangled” relationships are best demonstrated by the 
following figure: 
 
                                                             
22 This company ranks 11 in terms of market capitalization by year end 2010 among all firms listed on 
Shanghai Stock Exchange, it is one of the sample firm) 
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Source: Drawn by the author after relevant study 
 
To a different/western view point, it is best to see them as similar to holding 
companies: they hold the SOEs’ shares which were held directly by the state 
before. After reading the National Statistics23, the author identified roughly24 
320 SASACs, around about 30 of these are provincial SASACs. And combining 
figure [3] and figure [4] we can see the SOEs are tightly controlled by the 
central government through two layers of controlling mechanisms, the central 
SASACs and the local government is one layer and the local SASACs is the 
other layers. It is also important to keep in mind that even it is similar to holding 
companies regarding to controlling function, but the people who operate 
SASACs are government employees, they are not like employees in a private 
firm. Also, it should be noted: 
1. That the local SASACs, the ones who have direct control over the local 
SOEs are controlled by two different government agencies.  
2. This may create inefficiency in regulation, management and monitoring. 
3. However they all appear to be under the central government’s control.  
 
                                                             
23 Data obtained from National Bureau of Statistics website 2010 data 
24 The amount of data was vast and I could missed some due to this was a single man effort. 
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In short, SOEs are business entities established and actually controlled by the 
government; and they have a complex, possibly overlapping and confusing 
governance system. In voluntary disclosure context, this system create chaotic 
institutional environment; even these SOEs essentially answers to the central 
government, orders or guidance passed down from the central government will 
have to go through this chaotic environment and maybe seriously distorted. This 
could eventually lead to chaotic disclosure behaviour. As previously discussed, 
the disclosure regulation environment for all Chinese listed companies are not so 
strong, from an institutional theory perspective, Chinese companies may try to 
look for “guidance” on disclosure activities from other companies more than 
regulatory bodies and laws. And since these SOEs are some of the biggest 
players in the market, other companies look up to them, this could further distort 
voluntary disclosure activities of Chinese listed companies. 
3.2.2 The leaders of SOEs answer to what or who? 
The leaders of SOEs are monitored and evaluated by the SASAC and the 
SASAC do so on behalf of the state council; for the top SOEs (like China 
National Petroleum Corporation), the one decide their fate is the COD, the 
CCP’s human resource department. Should there be a conflict of interests 
between non-state shareholders and state interests, it is most likely the leaders of 
SOEs will chose the state. Their whole career path and financial rewards 
depends on how tight and well they follow the central government after all.  
Individual Investors’ Education 
An issue with institutions that invest in Chinese stock market is primarily the 
absence of fair disclosure regime, they may acquire information earlier than 
individual investors or they may acquire information individual investors can 
not get; but in terms of perception, the ones making decisions are still 
individuals, even though as an organization they might not share some cognition 
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errors or judgment errors individuals may have. Individual investors are also 
much vulnerable than institutional investors when facing risks and inappropriate 
disclosure behavior. Also, according to statistics released by the SSE, during 
2007, individual investors hold 60% of the shares circulating in ShangHai Stock 
Exchange25. Thus it is important to understand how they were educated to act in 
stock market because information intake affect behaviors. 
 
Ever since the establishment of the two stock exchanges, individual investor 
education had been an important task for the government; by 2001, CSRC 
started to officially oversee this sector. However, the CSRC lacked the funding 
to operate these education facilities nationwide, thus some of the effort was take 
up by security trading institutions. So now there are two main types of 
individual investor education facilities in terms of who is the host: the CSRC 
host lessons at trading offices across the nation and investors schools founded 
and ran by security trading institutions/companies. After review the courses and 
course materials from both types26, the author found two issues: order and time. 
 
It is in this author’s opinion that for one to trade on stock market, one should 
first gain basic economic knowledge, learn market condition, learn risks, 
establish one’s own investment concept and know him/herself by legal measure. 
Then one learns how to analyze fluctuations, predict movement and make 
trading decisions. However, the education offered to investors came in just the 
reverse order, risk and investment concept came in last. And it is not just what is 
                                                             
25 According to <Analyze of Chinese Stock Market Investors’ Surveys>, a study conducted by China 
Securities Association published in 2007: retired, unemployed and self-employed people takes up 35% of 
the survey population; percentage of individual investors with high school (please note, Chinese high 
school is the equivalent to Year 11~13 period in New Zealand high school) qualifications or lower is 43%; 
70% of the surveyed individual investors earn less 5000 RMB a month, that is around 800 NZD, 5000 RMB 
at 2008 would not qualify as high income. These are dangerous signs: a lot of individual investors are 
perhaps not educated enough to interpret information disclosed by companies with sufficiency or reasons; 
a lot of them do not earn much from income generating activities other than stock trading, this makes 
them rely on it and because they possibly rely on stock trading for basic income to sustain their life, they 
could be very skeptical or have a gambling mindset. The skeptical and/or gambling mindset individual 
investors have is evident in two cases, the Hangxiao Steel Frame case and the Changjiu Bio-Chemical Case. 
The detail of these two cases can be found in Appendix [3]. 
 
26 Course materials are selected from what the schools put on the internet, the author also watched 10 
educational videos and class recordings. 
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taught first seems reverse, what gets taught more also seems unbalanced. How 
to read price fluctuations on site and gain profit in short term weighs more than 
everything else. 
Chapter Summary 
As reviewed in this chapter, Chinese stock market disclosure regulation system 
has improved since its establishment, but it still has many flaws. These include: 
over complex, inefficient and un-independent regulatory system; insufficient 
investor protection mechanisms; insufficient punishment mechanisms; unclear 
wording and legal logic in regulatory documents; absence of “safe harbor” 
protection mechanisms; absence of “fair disclosure” clause. This chaotic 
environment could lead to irregular voluntary disclosure patterns and serious 
discourage voluntary disclosure. 
 
The SOEs have great influence over voluntary disclosure activities of Chinese 
listed companies as well as they have influence over the stock market itself. 
However, SOEs’ voluntary disclosure choices are affected by a confusing 
governance system and the leaders answers to the central government directly. 
The only certain thing these SOEs and SOEs’ leaders can follow are instructions 
flow down from the central government. However, as far as it is known, the 
Chinese central government rarely did issue and is not responsible for issuing 
clear guidance for voluntary disclosure. To summarize, these SOEs make their 
disclosure decisions based on their own understasndings of the central 
government’s “spirit”. Therefore, the voluntary disclosure pattern of these SOEs 
could be chaotic; and because other companies are quite likely to mimetic them, 
Chinese listed companies’ voluntary disclosure activities could be chaotic. 
 
As for agency theory, an important question is: who is the real principal? After 
reviewing the governance structure of SOEs, it is inevitable to conclude that 
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these SOE leaders respond to the government rather than the classical 
shareholder concept in the agency theory. This creates two problems. First, SOE 
leaders will try to meet government expectations; however, due to the 
complicated political structure, such expectations may not be funneled to the 
SOE leaders accurately enough, nor the author suspect there will be unity in 
understanding those expectations. This could affect SOE leaders’ choices of 
voluntary disclosure.  
 
Companies disclose information to maintain legitimacy, but do SOEs need to do 
this? They are controlled by the government and as the government is 
determined to maintain control over certain industry sectors, they will certainly 
not allow these SOEs to fall nor will the government allow SOEs to be 
perceived as “not legit”. If it is the government that will do this for the SOEs, 
what is the incentive for the SOE to disclose information relate to legitimacy? 




Chapter Four: Development of Analytical Framework 
This chapter seeks to develop an analytical framework for this study. This 
analytical framework draws from the three theories 
(agency/legitimacy/institutional) reviewed in chapter two and the findings in 
chapter three. The framework provides assistance towards understanding of 
Chinese listed companies’ voluntary disclosure behavior; it also provides 
structure for analysis of changes in voluntary disclosure level of top 50 Chinese 
companies listed on Shanghai Stock Exchange. The framework is depicted as 
follow: 
















Source: Drawn by the author 
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4.1 Legitimacy Theory Factors 
4.1.1 Social Responsibilities and Sustainable Development 
China’s economy has been booming, however in some aspects27 it have not 
been doing for the best of its people. The Gini coefficient (GINI), a statistical 
measure tends to capture the income distribution gap among a nation’s residents 
had not been looking good for China for past few years. According to the World 
Bank data, China’s GINI of 2005 was 0.425, 2008 this figure became 0.426, it 
dropped to 0.421 in 200928. According to China’s official government data 
released in 2013 after 13 years of silence on this matter, this figure had been: 
0.491 for year 2008, 0.49 for year 2009, 0.481 for year 2010, 0.477 for year 
2011 and 0.474 for year 2012. Despite these two sets of data are different in 
numbers, they are all above the 0.4 threshold. There had been media reports of 
increasing income or wealth gap in China29. This degree of social inequality is 
causing a lot of social anger against the wealthy people in general population; 
one of the top reasons causing this inequality as the mass population believe is 
corruption, a few people accumulate wealth just for their own interest. The top 
50 companies that have a lot of the wealth accumulated may want to 
demonstrate to the society that they are giving something back by voluntarily 
disclosing they help to improve communities’ well-being. This could specially 
be important to these top Chinese companies as a lot of them are SOEs, 
enterprises owned by government; their contribution to society besides fulfilling 
basic economic target can serve as a mean to improve government image and 
ease the social anger. 
 
                                                             
27 Not limit to these aspects 
28 From World Bank website: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI, data beyond 2009 was not 
available. 
29 For a list of these exposures: http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/zhuanti/249739.htm; 
http://money.hexun.com/2009-06-26/119035123.html; 
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2010-09-14/013121094611.shtml; 
http://www.ce.cn/macro/more/201212/10/t20121210_23922300.shtml. These are some of the credible 
news or analysts wetbsites. 
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Another consequence of rapid economic development besides wealth gap is 
pollution. From a policy perspective, the State Council issued series of notices 
about pollution control, the latest one was issued in September 201330, and these 
environmental protocols are to be carried out across the nation, even the 
financial service industry had been either given the order or strongly suggested 
to give low pollution enterprises priority regard to funding. From a people’s 
perspective, media exposure of environmental issues has been rising. And 
ironically enough just one month after the State Council’s air pollution notice, 
the Harbin Smog incident happened, raised public concern about environment 
issues even more31. There had also been rising concerns about product safety in 
China, from the milk powder scandals to medicines that kill, from exploding 
watermelons caused by chemical usage32 to the use of “Gutter Oil”33, China’s 
industries had been experiencing product safety and quality crisis (Liu, 2009). 
The service industries did not have these safety or quality issues, but the State 
Council still issued official documents with the purpose of promoting service 
equality (State Council-Guiding Opinions about accelerating the development of 
service industry, 200734).  
4.2 Institutional Theory Factors 
This section draws upon the review of institutional theory literature in chapter 
two and the background information about Chinese stock market regulation 
reviewed in chapter three. Institutional theory considers how organizations are 
affected by forces beyond their control; the institutional environment plays a key 
role in shaping organizational behavior. Since CSRC had been constantly and 
strongly suggest companies to disclose information and to assume the CSRC has 
over-riding power over the Chinese stock market, this regulatory agent would 
                                                             
30 http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2013-09/12/content_2486773.htm 
31 http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90882/8433264.html, people’s daily is the official government 
newspaper, considered by Chinese as the voice of the government 
32 http://news.sohu.com/20110513/n307419550.shtml 




have created coercive pressure in forms of corporate governance regime and 
regulation enforcement. As for resource dependency, it would appear this 
dependency is reflected in three main aspects: Temporary Halt of Listing, 
De-Listing decisions, and IPO processing (CSRC 2009; CSRC 2013). Therefore, 
it is safe to consider the Chinese listed companies will respond to these 
institutional pressures in order to remain operational and active in the stock 
market.  
4.3 Agency Theory Factors 
This section drew from the review of agency theory literature in chapter two and 
the background information about SOE governing reviewed in chapter three. In 
the classical agency theory, the agency relationship is between the 
principals---shareholders and the managers. However as reviewed in chapter 
three, in a Chinese SOE context, the principals are not the shareholders in a 
classical sense; the principals or to be more accurate, the dominating principals 
are effectively the state. And by tracing that power chain, the dominating 
principals are effectively the central government. As reviewed, the managers (or 
leaders to be more precise) also have a contract with the government, this 
contract is very strict, and it is related to their benefit and entire career; these 
contracts certainly provide incentives to these leaders and make them share the 
outcome of their actions. However, the monitoring costs here are very tricky, the 
SOE managers do not have to bear the monitoring costs as direct as private 
firms’ managers do, as it is standard procedure for them to be regularly 
monitored and it is the government that dispatches monitoring personnel; 
eventually these monitoring costs link back to the managers, because economic 
value SOEs generate goes to the state and the state pay them their wages with 
these values they generated and possibly with other tax payers’ money. The 
author hypothesize this relationship with the government may put an extra layer 
of pressure on SOE managers and could make them to act more actively to 
 50 
  
regulations and suggestions or initiatives government/regulatory agencies 
propose. 
4.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter developed an analytical framework used to analyze disclosure level 
of some top listed Chinese companies. The three theories reviewed in chapter 
two, namely the agency theory, the institutional theory and the legitimacy theory 
form the main body of this analytical framework. Several issues that need to be 
considered when analyzing disclosure behavior of Chinese listed companies are 
added to this framework so the three classic accounting theories can be 
effectively used to analyze Chinese listed companies. These issues include 
legitimacy theory factors, institutional theory factors and agency theory factors. 
For legitimacy theory, escalating social and environment issues could pressure 
Chinese listed companies to voluntarily disclose more information about social 
responsibilities and environmental efforts. For institutional theory, increasing 
pressure from the CSRC could lead to more voluntary disclosure in certain 
sectors such as corporate governance, core competency and social 
responsibilities; however the confusing institutional environment could decrease 
the effectiveness of these institutional pressures and may cause an irregular 
pattern in disclosure level. For agency theory, it is mainly the principal conflict 
because for some listed Chinese companies the principal is effectively the state; 
this could put an extra layer of pressure on SOE managers and could make them 
to act more actively to regulations and suggestions or initiatives 
government/regulatory agencies propose; however, because the state owns these 
SOEs and at the same time they control the monitoring/regulatory agent-the 
CSRC, this could create a serious conflict of interests due to self-monitoring. 
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Chapter Five: Method 
This work is essentially of empirical nature; this study examines the content of 
the voluntary disclosure of annual reports and as such follows the scientific 
methodology. This study investigates voluntary disclosure of the top 50 listed 
companies by market capitalization that list on ShangHai Stock Exchange 
A-Share sector during 2006-2008 period. Disclosure levels are tested 
longitudinally (across the 5 year period) and horizontally (across different 
industry types), this study also compares the disclosure levels of SOEs and 
private companies across testing period as well. 
5.1 Testing Period and Sample Selection 
5.1.1 Selecting the 2006-2012 Reporting period 
A five year period was selected due to the following reasons. First, the CSRC 
revised Standards 2 in 2007 with some non-minor changes, thus some of the 
findings of previous studies could use an update. Second, the 11th five year plan 
ended in 2010, this provide a good chance to observe the impact of the 
government economic policy changes on voluntary disclosure under China’s 
unique situation, even these changes may be a bit blurry to be put into a detail 
hypothesis. Third, product safety, wealth gap, environmental issues, all these 
social concerns had been increasing in this period, choosing this period would 
provide a good opportunity to see if these top companies are responding to 
public concerns.  
5.1.2 Selecting the Top 50 companies by market capitalization listed on 
ShangHai Stock Exchange A-share sector 
The primary reason for selecting a single stock exchange is because the two 
stock exchanges ShangHai and Shenzhen, issue separate documents about 
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disclosure, despite that these are merely of guiding nature. In order to increase 
comparability between companies’ disclosure levels, a single stock exchange 
was selected. There are primarily two reasons for selecting SSE. First, the total 
market capitalization of the SSE have been greater than that of SZE35. Second, 
besides SSE has more large/mega cap share listed there, nine out of ten of the 
top ten weighted stock of Chinese stock market are also listed there36.  
 
As for selecting the A-share sector, it is because these are the shares traded by 
domestic Chinese, local Chinese investors can not trade B Shares; the A-shares 
is where the majority of Chinese investors concentrate. The reason for using 
market capitalization as selection criterion is simple. Because it is the share 
price times the number of shares outstanding, it may be used as a measuring 
proxy for how the public view a company’s worth, it reflects the equity value of 
a company. The top 50 was selected mainly due to fact in 2012, these 50 
combined market capitalization takes up 60.51% of all listed companies total 
market capitalization, and they are a very significant market influencing sector. 
 
In some previous studies, banks and security trading companies were excluded 
from sample because it was considered: 
 
    “Firms must belong to an industry classification other than banking and 
financial institutions, which are subject to a different accounting system and 
disclosure requirements in China” (Wen et al, 2012, pg 35) 
These two categories were usually not included in the sample (Wen et al, 2012; 
Qiao, 2003; Wang and Jiang, 2004; Fan, 2006; Yu and Zhang, 2007). This study 
does not exclude these companies from the sample due to two reasons. First, 
after examining the “different disclosure requirements” for the above two 
categories, the author found such extra information required does not affect 
                                                             
35 all data retrived from official SSE and SZE websites 
36 According to official SSE and SZE website data 
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comparability37. Second, banks and security trading companies are important 
forces in Chinese stock market. 
 
However, it is worthy to notice disclosure regulations do require banks and 
security trading companies to disclose that they have accounting firms 
evaluating their internal risk control mechanisms. This could lead to extra 
voluntary disclosure of risk management information, the author will test this in 
this study. 
5.1.3 Choosing Annual Reports as source 
There are several reasons for choosing annual reports. First, despite the rapid 
growth of the internet as disclosure media, information that are disclosed on the 
internet is not audited and can be manipulated much easier compare to 
information disclosed in annual reports. Second, as Li and LI (2012) revealed, 
the most important quality of information to Chinese investors is “if this 
information comes from authority”. Third, even though many Chines investors 
go to websites for information, the website they visit the most are official 
websites including the statistics bureau, the stock exchange and the CSRC (Li 
and Li, 2012); and the majority of information disclosed there are in the annual 
report as well because such disclosure on those websites are required by law. 
Fourth, annual reports summarize what half year reports, quarter reports 
disclose. 
5.2 The Content of Voluntary Disclosure 
As previously reviewed in chapter two, a major limitation in voluntary 
disclosure studies is how to decide the content of voluntary disclosure. This 
study chooses to use self-constructed measure for three primary reasons. First, 
there is no official government or professional association built database that 
                                                             
37 Please go to Appendix [4] for details 
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would provide a set of voluntary disclosure items like the AIMR. Second, the 
author found recent Chinese studies on voluntary disclosure mostly did not have 
a set of clear boundaries on the content of voluntary disclosure; they simply 
adopted or referred to previous international studies or how they differentiate 
voluntary disclosure from mandatory disclosure is not sufficient due to changes 
in legal requirements (Qiao, 2003; Wang and Jiang, 2004; Li et al, 2004; Wang 
and Yuan, 2006; Fan, 2006; Liang, 2010; Wang and Zhang, 2013). Three, 
China’s stock market is unique comparing to some western stock markets; 
government control is still tight, many investors are not so sophisticated, legal 
reinforcements are relatively weak and regulations are not strong either. These 
three reasons compelled the author to self-construct a voluntary disclosure index 
(VDI). 
 
However, VDI constructed by previous scholars were still consulted as they 
offer valuable insights; just certain checks need to be passed. First, as discussed 
in introduction, voluntary disclosure is disclosure activity that not required by 
the law; thus, relevant laws and regulations must be examined first to rule out 
mandatory disclosure; the author considered this to be the premise check. 
Second, unlike mandatory disclosure where companies answer to the demand of 
authorities, investors’ needs must be considered when formatting a voluntary 
disclosure index. Voluntary disclosed information should be relative to 
information users’ economic decision making, it is not the more the better; if 
there is too much information, and investors’ decision making process could be 
distorted. Also, the information must be relative to the stock market’s objective 
conditions that may affect the market, such as government intervention, 
investors’ ability to interpret information and social concerns. The author 
considers this is the relativity check. The information disclosed in annual 
reports must first pass the premise check, then the relativity check will further 
determine what will be examined.  
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5.2.1 Premise Check-Excluding Mandatory Disclosure Items 
All latest unconditionally38 enforceable disclosure regulations are checked, any 
information falls under these regulations are not considered voluntary. The 
information required by the<Security Law>, <Company Law>, <Accounting 
Law> and the <Auditing Law>39 are ruled out first due to the mandatory 
nature40  
 
As previously discussed in chapter three; the wording in Standards 2 is 
confusing which makes it hard to determine what is really “mandatory”. The 
following information deemed as “Ying-Dang” to be disclosed by Standards 2 is 
categorized as mandatory. First, disclosure items have association with 
unconditionally enforceable legislation41.  
 
Such associate with unconditionally enforceable legislations with detail 
conditions eliminate the suggestive nature of the word [Ying-Dang], making 
such Articles in Standards 2 no longer indicate a weak responsibility, acting not 
                                                             
38 As reviewed, the CSRC disclosure regulation documents use “conditional enforcement “ from a Chinese 
legal perspective 
39 For a list of what articles govern annual report disclosure in these Laws, please go to Appendix [5] 
40 <Standards for the Content and Format of Information Disclosure by Companies that Offer Securities to 
the Public No. 2 - The Contents and Formats of Annual Report (Revised in 2012)> (Standards 2) issued by 
the CSRC stated: 
 
    “Article 1 With a view to standardizing the annual report preparation and information disclosure of 
the listed companies and protecting the legal interests of the investors, these Standards shall be 
formulated in accordance with the Company Law of the People's Republic of China, the Securities Law of 
the People's Republic of China and other laws and regulations as well as the relevant regulations of the 
China Securities Regulatory Commission (hereinafter referred to as the"CSRC").” 
 
“Article 2 The joint stock limited company/companies (hereinafter referred to as the 
"Company/Companies") that issue shares to the public and are listed on the main board (including small 
and middle enterprise board) of the stock exchanges within the territory of the People's Republic of China 
in accordance with the Company Law of the People's Republic of China and the Securities Law of the 
People's Republic of China shall prepare and disclose their annual reports pursuant to the provisions of 
these Standards.” 
 
41 For example, Article 37 of Standards 2 state: 
“Company [Ying-Dang] disclose any other important events happened during the reporting period in 
accordance with Article 67 of the Securities Law and Article 30 of the Listed Company Information 
Disclosure Regulation…” 





in accordance with such Article will have unconditional legal consequences thus 
is mandatory to the reporters. Also, Articles that have specific quantitative 
requirements are mandatory. A specific quantitative requirement would make the 
Article not subject to interpretation, makes it more of an instruction rather than 
of guiding nature42.  
 
The author tested this setting by reviewing the 250 annual reports across the five 
year period and found that disclosure items in Standards 2 that had specific 
quantitative requirements had been disclosed accordingly. Also, companies 
failed to comply with these articles had been asked to amend their annual reports. 
For example, a company which failed to disclose the [Ying-Dang] content in 
Article 21(4) for their 2012 report has been asked by the ShangHai Stock 
Exchange to amend their annual reports 43  and it did. This supports the 
researcher’s method for deciding what is mandatory. The researcher also tried44 
to review these amendment notices issued by the SSE, by reviewing these 
notices and comparing them to Standards 2 and actual annual report disclosure, 
the author identified what has been considered by the CSRC and SSE as “rather 
suggestive” and what has been considered rather as instructions need to be 
followed unconditionally. By doing so, the author further identify what is 
mandatory disclosure in annual reports of listed Chinese companies according to 
the CSRC standards. 
5.2.2 Relativity Check-Investors’ Needs 
Jiang and He (2008) and Li and Li (2012) both used content analysis method 
and analyzed questions asked by investors about the stock market and listed 
                                                             
42 For example, Article 21(4) on research and development cost: 
    “Company shall[Ying-Dang] disclose and elaborate the purpose, progress and target of R&D projects 
within the reporting period and predict its impact on future company development. The Company shall 
[Ying-Dang] disclose the R&D/Net Asset and R&D/operational revenue ratios, if such ratios fluctuate more 
than 30%, the Company shall [Ying-Dang] disclose reasons for such fluctuation.” 
 
43 The original document can be retrieved from 
http://www.cninfo.com.cn/finalpage/2013-05-31/62539273.PDF 
44 The SSE website only offers a limited amount of archived historic notices, thus I could only try to review 
as many as possible for the 5 year period. 
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companies45 in year 2008 and 2012 respectively. Both studies provide insights46 
regarding to investors’ information needs. The author used the findings of these 
two studies to answer the question “what do the investors want to know?” As for 
government intervention information, investor interpretation capabilities and 
social concerns, they will be briefly discussed along with the final 31 disclosure 
items in the VDI in the following section. 
5.3 Construction of Voluntary Disclosure Checklist 
Disclosure index can be considered as: 
    “A qualitative-based instrument designed to measure a series of 
items which, when scores for the items are aggregated, gives a surrogate score 
indicative of the level of disclosure in the specific context for which the index 
was devised” (Coy, 1995)47 
 
Many previous studies used disclosure index to study various sectors of 
voluntary disclosure in annual reports (Yi and Davey, 2010; Singleton and 
Globerman, 2002; Chau and Gray; Wang and Jiang, 2004; Liang, 2011; Lan, 
Wang and Zhang, 2013). First, a preliminary list of 57 voluntary disclosure 
items were identified based on prior Chinese literature (Zhang et al, 2005; Wang 
and Jiang, 2004; Liang, 2011; Lan, Wang and Zhang, 2013) and Non-Chinese 
literature (Botosan, 1997; Chau and Gray, 2002). Second, these items pass the 





                                                             
45 These questions were asked on two major investor communication websites, they are: 
http://www.cninfo.com.cn/etc/callcenter.html and http://zhidao.hexun.com 
46 Both studies have reasonable sample size and selection, they did not select or random select questions, 
they simply analyzed all questions asked until their data gathering data which were 2008 and 2011 
respectively. The two websites where they gathered data are well respected in China and the author 
considers their research methods (particularly coding) reasonable 
47 Reproduced from Yi and Davey, 2010 
48 The full screen process can be found in Appendix [6] 
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Table 4 : Example of the screening process of disclosure items reviewed in previous 
studies 
General/Overall Corporate Information Removal Re-Categorization 
Corporate History Y-As required by The 
Company Law  
 
Corporate Structure Y-AS required by The 
Company Law 
 
Statement of financial strategy and 
objectives 
 Re-categorized into VD1-Financial Information, under item [Advantage 
and Difficulties] 
Statement of marketing strategy and 
objectives 
 Re-categorized into VD4-Management and Strategy under item 
[Branding] 
Statement of social strategy and 
objectives 
 Re-categorized into VD6-Society and Environment, under item 
[Corporate culture] 
Strategic plan and barriers may 
encounter 
 Re-Categorized into VD 4-Management and Strategy, under any item 
Source: created by author 
 
Further modifications after initial screening process are discussed in section 
5.3.1 to 5.3.6. The final 31 disclosure items are divided into six categories, they 
are: forward looking financial information; human resource; corporate 
governance; management strategy; research and development; society and 
environment. The list is depicted as follow: 
Figure 6 Voluntary Disclosure check list 
 
Source: Drawn by author 
5.3.1 VD1-Forward Looking Financial Information 






































































































VD5-Product and Service Development
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company’s future financial performance; they describe expectation for the future; 
they can be very subjective; some of them have reasonable basis of estimation. 
After the initial screening process discussed previously, current Chinese 
individual investors’ interpretation capabilities was taken into account and ratio 
forecasts were excluded from the list because they could be misleading to 
untrained minds; for example, service-centered industries (software 
development) ROE could hold different meaning comparing to capital intensive 
industry. Two items were added and one item was modified. The two items 
added are: impact of macroeconomics/policy on company future financial 
performance; impact of market risk on future financial performance. These two 
were both frequently asked by investors and the government along with part of 
the market it controls does influence financial performances as discussed 
previously. The item modified was cost forecast; it was modified into 
cost/capital investment forecast to cover wider company future spending and 
capital investment is something also frequently asked by Chinese investors.  
5.3.2 VD2-Human Resource 
The initial list for human resource contained only two items after eliminating 
mandatory items: Training and employee welfare. Then after considering 
government intervention and social concerns, two items were added and one 
item was modified. The item added due to social concerns is employment 
fairness a detailed discussed in chapter four. The item added due to government 
intervention is recruitment and layoff information. Chinese government 
intervention in recruitment/layoff had been like V shape, initially after the 
founding of PRC all jobs are assigned, there are retirements but no redundancy; 
after the reform and the market started to open up, government intervention in 
employment sector faded a bit; but in recent years, the government is starting to 
step in to control unemployment rate. Thus, recruitment/layoff information is 
important to investors in a sense that it indicates how much government 
intervention there is in a certain company. Training was modified into 
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training/career progression due to investors have started to care about career 
progression not just technical training, they are starting to realize the companies 
now compete for good human resource and how companies attract employees 
with career progression is important. 
5.3.3 VD3-Corporate Governance 
For corporate governance category, the initial list after screening out mandatory 
items contains three items: audit committee; nominating committee; strategic 
committee. After taken into considering of investor’s need, two items were 
removed and two items were added. The two items removed are nominating 
committee and strategic committee, it would appear the investors do not demand 
information regarding to these two committees. The two items added are 
disclosure policy and investor relation. After considering government 
intervention, independent director item was added. It is worth to mention 
independent director was first screened out due to legal requirement as article 49 
of the Code of Corporate Governance of Publicly Listed Company states 
“Companies should establish independent director system according to relevant 
regulations” and article 123 of the <Company Law>; however after examining 
government intervention evidence, this item was added back; the reason is 
discussed in the following paragraph. 
 
As previously discussed49, articles in Standards 2 associate with unconditionally 
enforceable legislation that have a set detail conditions that must be satisfied are 
considered mandatory. However, article 123 of the Company Law has no details 
at all, it simply state companies must have independent directors and all details 
are for the state council to decide. Thus, as agency answer directly to the state 
council, CSRC holds the power; but the words are ambiguous in relevant CSRC 
articles in the 2007 version, the word “Ying (just a shorter way of saying 
Ying-Dang)” was used. And the information suggested does not include the 
                                                             
49 Referring to section 5.2.1 
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qualifications/work experience/expertise of independent directors, which is the 
information this thesis look for regard to voluntary disclosure. In the 2011 trial 
version and the 2012 version, regard to what information companies should 
disclose about their independent directors, the phrase “but not limit to” was 
added, further emphasized its voluntary nature. Thus, independent director was 
added back. Risk management committee (or anything with similar nature and 
function just a different name) was added simple due to the fact some sort of 
risk management mechanisms are suggested multiple time in corporate 
governance code issued to listed companies. 
5.3.4 VD4-Management Strategy 
Before the economic reform in 1978, companies basically function through 
orders that come down from central government. Companies did not have to 
care about how to brand themselves, because goods they produced or service 
they provide were rather “distributed” than “sold”. Companies did not need to 
consider any matter relating to competitors and clients; they did not have to 
consider the management of their advantages and difficulties, because 
eventually it is the state that will deal with them. Now days, the story is different; 
companies must decide on their own how to run their business. Therefore, it is 
important that investors know how business function and/or improve; this is the 
information this disclosure segment intend to capture. The initial list contained 
three items: Advantage of current management/Difficulties management will 
soon face; competitor analysis; client analysis. After considering government 
intervention, strategic time frame was added; this item measures information 
disclosed about timeframe needed to complete a current strategy. After 
considering social concerns, branding was added due to man product quality 
safety crisis China had been having. After considering investors’ need, 
continuity and impact of strategy on current performances are added; the first 





The speed with which information spread and intangible factors within 
organizations have changed (Yi and Davey, 2010). Technology is more easily 
accessible (Wong and Gardner, 2005); and thanks to the improvement of 
information sharing technology, development of new technology becomes faster 
due to that knowledge is more easily and faster shared. Thus, it is important for 
companies to have a focus on research and development of new technology. 
During the initial stages of China’s economic reform, the Chinese economy was 
still labor intensive. No country can remain as the world’s low cost factory 
forever, because as the economy develops, shifts take place to higher value areas; 
for example, marketing, product design and the manufacturing of more 
sophisticated products. According to Farrell and Grant (2005), China’s 
manufacturing sector cut down 15 million jobs from 1995 to 2002 alone. This 
makes the advantage from research and development ever more important for 
Chinese companies. Also, as reviewed in chap two, core competency is of great 
importance go companies and important to voluntary disclosure activities, 
research and development is part of core competency enhancing effort. This 
disclosure segment capture research and development information voluntarily 
disclosed by companies in their annual report. The initial list contained three 
items: R&D initiatives; R&D results; Advantages brought by R&D. The author 
decides to keep the three items after considering government intervention, social 
concerns and investors’ need. 
5.3.6 VD6-Society and Environment 
As reviewed in chapter two, corporations must establish, maintain or repair their 
legitimacy in order to continue to operate within society; and as discussed in 
chapter four, Chinese corporations has been facing many issues that could threat 
their legitimacy. These issues include safety and quality of their 
products/services, environmental damages, generation of wealth gap. Thus it is 
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reasonable to consider corporations have the need to voluntarily disclose 
information as response to these rising concerns; this disclosure segment intend 
to capture disclosure activities regard to such information. All six items in this 
category are based on social concerns, they are: Product/service quality and 
safety; Environmental protection; corporate culture influence; community 
relation and donations. 
5.4 VDI calculation 
The detail how each item receive a score of either 0, 1, 2, or 3 is provided in 
Appendix [7]. Each of the 31 disclosure items receive either 0, 1, 2, or 3. An 
example of this scoring standard is shown below: 
Table 5 Example of scoring standard 
Item-6 Impact of Macro Economics/Policy Risk on Company Performance: 
1. Simply mention macro economic risk or policy risk 
could impact company performance. 
Example: “2011 will be the start of the new five year 
project, this will likely lead to more sales...(no 
support to back up this claim”---<China SANY group 
2010 annual report> 
2. Such claim above made above is supported by 
reasons. Example: “In the new five year plan, the 
national government plans to build ….miles of new 
rail roads, thus the company expect an increase in the 
company’s transport capabilities…”---<China Rail 
2010 annual report> 
3. Such claim is supported by reasons and described in 
quantitative terms. 
 
Note 1—Qualifying Conditions: To qualify a score 3, 
there has to be a reasonable strong logic connection 




Qualify: The State Assets Administration Committee 
decided to increase the Molybdenum extraction cap in 
2011, thus the company expect to see the company 
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molybdenum production level of 2011 increase by 
roughly 10 percent ---<Jinzhui City Molybdenum Co 
2010 Annual Report> 
 
Note 2 Avoid Double Counting  with scores of 
Item1-5: Should Macro Economics risk or policy 
risks impact on items (1)-(5), and when the 
influencing factors and the company performance 
figure influenced both are described in quantitative 
terms and logically linked together, a 3 point is given 
to this item but not items 1-5. 
 
 
The calculation formula is: 
VDn=SCOREn/(3xKn) 
VDn represents the voluntary disclosure index; n equals to 0~6, represents 
overall voluntary disclosure index, forward looking financial information, 
human resource, corporate governance, management strategy, R&D, and society 
& environment respectively. SCOREn reporesents raw score of voluntary 
disclosure, which equals to disclosure items’ individual scores added, the extent 
of n here is same as in VDn. Kn represents the number of disclosure items, the 
extant of n is same as in VDn.  
 
This study uses non-weighted methods; no different weights were assigned to 
different items (Gray et al, 1995). This should help to reduce the subjectivity 
result from giving different weights manually. 
5.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter established the research method for this study. The testing period is 
selected as period 2008~2012 mainly due to that CSRC regulation updates, 
government policy changes and rising social/environmental issues provide a 
good chance to observe more recent voluntary disclosure efforts of listed 
Chinese companies. A single stock exchange was selected mainly because of 
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that two Chinese stock exchanges do issue separate disclosure guiding 
documents; Shanghai Stock Exchange was selected over the ShenZhen Stock 
Exchange mainly due to SSE is more significant in terms of market 
capitalization and number of weighted stock listed. The A share sector is 
selected because these are the shares traded by domestic Chinese, local Chinese 
investors can not trade B Shares; the A-shares is where the majority of Chinese 
investors concentrate. Annual reports are selected as source mainly due to the 
credibility they have, the authority they resemble and the investors’ faith in 
them.  
 
For the content of voluntary disclosure and the construction of a Voluntary 
Disclosure Checklist, an initial list was first developed after review of previous 
studies and content analysis of Chinese listed companies’ annual report. Then 
the premise check and relativity check were carried out to ensure that 
information of following nature was screened out: mandatory, low/non 
demanding information and information which could be relatively 
sophisticated/confusing for Chinese individual investors; and to ensure 
information of following nature was considered: highly demanded information 
and information which is very important to the Chinese society. 
 
A non-weighted method was established. The scoring procedure attempted to 
measure disclosure effort more accurately comparing to simply giving 1 for 
disclosure and 0 for non-disclosure. This procedure also attempted to be more 
accurate than giving an extra point simply for adding data to qualitative support; 
there must be reason and logic in qualitative claims and quantitative support for 
such claims must link closely to the claims and have credible/official source.
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Chapter Six: Results 
This chapter presents the empirical results and is organized as follows. First, the 
company categorization and ownership proportion of the testing period. Second, 
VDI results50 of the six disclosure category plus VD0 results for all companies 
are presented; also, the separate sets of VDI results covering six categories and 
VD0 are also presented base on ownership structure and on industry 
categorization. 
6.1 Company Categorization 
6.1.1 Industry Proportion 
The CSRC group all listed companies into 19 categories51. According to this 
classification52, the sample companies during 2008-2012 testing period can be 
categorized as follow: 
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B(Mining) 18% B 18% B 20% B 16% B 16% 
C(Manufacturing) 24% C 20% C 22% C 20% C 20% 
D- Electric Power, 
Heat, Gas and Water 
Production and Supply 
8% D 6% D 2% D 8% D 4% 
E- Construction 4% E 8% E 8% E 4% E 8% 
G- Transport, Storage 
and Postal Service 




2% I 2% I 2% I 2% I 2% 
                                                             
50 Including Maximum, Minimum, Average and Standard Deviation 
51 The list is in Appendix [8] 





J- Financial Services 32% J 36% J 36% J 42% J 40% 
K- Real Estate 2% K 2%   K 2% K 2% 









Source: Created by author based on CSRC classification ruling 
 
During the five year period, category B-Mining, category C-Manufacturing and 
category J-Financial Services are the three leading industry clusters; the one 
category I company stayed on list for five years is China Telecom, the state own 
telecommunication giant; the one category K-Real Estate company stayed on list 
for 4 years except year 2010 is BaoLi Real Estate, company belongs to the 
BaoLi group. Besides one category N company in 2008, no real estate company 
made into the list in 2010 and one category S company made into the list in 
2012, industry types in the sample remained the same. The composition 
percentage varied, but financial service industry maintained the heaviest 
proportion, manufacturing industry comes in second and mining has been third 
place. 
6.1.2 Ownership Proportion 
Using previously discussed method, the ownership of the companies was also 
investigated, the results are presented below: 
Table 7 Ownership Structure Spread of Selected Sample 
2008 No. 2009 No. 2010 No. 2011 No. 2012 No. 
SOE 41 SOE 40 SOE 42 SOE 40 SOE 39 
Private 9 Private 10 Private 8 Private 10 Private 11 
Source: Created by author based on previously established definition of SOE 
 
And the industry proportion among private controlled listed companies is as 
follow: 
Table 8 Industry type spread among private controlled listed companies 
2008 No. 2009 No. 2010 No. 2011 No. 2012 No. 






8 J 9 J 7 J 9 J 9 
        S-Diversified/Ge
neral 
1 
Source: Created by author based on official SSE data 
 
Government control remained dominant among the top 50 listed companies at 
ShangHai Stock Exchange A-Share sector. For private controlled company, only 
two types of industries managed to squeeze into the top 50 during 2008-2011 
period, and among these private controlled companies, financial service 
companies maintained dominant position. The private manufacturing company 
in 2008 sample was TBEA Co Ltd, a company specialize in electricity 
transmission related equipment; after that it had always been SANY-company 
specialize in heavy industry equipment. A category S company made into the list 
in 2012, its mainstream business covers energy and mining. 
6.2 VDI Results 
This section presents the empirical voluntary disclosure results, it is divided into 
seven subparts covering the six disclosure categories and the overall result. Each 
subpart presents the maximum, minimum, average disclosure score of the 
selected companies during the five year period; the disclosure score categorized 
by ownership structure; and by industry type; trend analysis of average 
disclosure score, as well as by ownership structure and industry type. 
6.2.1 VD0 and Overall Comparison of Sector Average 
Table 9 VD0 during 2008-2012 
 Max Min Avg SD 
2008 0.763441 0.354839 0.559355 0.095448 
2009 0.795699 0.258065 0.516129 0.115443 
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2010 0.741935 0.193548 0.419785 0.10944 
2011 0.655914 0.150538 0.417419 0.116596 
2012 0.645161 0.258065 0.425806 0.09615 
All maximum VD0 are above 60%, highest value of 0.795 indicate there are 
companies disclosed nearly 80% of all information covered by the disclosure 
index this study constructed. The best performers’ performances are good but 
the lowest minimum score of 0.15 indicates some companies only disclosed 15% 
of all information which is a poor result.  
Table 10 VD0 during 2008-2012 categorized by ownership structure 
 
The highest VD0 all belonged to SOEs, but 4 out of 6 years’ minimum value 
also belonged to SOEs. The difference between maximum value and minimum 
value had been smaller for private companies than that of SOEs except year 
2008. This observation combined with what is seen in previous six disclosure 
categories suggest SOEs tend to polarize a bit more than private companies 
regarding to disclosure behavior.  




max 0.763441 max 0.645161
min 0.365591 min 0.354839
avg 0.562287 avg 0.545998
sdv 0.097733 sdv 0.088306
2009
max 0.795699 max 0.591398
min 0.258065 min 0.27957
avg 0.527419 avg 0.470968
sdv 0.117082 sdv 0.101605
2010
max 0.741935 max 0.688172
min 0.193548 min 0.354839
avg 0.404762 avg 0.498656
sdv 0.102363 sdv 0.118341
2011
max 0.655914 max 0.580645
min 0.150538 min 0.258065
avg 0.410215 avg 0.446237
sdv 0.118105 sdv 0.111429
2012
max 0.645161 max 0.516129
min 0.258065 min 0.311828
avg 0.42349 avg 0.434018















Figure 8 Average VD0 by ownership for Financial Service Industry 
 
From these two figures it can be seen that private companies’ average VD0 was 
lower than SOEs and overall level prior to 2010. However, during the 2010 
period, while SOE and overall average declined, private companies’ level 
increased and from 2010 onward, situation was reserved. And the overall 
disclosure did not increase during 2008-2012. 
 
Figure 9 Average VD0 by industry type 
 
Only manufacturing industry follows exactly the same movement pattern of 
overall VD0. The highest VD0 belongs to construction industry in 2009. The 
one common trend can be spotted is that disclosure level dropped in 2010. From 
an overall perspective, VD0-the total voluntary disclosure index for the top 50 
A-Share companies in SSE remained rather still after 2010; however if strictly 
speaking from numbers, overall disclosure level was on a four year decline 






























Figure 10 Average VD0-VD6 during 2008-2012 
 
VD3 average is higher than other disclosure categories during the periods.  
Considering the coercive institutional pressure the CSRC has over companies 
and extra regulation on corporate governance disclosure compare to other 
disclosure items discussed before, this result comes as no surprise. VD1 average 
is lower than other disclosure sector possibly due to the punishment on 
disclosing inaccurate forecasting information and the absence of a “safe harbor” 
protection clause. 
















































































VD3 for SOE and private companies are higher than other categories 
respectively during the year except SOE’s 2009 VD3 is slightly lower than 
SOE’s 2009 VD5. This further confirms that coercive institutional pressure 
affect Chinese listed companies’ disclosure behavior. VD1 for SOE and private 
companies are all lower than other categories respectively during the 2008-2012; 
once again, it is quite possible the punishment for inaccurate disclosure of 
forecast information combine with no safe harbor clause resulted this. 
Figure 12 Average VD0-VD6 during 2008-2012 by ownership structure in Industry 
J 
 
Figure 12 add further support to the two possible findings discussed in the 
previous paragraph. 
6.2.2 VD1-Forward looking Financial Information 
Table 11 VD1 during 2008-2012 
 
 
The maximum VD1 value during the 2008-2012 reporting periods are quite high 
considering. However, despite maximum values are reasonable high, the gap 




























































Max Min Avg SD
2008 0.714286 0.142857 0.42928 0.139974
2009 0.809524 0.047619 0.302857 0.194267
2010 0.809524 0.047619 0.264762 0.189297
2011 0.619048 0.047619 0.209524 0.147793
2012 0.761905 0.047619 0.258095 0.19363
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biggest differences are in year 2009 and 2010 where the maximums are 
0.761905, which is even bigger than the maximum of 2008. Average value had 
not been above 50%; and in 2011 the figure is only 0.209, which means there are 
companies only disclosed about 20% of the total information that could have 
been disclosed.  
 
Table 12 VD1 during 2008-2012 categorized by ownership structure 
 
 
All maximum values belonged to SOEs, this indicate to some degree that SOEs 
disclose more financial forecast information than private companies. This is 
could be that due to the fact that SOE managers have to sign a contract with the 
state which contains certain production/financial target, which presents them 
with a much clearer estimate of the future compare to their private counterpart. 
Minimum values are retained by SOEs and private companies both during the 
2008-2012 periods. The movement of average value is shown below: 




max 0.714286 max 0.619048
min 0.142857 min 0.142857
avg 0.42928 avg 0.42328
sdv 0.138922 sdv 0.153279
2009
max 0.809524 max 0.285714
min 0.047619 min 0.047619
avg 0.336905 avg 0.166667
sdv 0.199536 sdv 0.084739
2010
max 0.809524 max 0.47619
min 0.047619 min 0.047619
avg 0.268707 avg 0.244048
sdv 0.197272 sdv 0.14937
2011
max 0.619048 max 0.238095
min 0.047619 min 0.047619
avg 0.233333 avg 0.114286
sdv 0.152427 sdv 0.075125
2012
max 0.761905 max 0.380952
min 0.047619 min 0.047619
avg 0.290598 avg 0.142857














Figure 14 Average VD1 by ownership for Financial Service Industry 
 
Before controlling SOE/private proportion and narrow down to financial service 
industry, SOEs’ average and all companies’ overall are both higher than private 
companies’ average. However as Figure 13&14 above show, situation is a bit 
different after controlling process, private companies’ average was higher than 
SOEs’ and all companies’ overall in year 2010 while during other years it is still 
lower than the two. Also during 2009-2010, private company’s average value 
increased while SOEs’ average and overall average decreased. Once again, year 
2010 stands out. 
Figure 15 Average VD1 by industry type 
 
 
Excluding 2008, industry categories B/C/E/G average value had all been higher 
than industry j (the financial service industry); while industry J has private 
companies other industry categories are all made up of SOEs. The highest 



























industry’s highest average in 2008 is not much lower than that (0.473 compare 
to 0.511). Overall, the SOEs did voluntarily disclose more forwardlooking 
financial information than private companies durting 2008-2012. However, no 
confirmation was found that disclosure level in this category increased during 
2008-2012 periods from ownership perspective, overall perspective and industry 
type perspective. The findings in this sector indicate SOEs average disclosure 
level is higher compare to private companies in this disclosure category. 
6.2.3 VD2-Human Resource 
Table 13 VD2 during 2008-2012 
 Max Min Avg SD 
2008 0.916667 0.083333 0.58 0.194132 
2009 1 0.083333 0.526667 0.255573 
2010 1 0 0.268333 0.227932 
2011 1 0 0.323333 0.239662 
2012 0.833333 0.083333 0.351667 0.183109 
This is another disclosure category with significant difference between 
maximum value and minimum value during 2008-2012. The biggest differences 
were in 2010 and 2011 with a value of 1, which means there were companies 
disclosed nothing while there were companies provided qualitative information 
with quantitative support for disclosure items measured: Training/Career 
Progression, Welfare, Insurance, Recruitment and Layoff, Employment Fairness. 
This is also the only category where minimum disclosure level did not exceed 
0.1 in all five years. Overall average value decreased by 50% in 2010 and slowly 
rose back a bit. 




max 0.916667 max 0.75
min 0.083333 min 0.416667
avg 0.581301 avg 0.574074
sdv 0.204539 sdv 0.146986
2009
max 1 max 0.833333
min 0.083333 min 0.083333
avg 0.541667 avg 0.466667
sdv 0.262847 sdv 0.226351
2010
max 1 max 0.833333
min 0 min 0.083333
avg 0.240079 avg 0.416667
sdv 0.205119 sdv 0.295468
2011
max 1 max 1
min 0 min 0.6
avg 0.66 avg 0.866667
sdv 0.194394 sdv 0.121716
2012
max 0.833333 max 0.75
min 0.083333 min 0.083333
avg 0.34188 avg 0.386364
sdv 0.183169 sdv 0.187353
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The maximum values belonged to SOE only except 2011, the minimum values 
belonged to SOE alone except 2009 and 2012. The difference between 
maximum value and minimum value had been smaller for private companies 
than that of SOEs. The average value movement is shown below: 
Figure 16 Average VD2 by ownership 
 
Figure 17 Average VD2 by ownership for Financial Service Industry 
 
 
The average value moving pattern is the same before and after controlling 
number of companies and industry; but after controlling, the SOEs’ average 
VD2 is higher than overall average and private companies’ average value during 
2011-2012. A sharp decline during 2009-2010 can be observed for SOEs and 
overall, though private companies’ average VD2 declined during that period and 
other periods as well, the decline rate is much lower. As for SOEs, if state 
controlled financial services companies are included, as graph 10 shows, in 2010 






























Figure 18 Average VD2 by industry type 
 
Except for the financial service industry, no other major industries selected 
shows the same moving pattern of average value when compared to that of the 
overall average value’s moving pattern. The highest average value belongs to the 
construction industry in 2009; the smallest average value belongs to the 
manufacturing industry in 2011. Transportation industry’s average VD2 did not 
fluctuate much if compared to other industry. And for mining industry, during 
2011-2012 its average VD2 decreased while others increased. The author could 
not confirm disclosure level in this category increased during 2008-2012 periods 
from ownership perspective, overall perspective and industry type perspective; 
third, the findings in this sector indicate that the SOEs average disclosure level 
is not higher compare to private companies in this disclosure category in 2010 
when sample size and industry is controlled.  
6.2.4 VD3-Corporate Governance 
Table 15 VD3 during 2008-2012 
 Max Min Avg SD 
2008 0.933333 0.4 0.702667 0.127213 
2009 1 0.466667 0.710667 0.147302 
2010 0.933333 0.333333 0.662667 0.171645 
2011 1 0.333333 0.701333 0.199428 
2012 1 0.133333 0.644 0.229209 
The maximum value remained high during 2008-2012 periods with the smallest 



















companies score 1. The biggest gap between maximum value and minimum 
value is in year 2012 with a value of 0.867. The smallest minimum value comes 
from a state owned mining company where the company only scored 1 for 
independent director item and 1 for auditing committee item, and 0 for the rest. 
The average values during the periods remained above 50% and they has not 
increased since 2008.  
Table 16 VD3 during 2008-2012 categorized by ownership structure 
 
As table 16 illustrates, the differences between SOEs’ and private companies’ 
maximum values had been rather not significant during the periods. The 
minimum average VD3 of SOE and private companies remained roughly the 
same for 2008 and 2009; but in 2010, the SOEs’ minimum VD3 dropped while 
the private companies’ minimum VD3 increased. From 2010 and onward, SOEs’ 
minimum VD3 had been lower than private companies’ equivalent. The average 
value movement is shown below: 




max 0.933333 max 0.866667
min 0.4 min 0.466667
avg 0.695935 avg 0.733333
sdv 0.126534 sdv 0.133333
2009
max 1 max 0.933333
min 0.466667 min 0.466667
avg 0.696667 avg 0.766667
sdv 0.140775 sdv 0.167037
2010
max 0.933333 max 0.933333
min 0.333333 min 0.533333
avg 0.642857 avg 0.766667
sdv 0.171599 sdv 0.138013
2011
max 1 max 1
min 0.333333 min 0.6
avg 0.66 avg 0.866667
sdv 0.194394 sdv 0.121716
2012
max 0.933333 max 1
min 0.133333 min 0.333333
avg 0.608547 avg 0.769697













Figure 20 Average VD3 by ownership for Financial Service Industry 
 
It would appear after controlling the number of companies under the SOE 
category and private category and focus on one industry, the SOEs’ voluntary 
disclosure level of corporate governance information is higher comparing to 
equivalent private companies’ 2008-2012 reporting periods; if the controlling 
procedures are ignored, the private companies being a small number on average 
disclose more corporate governance information than SOE. On average, 
companies had not been increasing corporate during 2008-2012; from Figure 
19&20 shown above, it is safe to conclude average VD3 dropped in 2009-2010 
and 2011-2012 period.  
Figure 21 Average VD3 by industry type 
 
The financial service industry stands out in corporate governance category; its 



































overall average during 2008-2012 periods as well; it is also the only industry has 
the same average value moving pattern as the overall pattern. It is even possible 
that the financial service industry is pulling the overall average figure up and 
affected overall fluctuation pattern consider the industry’s dominating 
proportion in the sample. The highest average belongs to financial service 
industry in 2011 which was 0.895; the lowest belongs to transportation industry 
in 2012 which was 0.Overall, The author could not confirm disclosure level in 
this category increased during 2008-2012 periods from ownership perspective, 
overall perspective and industry type perspective. Disclosure level had not 
increased during 2008-2012 periods; third, the SOEs average disclosure level is 
higher compare to private companies in this disclosure category when sample 
size and industry is controlled.  
6.2.5 VD4-Management Strategy 
Table 17 VD4 during 2008-2012 
 Max Min Avg SD 
2008 0.761905 0.238095 0.46381 0.140344 
2009 0.666667 0.238095 0.422857 0.100275 
2010 0.809524 0.190476 0.39619 0.111548 
2011 0.571429 0.095238 0.34381 0.120656 
2012 0.571429 0.142857 0.340952 0.101066 
The maximum value fluctuated greatly compared to the previously discussed 
two disclosure categories, maximum value at 2010 was 0.810 it dropped by 
0.239 in 2011. The gap between the biggest maximum value of the periods and 
smallest minimum value is not as big when compared to VD5, yet still 
significant with a figure of 0.715, this means some companies disclosed nearly 
81% of the information in this category and there are also companies barely 
disclosed 10%. The average VD4 showed a declining trend during the 
2008-2012 periods with average of 0.464 in 2008 dropped to 0.341 in 2012. 






Table 18 VD4 during 2008-2012 categorized by ownership structure 
 
It is interesting to notice here that except year 2011, all years maximum values 
belong to the SOEs and at the same time the SOEs scored all the minimum 
values as well. The gap between maximum and minimum is more significant 
among SOEs than that of private companies. The movement of average VD4 
value during the periods is shown below: 
Figure 22 Average VD4 by ownership 
 
Figure 23 Average VD4 by ownership for Financial Service Industry 
 
 
Once again, before and after isolating the financial service industry where 
2008
SOE Private
max 0.761905 max 0.428571
min 0.238095 min 0.285714
avg 0.481998 avg 0.380952
sdv 0.147233 sdv 0.05324
2009
max 0.666667 max 0.52381
min 0.238095 min 0.285714
avg 0.422619 avg 0.42381
sdv 0.104098 sdv 0.088235
2010
max 0.809524 max 0.52381
min 0.190476 min 0.238095
avg 0.393424 avg 0.410714
sdv 0.113791 sdv 0.104754
2011
max 0.571429 max 0.571429
min 0.095238 min 0.142857
avg 0.339286 avg 0.361905
sdv 0.118711 sdv 0.133182
2012
max 0.571429 max 0.47619
min 0.142857 min 0.238095
avg 0.346764 avg 0.320346

























numbers of SOE and private companies are closer, the SOEs and the overall 
average during the periods show similar trend; both had been decreasing during 
the periods. In 2008, the private companies’ average VD4 was lower than 
overall average and SOE average and then it increased while the other two 
decreased during 2008-2009. However, this time, the private companies’ average 
did not increase in 2009-2010 while SOE average and overall average decreased, 
it deceased as well.  
Figure 24 Average VD4 by industry type 
 
The construction industry and the financial service industry display the same 
pattern when compared to overall average movement, they all show a five year 
decline. Transport industry and manufacturing industry shared similar pattern, 
they both decreased during 2008-2011 and increased in 2012. The mining 
industry’s pattern is unique when compared to others, although its average VD4 
decreased in 2008-2009, but during 2009-2011 while all others decreased, it 
increased. The largest average figure belongs to the construction industry in 
2008. The lowest value belongs to financial service industry in 2012.  
 
Average disclosure level increased for private companies in 2008-2009, after 
that from ownership perspective and overall perspective, the average VD4 
declined; the SOEs’ decline rate is higher than private controlled companies. 

















major industry sectors. And interestingly, the private sector’s trend during 
2009-2010 is not the opposite of overall trend, it declined as well. The author 
could not confirm disclosure level in this category increased during 2008-2012 
periods from the two perspectives mentioned above and industry type 
perspective, disclosure level had not increased during 2008-2012 periods; third, 
the SOEs average disclosure level is not higher compare to private companies in 
this disclosure category 
6.2.6 VD5-Research and Development 
Table 19 VD5 during 2008-2012 
 Max Min Avg SD 
2008 1 0.111111 0.628889 0.22178 
2009 1 0.111111 0.688889 0.255945 
2010 1 0.111111 0.615556 0.282352 
2011 1 0 0.6 0.263702 
2012 1 0.111111 0.602222 0.256033 
The maximum value during this period remained high; peak value of 1 was 
maintained for 2008-2012 period indicating there are companies disclosed 100% 
of total amount of information in this sector. However, as table 19 demonstrates 
the gap between maximum value and minimum value is significant with biggest 
gap of 1, this is almost the maximum value of year 2011. There are companies 
disclosed qualitative information supports by quantitative evidence regard to 
their development initiative, R& D results and advantage from these R&D 
projects and there are companies disclosed nothing. The co-existing of two 
extreme ends: everything and nothing (or almost nothing) persisted during the 
periods. Average value had not been increasing constantly during 2008-2012 











Table 20 VD5 during 2008-2012 categorized by ownership structure 
 
The results after ownership categorization review more details. Maximum 
values of 1 were spotted in both SOE and private companies for all periods 
except 2008 where the maximum VD5 for private companies that year was 
0.889. The minimum value of 0 belongs to SOE and the minimum values of 
private companies had been higher than SOEs’ during the periods. The 
movement of average VD5 value during the periods is shown below: 
Figure 25 Average VD5 by ownership 
 
As Figure 25 indicates that the average VD5 had not been constantly increasing 
regardless of ownership structure. The SOE’s average value and overall average 
value share very similar trend, but private companies behaved differently. Again, 
during the 2009-2010 period, where overall average and SOE average decreased, 
the private company average increased; except 2010-2011 period, private 
companies’ average had been going upward. Due to majority of the sample 
companies are SOEs and private companies mainly concentrate in financial 
2008
SOE Private
max 1 max 0.888889
min 0.111111 min 0.222222
avg 0.653117 avg 0.518519
sdv 0.208159 sdv 0.260579
2009
max 1 max 1
min 0.111111 min 0.222222
avg 0.7 avg 0.644444
sdv 0.2593 sdv 0.250103
2010
max 1 max 1
min 0.111111 min 0.222222
avg 0.600529 avg 0.694444
sdv 0.288346 sdv 0.25022
2011
max 1 max 1
min 0 min 0.333333
avg 0.619444 avg 0.611111
sdv 0.312135 sdv 0.183324
2012
max 1 max 1
min 0.111111 min 0.444444
avg 0.581197 avg 0.676768












service sector, the author analyzed financial service sector (J) as well: 
 
Figure 26 Average VD5 by ownership for Financial Service Industry 
 
Graph 20 shows a different situation. After isolating the population down to just 
financial service industry, similarities between three trends decreased even more. 
State controlled companies’ average disclosure level declined except for 
2011-2012, private companies’ average disclosure level fluctuated more 
violently before isolation. However it is worth to notice, private companies’ 
trend in 2009-2010 remain upward while the overall average and SOE average 
declined.  
Figure 27 Average VD6 by industry type:53 
 
After categorization by industry type, other than the financial service industry 
and construction industry showed similar trend to overall trend, there are no 
                                                             
53 Industries that only have one company present are excluded for this graph due to this is an average of 

































similarities in disclosure level movement except almost all industry sectors 
included showed their VD5 average dropped in 2010; construction industry’s 
disclosure level of this category did not drop in 2010, it remained the same 
compare to 2009. The highest average VD5 figure 0.83 belongs to 
manufacturing industry in 2009; the lowest 0.389 belongs to construction 
industry in 2008. It is worth to notice the manufacturing industry is the only 
industry cluster has average higher then all companies’ overall VD5 during 
2008-2011 (and there is only 0.002 different between the two in 2012); this 
could indicate as manufacturing industry rely on innovations more than mining, 
construction, transportation and financial service industry. 
 
Overall, it would appear that after 2010, private companies averagely disclose 
more information in this disclosure sector when compared to SOEs’; situation in 
2008 and 2009 are the opposite. This observation stands after the figures get 
isolate down to financial service sector, where most private companies 
concentrate; the private financial service companies disclosed more information 
than state controlled ones after 2010. There is no common pattern except in 
2010 we can observe there is an average disclosure level drop from overall 
perspective and industry type perspective.  The author could not confirm 
disclosure level in this category increased during 2008-2012 periods from the 
two perspectives mentioned above and ownership perspective. 
6.2.7 VD6-Society and Environment 
Table 21 VD6 during 2008-2012 
 Max Min Avg SD 
2008 0.933 0.133 0.687 0.198 
2009 0.933 0.133 0.639 0.214 
2010 0.933 0.133 0.444 0.219 
2011 0.933 0.067 0.483 0.245 




The maximum value during the period remained high; peak value of 0.933 was 
maintained for 2008-2011 period and dropped slightly in 2012 to 0.867 
indicating there are companies disclosed 93.3% and 86.7% of total amount of 
information in this sector. However, as table 21 demonstrates the gap between 
maximum value and minimum value is significant with biggest gap of 0.866, 
this is almost the maximum value of year 2012. Average value had not been 
increasing; rather it decreased during 2008-2010 and slightly increased in 2011 
and 2012.  
Table 22 VD6 during 2008-2012 categorized by ownership structure 
 
The results after ownership categorization are slightly different in some values 
and shed more insights. Except 2010 and 2011, maximum VD6 value belonged 
to SOE only; however, except for 2012, all minimums belonged to SOE as well. 
Private companies had higher minimum values than SOEs other than 2012; the 
difference in minimum value between SOE and private companies was most 
evident in 20008 with a difference of 40%. The average is shown below. 




max 0.933333 max 0.866667
min 0.133333 min 0.533333
avg 0.671545 avg 0.755556
sdv 0.211024 sdv 0.1
2009
max 0.933333 max 0.866667
min 0.133333 min 0.266667
avg 0.656667 avg 0.566667
sdv 0.219063 sdv 0.183922
2010
max 0.933333 max 0.933333
min 0.133333 min 0.266667
avg 0.403175 avg 0.658333
sdv 0.194756 sdv 0.223784
2011
max 0.933333 max 0.933333
min 0.066667 min 0.2
avg 0.45 avg 0.613333
sdv 0.219167 sdv 0.307599
2012
max 0.866667 max 0.8
min 0.2 min 0.2
avg 0.502564 avg 0.557576












As Figure 28 shows, average VD6 had not been always increasing regardless of 
ownership structure. However it is worth to notice the SOE’s average value and 
overall average value share very similar trend, but private companies behaved 
differently. Private companies’ average VD6 value showed inverted trend during 
2009-2012 when compared to SOE’s trend and overall trend. Due to majority of 
the sample companies are SOEs and private companies mainly concentrate in 
financial service sector, the author analyzed financial service sector (J) as well: 
Figure 29 Average VD6 by ownership for Financial Service Industry 
 
Figure 29 shows slightly different situation, while the private companies’ trend 
is still inverted compare to SOE and overall during 2009-2011, average of 
private controlled companies and SOEs in this industry sector actually both 
showed declining trend in 2011-2012. Both private and SOE financial service 
companies’ trends declined in 2012 while the overall trend of all companies 
went up.  
Figure 30 Average VD6 by industry type:54 
 
                                                             
54 Industries that only have one company present are excluded for this graph due to this is an average of 





























It would appear after breaking figures down into industry groups, there is no 
common trend except all industry sectors included showed their VD6 average 
dropped in 2010; category-C, manufacturing industry decreased the most by 
44%; category-J, financial service sector decreased the least by 18%; all 
companies overall VD6 dropped 30% in 2010. The highest average VD6 figure 
0.8 belongs to construction industry in 2009; the lowest 0.3 belongs to 
manufacturing industry in 2011. 
 
Overall, it would appear that private companies averagely disclose more 
information in this disclosure sector when comparing to SOEs. This observation 
partially stands after the figures get isolate down to financial service sector, 
where most private companies concentrate; the private banks disclosed more 
information more than state controlled banks in four years except in year 2008 
and 2009. There is not common pattern except in 2010 we can observe there is 
an average disclosure level drop from overall perspective and industry type 
perspective. The author could not confirm disclosure level in this category 
increased during 2008-2012 periods from the three perspectives mentioned 
above. Disclosure level had not been increased during 2008-2012 periods; third, 




Chapter Seven: Discussion 
Following the presentation of the results, this chapter presents a discussion of 
these results. Each of the six disclosure categories will be discussed. There will 
be a section which compares some results of this study to other international and 
Chinese studies. After this, a section focusing on other relevant useful disclosure 
findings that may not be relevant to the disclosure categories will also be 
presented.  
7.1 VD1 
As hypothesized; the average disclosure level of forward looking financial 
information is lower than other disclosure categories previously discussed and 
the SOEs do disclose more forecasting information than the private companies. 
Even though there were no correlation tests conducted, the author still holds the 
opinion that the serious punishment, lack of a “safe harbor” clause contributed 
towards this situation. With punishment for incorrect results but no protection 
for good intention, companies would not feel motivated to disclose such 
information, yet forecast information is demanded by investors. This confirms 
that institutional environment shapes voluntary disclosure behavior. 
 
These companies all disclosed information about how macro economics/policy 
and market risk may impact their financial performances; though these 
disclosures are usually hollow and lack quantitative or even qualitative support. 
The change in policies is the most frequent asked question, investors’ demand 
behavior and companies’ disclosure behavior add to the support that 
government’s influence on the market is still significant. Despite policies are 
important to share price in China, the investors’ may lack the ability to interpret 
these policies, this could lead to misinterpretation of information which will 




Once again, the difference in disclosure level between those companies which 
disclose the most and those which disclose the least is big. And it would appear 
the companies tend to put human resource information in their CSR or 
sustainability report, average VD2 declined greatly in 2010 because of this. Also 
if one is to look at all companies categorized by ownership structure not just the 
financial service industry, private companies’ VD2 level is higher than SOEs 
except year 2008 and 2009. After detail reading of the annual reports, the author 
found this situation is mainly due to SOEs all disclosed how they contributed 
towards “stabilizing the economy during the financial crisis as them answering 
the call of the government”. If this information is removed, then SOEs human 
resource information will be lower than private companies’ over all years. As the 
main point of this category’s information is to demonstrate how well companies 
manage one of corporate’s most important capital-human capital and how well 
they treat their employees, this indicates SOEs are not doing too well in this area 
or they just simply don’t care about demonstrate to the society they are good 
employers? The author think the reason is the latter. 
 
SOEs are basically government’s enterprise branch, and their employees are 
materialistically---civil service personnel of the PRC, a branch of government 
employees that will never be fired unless they committee a serious legal or civil 
offence. In 2011, 2.17 million people participated civil service personnel exams 
knowing the government will only hire 15290, that is a pass ratio of 59:155; by 
2013 it gets even more crazy, 180000 people participated in a single civil service 
personnel exam knowing there are only 3354, among these people there were 
103 people with a Doctor degree. The author does not wish to go detail analyze 
why is this happening, but the certain thing is that SOEs are branchs of the 
government do not have the need to attract talented employees as much as 




private companies do. The results here support this. 
 
Another disturbing set of figure is the individual scores of the employment 
fairness item shown as below: 
Figure 31 Employment Fairness Item Score Count 
  
China is a country with 56 ethnic groups with the Han as the majority group and 
the other 55 as the minority race, these are the 56 group recognized by the 
Chinese central government. Since the founding of the PRC, the government 
officially recognized the importance of ethnic minority groups and provided 
protection for minority groups’ rights in political, economy, legal and 
administration56. Since the 1980s, government policy further increased various 
benefits to these minority groups, such as ease of restrictions on family planning, 
or preferential treatment in education57 and hiring (Sautman, 1998). Also, much 
of China’s land area (roughly around 64%) is designated as ethnic minority 
regions (State Ethnic Affairs Committee, 2003), and much of these regions are 
of vital interests to the nation: the northwestern, the northeastern and the 
southwestern. For example, the Northwestern is where the current economic 
development effort is going (Lu and Neilson, 2004) and it is also a political 
sensitive boarder area (Fazio, Hughes and Zhang, 2010). Due to the significance 
of these issues, the author separate racial equality in employment from other 
corporate social responsibility hypotheses and consider: it would be reasonable 
                                                             
56 http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/162983/9701504.html, CCP official website on <CCP’s fundamental 
opinion towards racial equality 



























Source: Count of original data 
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think that some of the largest companies in China would want to demonstrate to 
the society that they offer fair or even preferential treatment regard to minority 
ethnic group employment opportunities.  
 
By year 2010, 48.56% of China’s population is women (National Bureau 
Statistics of China, 2010). Ever since the founding of PRC in 1949, progress had 
been made in achieving gender equality in social security, employment, 
education due to the strong state intervention. Several legislations have been 
passed to ensure female worker’s rights, such as the <Female Employees Labor 
Protection Regulations> in 1988 and the <Law on Protecting Women’s Rights 
and Interests> in 1992. They are hard workers; the majority of them works 
full-time through most of their working life and tends to only be interrupted by a 
short maternity leave (Cooke, 2013). Despite the importance of these two 
special employee groups, companies’ disclosure regard to them had actually 
been shrinking. From an legitimacy theory perspective, such disclosure behavior 
should not exist as ethnic and gender fairness issue should be very important in 
evaluating the legitimacy of business corporations. However, such disclosure 
behavior does exist. This is very disturbing, these biggest companies with 
majority of them as SOEs represent China’s central government’s attitude 
towards certain issues. This could be explained by considering agency theory 
with China’s unique situation. For the SOEs, the principal is effectively the 
central government; and considering government influence over the economy, it 
could be reasonable to think that to a certain extent that the central government 
is the principal for big companies as well because there is no way to grow big 
without acting in line with the government. If the principal does not demand to 
see such issues disclosed, then there could be no incentive to disclose such 
information. From an institutional theory perspective, this could mean there is 
not enough institutional pressure on companies to make them disclose such 
information. The government certainly has enough institutional power over 




The higher level of corporate governance information disclosed is proof that 
more guidance and regulation from regulatory agencies can improve voluntary 
disclosure level. This supports institutional theory. First, the CSRC issued a code 
for corporate governance, this detail guide decrease confusion for companies, 
making it easier to disclose such information. Second, as previously discussed, 
legislation giving power to CSRC to regulate the set up of independent directors 
contribute to results. Thirdly, despite Standards 7 and 8 being of guiding nature 
only, these standards that provide extra guide for commercial banks and security 
trading company contributed to financial service industry’s high corporate 
governance disclosure level. This further adds support to the idea that more 
guidance and regulation from regulatory agencies can improve voluntary 
disclosure level. A detail score count reveals more insights: 
Figure 32 Individual item score count of corporate governance category 
 
Source: Created by author 
 
Even though the CSRC had not stated that companies “must” disclose 
information regard to their independent director system, companies still 
responded to the corporate governance code and the legislative power given to 
the CSRC. The independent director item is the only item where all companies 
disclosed information across the entire 2008-2012 period. Another item worth 
Auditing Committee Risk Management/Committee/Monitoring Independent Director Disclosure Policy Investor Relation
No.3 41 5 36 7 17
No.2 7 15 9 27 19
No.1 1 20 5 16 13
No.0 1 10 0 0 1
No.3 33 14 33 7 14
No.2 11 15 13 24 23
No.1 5 18 4 18 13
No.0 1 3 0 1 0
No.3 30 7 32 7 17
No.2 14 10 16 19 13
No.1 6 23 2 24 19
No.0 0 10 0 0 1
No.3 29 21 33 11 21
No.2 19 4 15 13 9
No.1 2 17 2 26 14
No.0 0 8 0 0 6
No.3 28 22 23 8 17
No.2 19 1 25 7 8
No.1 3 14 2 33 17








mentioning is the auditing committee item, despite the voluntary nature of the 
item, the majority of companies disclosed this item. The primary reason for this 
is that companies have detail guide on how to set up such committee and they 
know what to disclose about this committee in their annual reports. 
7.4 VD4 
This category was the least affected by the disclosure anomaly in 2010, its 
overall average only decreased by 0.03. SOEs obtained both the maximum 
scores and minimum scores during the periods at the same time presents an 
interesting issue matter in terms of agency theory. As previously discussed, the 
“principals” for these SOE mangers are supposed to be the state; then the 
question is, if these managers truly answer to the same principal, then why their 
disclosure behavior varies so much? One possible explanation is the multi-layer 
control system the state has over the SOEs causes confusion for the SOE 
managers, making them unclear what they should disclose to ease the 
monitoring costs. Another explanation is to assume they have the same set of 
expectation from the principal, which is the CSRC document; however, as 
reviewed before, the CSRC lacks over-riding power and the guiding words in 
Standards 2 are confusing from a legal perspective. Thus, with a unified 
confusing standard, managers make their own interpretation of what the 
principal expect and create variance in disclosure choices. What more 
interesting is the choice of one disclosure item over another/ 
 
It would appear58 managers of these top 50 companies are not found to disclose 
information with respect to how company strategy might impact their current 
performance and how long it will take to carry out the current strategy (strategic 
time frame). These two items are highly demanded by the investors based on 
questions asked on the internet about company performance. This indicates a 
                                                             
58 Quantitative data relate to this claim is in Appendix [9] 
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possible lag between the companies’ view of China’s economic reform status 
and investors’ view of the China’s economic reform. For people who are still 
affected by planned economy system, these two figure would be important and 
natural to disclose because the government would have decided or at least 
heavily influenced these; but as companies move towards market economy, 
these two figures would be increasingly difficult to disclose. Considering China 
central government still issues “five year plan” to guide the economy, this could 
be a sign of change. Companies seem to care about how to sustain their business, 
even though many of them disclose quantitative information to support their 
concerns or claims. The claims on advantages or difficulties are ambiguous; 
there is usually very little quantitative evidence to support relevant claims.  
7.5 VD5 
The data indicated that most of the top listed companies do care to demonstrate 
their R&D efforts and advantages. For the period reviewed a large number of 
companies scored 1 in this category; however, there are also companies every 
year disclose nothing or near nothing. Predominately these scores came from 
two companies: Poly Real Estate Group and China Life Insurance; with 2010 
being the exception. In 2010, there were three companies scored 0.111, they are: 
Petro China, Shanghai Port and Shandong Gold. Even though they are not 
heavily technology oriented, it is surprising to find that they basically disclose 
no information in this area. Private companies showed different moving trend 
compare to SOEs, it is possibly because the private sector in this sample is 
primarily made of financial service companies and they rely on technology 
innovation to provide more efficient and better service; thus while other SOEs 
can choose not to disclose such information, these private financial service 





Data indicated that the private companies’ disclosure level increased while the 
SOEs’ and overall level decreased. A major reason for this was that most 
companies simply stopped including a copy of sustainability report or CSR 
report in their annual reports while disclosing these reports on websites 
designated by the CSRC. In 2009, there were only 9 companies did not include 
such reports in their annual reports, this number spiked to 34 in 2010. Thus, a lot 
of the information that was originally in these reports was just gone, for example, 
environmental information. This could also be considered as the primary reason 
why many other disclosure categories level dropped in 2010. The author could 
not find a direct explanation59 for this strange change as there are no changes in 
CSRC’s disclosure policy documents, CSRC officers did not make any public 
announcement encouraging companies to take their sustainability or CSR 
reports out of their annual reports, nothing came down from the state council or 
other high rank Chinese Communist Party (CCP) agencies. 
 
The overall average disclosure performance during 2008-2012 is not inadequate. 
The lowest average disclosure from these top companies is still around 45% 
which indicates at the lowest point, which is 2010; companies still averagely 
disclose around 45% information as to how they benefit the society and 
environment. This could possibly indicate some companies still see annual 
reports as important and direct information sources for investors. It is a surprise 
that the mining industry, primarily made up of coal extraction and processing 
companies averagely disclosed even less information in this category than the 
financial service sector in year 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011. With the China’s 
pollution problem, especially air pollution was actually getting worse in those 
years, according to legitimacy theory, these coal giants would have more 
incentives than the financial service providers to disclose information to 
                                                             
59 A possible reason can be found in Appendix [10] 
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maintain environmental legitimacy. Once again these Chinese companies did not 
act according to legitimacy theory. 
 
The results obtained here could answer a question asked in chapter three: do 
SOEs really need to disclose information to the public to maintain legitimacy? 
The answer is probably not, as it would appear that their legitimacy is not 
separated from the government; they probably don’t have to separately maintain 
their legitimacy if the people truly still see they are part of the government 
despite those reform efforts. From an agency theory perspective, if the 
government is the principal, the SOE leaders don’t really have an incentive to 
reduce monitoring costs in a classical way. The monitoring costs to the 
government is really “Are they tightly following the policies and regulations we 
gave them?”, in this sense, after regulation stated CSR/sustainability report 
should be separated from annual reports, the SOEs leaders will try to response to 
it as quickly as possible. 
7.7 VD0 and Overall Discussion 
The overall disclosure level throughout the testing period is not inadequate 
considering the max value is close to 80% and the lowest average value is still 
nearly 42%. With development of disclosure regulatory system and rising social 
concerns/awareness, voluntary disclosure level should have been increasing. 
However, the average disclosure level had not been increasing with average 
value of 0.559 in 2008 dropped to 0.425 in 2012. This could mean in this period, 
the disclosure regulatory system for Chinese companies had not been improving. 
The guidance corporations receive on how to disclose and what to disclose had 
not been improving; the ambiguity in wording in guiding documents have not 
been mitigated; and the matter of fact that the CSRC, the SEC equivalent of 
China did not have regulatory and monitoring power as it should have had. The 
fact that the government, who is effectively the actual owner of SOEs also 
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completely controls the CSRC could possibly lead to some self-regulation 
issues. 
 
It is interesting to notice the overall disclosure level of SOEs decreased while 
the private firms’ overall disclosure level increased in 2009-2010. A major 
political event happened in China in 2010 was Chairman Xi JinPing was 
“confirmed”60to be the next chairman leading the nation as he received the title 
of vice-chairman of China Central Military Commission. Even though there is 
not direct relation between this event and SOEs’ disclosure behavior anomaly, 
the author suspect this political event could be the reason. Looking back on 
PRC’s political history, each generation of government has its unique “moto” 
and usually different government regime brings different priorities to the nation; 
for example, Deng Xiao Ping’s famous “Gai-Ge-Kai-Fang (Reform and Open 
Up) and Hu Jin Tao’s “He-Xie (Harmony)”. From agency theory and 
institutional theory perspectives, considering the great influence government has 
over corporations and especially SOEs, government regime change could mean 
uncertainty for company leaders. They would feel uncertain about what 
information to disclose beyond mandatory, specially when they think a new 
government regime is coming but yet do not know for sure. 
 
The Chinese listed companies’ disclosure behavior seems not to be following a 
track that can be safely predicted by some classic accounting theories; and it 
would appear rather than governmental policies guide corporations to act and 
disclose better, it is the disclosure of corporations that lead to better 
understanding of government policies, or perhaps one should say intention 
rather than policy. It is also a strange fact that environmental issue, something 
that the Chinese people had been increasingly worried about is perhaps not 
being disclosed enough in annual reports; it is even stranger that the coal 
                                                             
60 Confirmed here is a relevant term, he was not officially announced as the chairman of the party thus 
not definitely going to be the next chairman in official terms. However, it is a basic chinese political sense 
that when someone become the vice-chairman of China’s Central Millitary Commission, he will be the 
next Chairman of the party and lead the nation. 
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extraction and processing companies, ones who contribute a lot to air pollution 
disclosed so little in annual reports. The author could not find any evidence that 
a change in disclosure policy lead to the cut down of environmental information 
in annual reports. The reason behind this strange disclosure behavior could be a 
very interesting future research topic. Could it be due to change in government 
policy or could it due to message from central command was distorted due to the 
confusing and over-complex governing structure? 
7.7 Comparative Discussion 
Overall, the Chinese listed companies’ voluntary disclosure level increased 
compare to the findings of Long (2010), where the author investigated 100 listed 
companies’ 2005 annual reports and found the overall voluntary disclosure level 
was 0.417; also compared to Liang (2011) where author analyzed annual report 
of 235 listed Chinese companies and found overall voluntary disclosure level 
was around 0.561.  
 
In several international studies, information that concerns the company’s “core 
competency” is often voluntarily disclosed (Bradbury, 1992; Singleton and 
Globerman, 2002; Chau and Gray, 2002; Meek, 1995; Botosan, 1997; Robb, 
single & Zarzeski, 2001; Newson and Deegan, 2002; Liang, 2011). This 
disclosure category usually contains information including but not limit to : 
human capital, profitability forecast, social responsibility issues, research and 
development. The findings of this study indicate voluntary disclosure of social 
responsibility information of Chinese listed companies is not low with a lowest 
0.45 average during the five year period; however, from the sudden score drop 
during 2009-2010, we can possibly conclude that Chinese companies’ motive to 
disclose such information largely comes from external coercive government 
pressure but not a need felt from within. From reading the annual reports and the 
                                                             
61 The original did not calculate such figure, she had the average score categorized by industry type, the 
0.5 figure is calculated by author of this study. 
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results, the author find Chinese companies like to disclose information regard to 
research and development. This is possibly because of China is trying to shift 
away from its previous labour intensive economy. Human resource information 
disclosed is not inadequate, but it is not too satisfactory either. The human 
resource segment has the lowest minimum scores during the test period, its 
average scores are not high comparing to other disclosure categories and 
information regarding to fair employment oppurtunities for ethnic minorities and 
women is shockingly bad.  
 
Branbury (1992) concluded that Canadian listed companies like to voluntarily 
disclose information regard to companies’ management team and companies’ 
strategy; similar findings can also be found in several other studies. For example, 
Meek (1995) found European companies voluntarily disclose a lot more 
strategic information comparing to US companies; Chau and Gray (2002) found 
HongKong companies’ voluntary strategic information score is 0.1849, which is 
much higher than their overall average voluntary disclosure score of 0.0977. 
This study indicate some of the top Chinese listed companies don’t like to 
disclose information regard to their management strategy-this disclosure 
segment’s average score is the second lowest compare to other 5 and the over all 
score during the five year period. Considering the dominating amount SOEs in 
the sample, this is possible because SOEs’ management strategy is perceived as 
closely aligned to state policy by the investors thus eliminate the need to 
disclose such information. Also, in the two studies reviewed that analyzed 
investors’ information need, need for information regard to companies’ 
management strategy also ranks at the bottom. 
 
Forward looking financial information disclosure level is low, this is consistent 
with the findings of Long (2010) and Liang (2011) on listed Chinese companies. 
The author identified the punishment for inaccurate disclosure without “safe 
harbor” protection clause could be the reason; another possible reason is the lack 
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of investor demand. An unique feature of Chinese companies’ voluntary 
disclosure in this segment is that Chinese companies disclose information regard 
to macro economics/policy impact on future financial performance and market 
risk’s impact on future financial performance. It is possible because of SOEs and 
investors’ demand.  
7.8 Problems and Suggestions 
Voluntary disclosure can not be deemed voluntary if there is an absolute 
obligation for companies to disclose information, but regulation and monitoring 
does help to improve the quality of voluntarily disclosed information. The 
results of this study, specially evidence in corporate governance sector support 
this. However, for Chinese stock market there are problems must be solved 
before this can happen. 
 
The first set of problem is essentially the independency and regulatory power of 
the Chinese stock market regulatory body-the CSRC. At the moment, unlike the 
SEC, the CSRC is controlled by the central government and at the same time the 
government owns the SOEs dominating the stock market. In other words, the 
regulators are the owners, this creates a serious conflict of interests. The SOE 
leaders answer to the government, they are part of that power hierarchy and at 
the same time the government is writing all the regulation protocols, this is 
basically self-monitoring; and when there is not external pressure, such 
monitoring may not work. When facing a voluntary disclosure choice, the SOE 
leaders basically face no external pressure; the pressure comes from within the 
system, the system they are in. And despite the SOEs are not all there are on the 
stock market, they do control more than half of the total market capitalization, 
their influence reach into major industries. Thus, failure to monitor and regulate 
information disclosure in the SOE sector could create a serious market 
confidence issue. The CSRC needs to be a separate regulatory body for true and 
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effective monitoring and regulating to happen.  
 
Also, the CSRC needs more legislative and legal enforcement power after it is 
separate from the central government power hierarchy. As evidence shown, this 
can enhance voluntary disclosure level. Also, with more legal enforcement 
power, the CSRC can carry out more efficient and more serious punishment 
against those who exploit voluntary disclosure thus enhance the confidence 
investors have in voluntarily disclosed information. This can lead voluntary 
disclosure into a positive circle. This being said, there is also not enough 
protection for some companies who want to voluntarily disclose forecast 
financial information. Financial forecast is helpful to investors if the information 
is properly generated, however at the moment in Chinese stock market there is 
no incentive for companies to do better in preparing such information; because 
whether or not companies prepared the information with good intentions or not, 
if the forecast is not as accurate, the people with a good intention will be 
punished the same way as those who intended to manipulate investors. For profit 
generating organizations, if there is not incentive for doing things with the right 
intention, then what is it there to stop them doing it with a wrong one? Another 
problem is in the documents that supposed to guide and help companies to 
achieve better voluntary disclosure. One can not simple use one word to guide 
the disclosure choice of an annual report, language and logic in those documents 
need to be made clear so preparers of annual reports can sense accurately what 
does the regulatory agency want them to disclose, and what the agency demand 
they just disclose.   
 
The second set of problems lay with investors. Chinese stock market is young 
and its investors are not so sophisticated, investors may misinterpretation 
information voluntarily disclosed by the company; the companies will then fear 
to disclose more, then investors will get less information and they will use their 
own undependable way to try to acquire more. This is a negative cycle. In order 
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to fix this problem, not only the regulatory power needs to improve itself and 
amend legislation, the investors need to be better educated as well. They need to 
be taught about risk and rational thinking first, before they are taught how to 
short term profit using the candlestick charts. However, there could be more to 
this investor issue, one cant simply blame everything on education. People 
become skeptical when there is none they can seek to trust, the dominating 
SOEs, the CSRC and the central government, these bodies are all tied together 
by a complicated chain of command. So eventually if one cant trust companies’ 
disclosures activities just by themselves, theoretically they still have the 
regulatory body they can look up to; but for Chinese stock market, they can’t 
look up to the CSRC because it is eventually run and monitored by the same 
people who run and monitor the companies that they don’t trust in the first 
place. 
7.9 Implications 
This section discusses some implications of this study, with focus on: 
implications for future study; implications for development Chinese stock 
market disclosure regulation system.  
7.9.1 Implications for future studies 
The study of voluntary disclosure had become an important field in accounting 
research. There has been ample amount of studies undertaken on voluntary 
disclosure internationally. However, in China, study on voluntary disclosure can 
be still considered as in a starting phase. Even this topic has triggered many 
research interests and there had been some comprehensive studies, some 
Chinese studies in this field do not look at the overall picture and do not offer 
reasons of certain disclosure behavior. For example, in a very recent study of 
Lan, Wang and Zhang (2013), the authors found increasing of voluntary 
disclosure does not lead to less cost of capital. Despite a very good sample size 
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of 1066 companies, they do not explore reasons behind this phenomenon; they 
did not include anything relate to disclosure of environmental and social 
responsibilities in their 119 voluntary disclosure items; yet they have included 
over 20 financial ratio analysis in their disclosure item list. The understanding of 
corporate characteristics and disclosure behaviour is important, but 
understanding possible reasons behind such behavior is important also. Also, 
based Chinese studies on previous international studies is very helpful, but 
China’s unique situations need to be considered; for example, low investor 
education level and lack of investor sophistication could mean voluntary 
disclosure of ratio analysis may not serve its purposes and thus may not be 
chosen by corporations. Then if one include such items in measuring voluntary 
disclosure level of Chinese corporations, wrong conclusions could be reached. 
 
This study attempts to provide a more complete picture of the Chinese corporate 
disclosure regulation system, its unique corporate governing situation, 
individual investors’ interpretation capabilities of accounting information and 
some rising social concerns people care about; and this study attempts to link 
these factors together when constructing a voluntary disclosure check list and 
when analyzing change in voluntary disclosure level of Chinese listed 
companies. The findings in this study can be a stepping stone for future studies 
on Chinese corporations’ voluntary disclosure behavior: the modified use of 
classic accounting theories; the reveal of some possibly more fundamental 
reasons behind certain disclosure behavior like regulatory loopholes and 
self-regulating issues; and more insights into construction of a voluntary 
disclosure check list for Chinese corporations. 
7.9.2 Implications for development Chinese stock market voluntary disclosure 
regulation and guidance system 
As this study reviewed, China has already set up a regulatory system for 
voluntary disclosure. However, this system has loopholes as reviewed in this 
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study. These loopholes include the following. First, the CSRC lacks regulatory 
power and power to punish harmful disclosure activities; it lacks regulatory 
power and has low efficiency. Second, the guidance companies receive on how 
to and what to voluntarily disclose is in fact very lacking; the confusing wording 
in some key documents lead to confusion rather than clarity, this needs to be 
fixed. Third, the education offered to individual investors are insufficient and 
perhaps mostly in the wrong direction and order; if the investors can not 
interpret information in a right manner, than voluntary disclosure could do more 
harm then good.  
 
In order to solve these problems, this study proposes the following. First, 
restructure the regulatory and monitoring system. This mainly involves 
simplifying relevant structures and improve coordination. As reviewed in this 
study, the Chinese disclosure regulatory and monitoring system is complex and 
confusing; there is power overlapping issue and yet there is no one with real 
authority to make change happens beside the central government. Supposingly, 
the central government represents the will of all people as it is the People’s 
Congress; but the reality is, what ever message comes from central command 
gets lost in this confusing and complex system. And agents in the lower part of 
the power hierarchy like the CSRC can not do the job it is entrusted with 
because this system does not grant it power. This system needs to be 
re-configured and simplified, power needs to concentrate so the regulatory and 
monitoring agent can do its job. Jobs including: guiding documents from a 
single source; better wording in these guiding documents; power in punishment 
and encouragement of relevant disclosure activities; and grant power to 
individual investors who are powerless against big corporations in legal 
conflicts, so they can be truly protected. 
 
Second, the improvement of Chinese individual investors’ information education 
and interpretation capabilities. Chines individual investors’ at present stage can 
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still be considered as very suspicious and overly rely on government information. 
Better education needs to be provided so they can gain better information 
interpretation capabilities. This is not just the job of authority, this is the job of 
corporations as well. Theory suggest corporations get influenced and in turn 
influence society, the corporations need to make a change as well; they need to 
lead the investors in certain areas. For example, less disclosure of government 
policy could possibly lead them to focus less on policy rumors. Also, less 
disclosure of environmental information could lead them to be less sensitive to 
environmental issues, this is very dangerous and should not be done. 
 
Chapter Eight: Conclusion 
China’s stock market has expanded greatly in size and is now very important to 
the global economy, this expansion has happened in a very short period. 
Voluntary disclosure of corporate information can help to maintain market 
growth and stability as it mitigates information asymmetry and increase faith 
investors have in companies.  
 
Many Chinese scholars have investigated the effect of voluntary disclosure, the 
improvement in voluntary disclosure, Chinese corporations’ voluntary disclosure 
level and relevant disclosure regulation/monitor system. Although these studies 
offer a lot of insights, due to regulatory environment changes some of them can 
be considered as out of date; some of them rely on international studies to 
develop tools to evaluate Chinese corporations’ voluntary disclosure activities 
but fail to consider possible inappropriateness of doing so due to some China’s 
unique situation. This study attempts to fill such gaps. 
 
Following a review of previous studies, this study reviewed some of China’s 
unique situations. These situations include China’s disclosure regulatory system 
and some of its problems, the Chinese SOEs who play a very important part in 
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China’s economy and its manager reward system, and Chinese individual 
investors’ education. By combining previous studies, the author then constructed 
an analytical framework based on agency theory, legitimacy theory and 
institutional theory with taking into consideration China’s unique situations. 
This study then developed a voluntary disclosure check list partly based on 
previous studies and with additions based on the current Chinese environment. 
This study then used this developed check list to conduct empirical analysis of 
the voluntary disclosure level of top 50 Chinese companies by market 
capitalization listed on Shanghai Stock Exchange during period 2008-2012. 
 
The empirical results and other research in this study highlighted many 
interesting issues. The Chinese disclosure regulation system itself is confusing 
and complex, power overlapping and insufficient power in key agent the CSRC 
cause blurry guidance for corporations, and very low investigation and 
punishment efficiency for harmful disclosure activities. The regulatory 
documents themselves have confusing wording issues, which make them less 
helpful if not hindrance to users; they also tend to be very strict on forecasting 
information but do not offer protection for good faith like the “safe harbor” 
clause. Some of the biggest corporations in China are SOEs, these SOEs face 
self-regulation issues since them and the CSRC are both completely and solely 
controlled by the central government. Finally it is noted that the individual 
Chinese investors receive insufficient education on how to avoid risk in stock 
market and tend to be very suspicious.  
 
Empirical results show that selected companies’ overall voluntary disclosure 
level did not increase during 2008-2012, rather it dropped. Chinese corporations 
appear not to be disclosing certain financial forecast information such as 
revenue, this is possibly due to lack of protection for inaccurate forecast and 
serious punishment for inaccurate forecast; this could also be due to 
interpretation capabilities of Chinese individual investors. Some selected 
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companies demonstrated a lacking in disclosure of human resource related 
information, they disclose no materialistic information and they show a serious 
lack in disclosing information regard to employment of ethnic minorities and 
gender issues. Corporate governance information disclosure has been relevantly 
high compared to other disclosure categories, this demonstrates that detail 
guidance does lead to better disclosure, this supports institutional theory. 
Managers of these top 50 companies are not found to disclose information with 
respect to how company strategy might impact their current performance and 
how long it will take to carry out the current strategy (strategic time frame). 
Results indicated that most of the top listed companies do demonstrate their 
R&D efforts and advantages, this supports previous studies’ finding on 
disclosure of core competency related information. Empirical results indicate an 
anomaly during 2009-2010 regarding social responsibility and environmental 
issues, many corporation detached their CSR report or environmental report 
from their annual reports; but no evidence was found to explain this widespread 
action. The results obtained here could also answer a question: do SOEs really 
need to disclose information to the public to maintain legitimacy? The answer is 
probably not; as it would appear that their legitimacy is not separated from the 
government. From an agency theory perspective, if the government is the 
principal, the SOE leaders don’t really have an incentive to reduce monitoring 
costs in a classical way. The monitoring costs to the government is really “Are 
they tightly following the policies and regulations we gave them?”, in this sense, 
after regulation stated CSR/sustainability report should be separated from annual 
reports, the SOEs leaders will try to response to it as quickly as possible. 
 
This study has two major set of implications. As for implications for future study, 
this study can provide a more complete picture of the Chinese corporate 
disclosure regulation system, its unique corporate governing situation, 
individual investors’ interpretation capabilities of accounting information and 
some rising social concerns people care about; and this study links these factors 
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together when constructing a voluntary disclosure check list and when analyzing 
change in voluntary disclosure level of Chinese listed companies. The findings 
in this study can be a stepping stone for future studies on Chinese corporations’ 
voluntary disclosure behavior. As for Implications for development Chinese 
stock market voluntary disclosure regulation and guidance system, this study 
proposes the following. First, restructure the regulatory and monitoring system. 
This would involve simplifying relevant structures and improve coordination. 
This system needs to be re-configured and simplified, power needs to be 
concentrated so the regulatory and monitoring agent can do its job. Issues 
including: guiding documents from a single source; better wording in these 
guiding documents; power in punishment and encouragement of relevant 
disclosure activities; and grant power to individual investors who are powerless 
against big corporations in legal conflicts, so they can be truly protected. Second, 
the improvement of Chinese individual investors’ information education and 
interpretation capabilities. Better education needs to be provided so they can 
gain better information interpretation capabilities. This is not just the job of 
authority, this is the job of corporations as well. For example, less disclosure of 
government policy could possibly lead them to focus less on policy rumors. Also, 
less disclosure of environmental information could lead them to be less sensitive 
to environmental issues, this is very dangerous and should not be done. 
 
The major limitation of this study is sample size, 50 companies may not be able 
represent the Chinese corporate population even these top companies comprise 
the majority62 of the market. However, this study still offer value insights into 
Chinese corporate voluntary disclosure. Some issues in this study can be 




                                                             
62 Over 60% of the market by market capitalization, please go to appendix 11 for details 
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Appendix 1: Chinese Corporate Disclosure Regulations 
General Category: 
Standards for the Content and Format of 
Information Disclosure by Companies that 
Offer Securities to the Public 
Specific Document 
No.1 - Prospectus (Revised in 2006) 
No.2 - Annual Report (Revised in 2012) 
No.3 - Semi-annual Report 
No.4 – Allotment Specification (Repealed) 
No.5 -- Modification of Shares of the Company 
No.6 –Legal Opinion (Repealed) 
No.7 –Listing Announcement 
No.8 –Verification Notes (Repealed) 
No. 9 - Application Documents for the Initial 
Public Offering and Listing of Stocks 
No. 10 - Application Documents of Listed 
Companies for Offering Securities to the 
Public 
No.11 ----Prospectus for New Issue by Listed 
Companies 
No. 12 --Application Documents of Listed 
Companies for Issuing Convertible Company 
Bonds 
No.13 ----Prospectus for Convertible 
Corporate Bonds 
No. 14 – Listing announcement of convertible 
company bonds 
No. 15 - Equity Change Reports 
No. 16 - Acquisition Reports of Listed 
Companies 
No. 17 - Report of Acquisition by Offer 
No.18 - Reports of the Board of Directors of 
the Acquired Companies 
No. 19 - Application Documents for Exemption 
from the Acquisition by Offer 
No.20---Application Document for the Issue of 
Bonds by Securities Companies 
No.21 ----Prospectus for Bonds Offered by 
Securities Companies 
No.22---Public Announcement for Listing of 
Bonds of Securities Companies 
No.23 - Prospectus for Offering Corporate 
Bonds to the Public 
No.24 - Application Documents for Offering 
Corporate Bonds to the Public 
No. 25--Preplan for the Non-public Insurance 
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of Stocks and Issuance Status Reports by 
Listed Companies 
No. 26-Application Documents for the Major 
Asset Restructuring of Listed Companies 
No.27---Sponsors' Statement on Offering and 
Sponsorship Work Report on Offering 
No. 28 - Prospectus of Companies on the 
Growth Enterprise Panel 
No.29---Application Documents for Initial 
Public Offering and Listing in Growth 
Enterprise Market 
No.30 -- Annual Reports of Companies Listed 





Rules on the Preparation and Submission 
of Information Disclosed by Companies 
Offering Securities to the Public 
Specific Document 
No. 1 - Special Regulations for the Prospectus of 
Commercial Banks (Repealed and Replaced by 
No.18) 
No. 2 - Special Regulations for the financial 
reports of Commercial Banks (Repealed and 
Replaced by No.18) 
(No. 3) -- Special Provisions on the Contents and 
Formats of Prospectuses of Insurance Companies 
(No. 4) -- Special Provisions on the Information 
Disclosure of Insurance Companies 
No. 5 - Special Regulations for the Content and 
Formats of Prospectus of Securities Companies 
No. 6 - Special Regulations for the Financial 
Report of Securities Companies 
No. 7 - Special Regulations for the Content and 
Formats of Annual Reports of Commercial Banks 
(Repealed and Replaced by No.18) 
No.8 Special Regulation for the Contents and 
Forms of Annual Report by Securities Companies 
(No.9): Calculation and Disclosure of Return on 
Equity and Earnings per Shares 
No. 10 - Special Regulations for the Content and 
Formats of Prospectus of Real Estate Companies 
No. 11 - Special Regulations for the Financial 
Report of Real Estate Companies 




(No. 13) –Quarterly Statement 
No. 14 –Treatment of Non-standard unqualified 
audit opinion and its relevant issues 
(No. 15) -General Rules on Financial Reports 
No. 16 - Interim Provisions on Supplementary 
Audit Implemented by A-share Companies 
No. 17 – Prospectus of Foreign Invested 
Companies 
No. 18 - Special Regulations for the Information 
Disclosure of Commercial Banks (Repealed and 
Replaced by No.26) 
No. 19 – Correction and Update of Financial 
Information 
No.20--Contents and Formats of Quarterly 
Reports of Enterprises Listed on Growth 
Enterprise Panel 
No.21 -- General Provisions on the Annual 
Internal Control Evaluation Report 
Could not find this document and could not find 
evidence this document existed63 
Could not find this document and could not find 
evidence this document existed 
Could not find this document and could not find 
evidence this document existed 
Could not find this document and could not find 
evidence this document existed 
No. 26 - Special Regulations for the Information 




Questions and Answers for 
Information Disclosed by 
Companies Offering Securities to 
the Public 
Specific Document 
No. 1: Uncommon Losses and Profits 
No. 2: Set up and recording of Mid and Top 
management reward fund  
No. 3: The source, calculation and disclosure of 
accumulated loss 
No. 4 – Profit allocation, Auditing Differences caused 
by domestic and foreign auditing standards for 
finance companies 
No. 5 – Disclosure of Differences in Financial Reports 
Caused by differences between domestic and foreign 
accounting standards 
                                                             
63 The author searched the internet generally, searched the CSRC Website specifically. Other documents 
could be found, but No 22~No 25 could not be found 
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No. 6 – Disclosure of Payment to Accounting Firms for 
Service Rendered 
No. 7 - Compilation and Disclosure of Comparative 
Financial Accounting Information during Transition 
Period between New and Old Accounting Standards 
 
General Category: 
Explanatory Announcement for Information 
Disclosure by Companies that Issue 
Securities to the Public 
Specific Document 






































Appendix 2: Influential Power of SOEs 
According to the China’s National Bureau of Statistics, the number of SOEs 
(refer to the ones follow into their narrow definition) will drop well below 80 by 
the end of 2012 (NBS, 2010) due to reform schedule. The number makes it look 
insignificant compare to other listed companies on the two stock exchange 
which numbers are in the thousands. However, it would be wrong for one to 
think like this. 
 
First of all, according to <The guiding opinion on promoting the adjustment of 
state owned capital and the reorganization of state own enterprises 2006>, the 
state will maintain at least fifty percent ownership stake in the following 
industries: defense industry, coal industry, air transportation, power generating, 
petroleum and petrochemical, shipping, telecommunication. After examining 
data extracted from the audited financial statement of certain SOE and data 
found on China National Bureau of Statistics website, the author found by 
visible evidence alone64, companies controlled by the state government still 
dominant in these industries in terms of revenue, industrial output and market 
capitalization. Below is a demonstration: 
SOEs in China’s petroleum and petrochemical industry 201065: 
Name Revenue( in billion 
RMB) 
% of Revenue to Total 
Market 
Zhu Hai Zhen Rong 61 0.7 
China Offshore Oil Corp 355 4 






                                                             
64 Due to the narrow definition of SOEs acknowledged by state government and possible indirect control, 
the true level of control the state has over the economy is likely to be higher.  






Other SCE revenue 
(Estimated according to 
WTO definition ) 
Subtotal 
2630 29.5 
Total SOE and SCE 6680 74.8 
Others 2251 25.2 
Industry Total 8931 100 
Second, besides the industry group just examined which was labeled as 
“strategic industry”, there are also those one might call “model industry”. 
According to the <Guiding Opinion>66, the state government will and must 
maintain control in the key enterprises in these industries regardless how many 
shares the state hold; it could be no shareholding at all. These industries include: 
Automobile, steel production, construction, Non-Ferrous Metal, Machinery and 
Equipment, Information and Scientific Technology. According to statistical data 
after taken into the consideration of the WTO definition of SOE, the visible 
control coming from the state is lower in these industries, the exceptions is the 
automobile industry in terms of Market Occupation but not revenue, as 
demonstrated below67: 
Automobile SOE output 2010 
   
Name  Output In Million Units Market Occupy Share % 
KwanTong Auto Group 0.7 4 
Peking Auto Industry 
Group 
1.5 8.3 
Changan Automobile Co 
Ltd 
2.4 13.2 
                                                             
66 The same document in last paragraph, not using full name here to avoid over lengthing.  




FAW Group 2.6 14.2 
Dongfeng Automobile 2.6 14.2 
Shanghai Auto Industry 
Group 
3.6 19.7 
SOE subtotal 13.4 73.5 
Others 4.7 26.5 
Market Total 18 100 
 
Third, even though the banking sector is not listed as a strategic industry nor a 
“model industry”, but as the author will demonstrate below, it is still controlled 
by the state just through a different regulatory path with a set of different 
regulatory structure. There are three levels of banks in China. The first level 
could be called State banks or as Chinese people call it “policy banks” as they 
directly carry out and reinforce nation’s fiscal policy, they are Agriculture 
Development Bank, China Development Bank and Expo-Import Bank of China. 
The second level is SE banks; they are Industrial and Commercial Bank, 
Agricultural Bank, Bank of China, China Construction Bank. These four banks 
despite they are listed, are fully owned by the state by the Ministry of Finance 
(they don’t go through SASACs). There are many joint owned commercial 
banks, the author could not find precise how many there are; but some scholar 
estimate these joint owned commercial banks along with SE banks and policy 
banks control around 75% of China’s banking assets (Deng et al, 2011). Thus, it 
is reasonable to consider the state controls the banking sector. 
 
At last, there is also the flow of investment funding issue. Certain studies state 
that SOEs gain funding much easier than private companies (Price, Lightizer 
and Schagrin, 2009; Tsai, 2002), but after reading these studies the author could 
not agree on their evidence thus the credibility of their conclusion68. However, 
the five year plans issued by the CCP that set what types of preferences to be 
                                                             
68 Much of them are based on speculations or news rather than academic and verifiable resources 
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provided to certain industries do point out what type of enterprises “should” 
gain more support from local government and banks; and the state controlled 
banks do follow these instructions. For example, all banks among the top 50 
companies69 listed on Shanghai Stock Exchange increase loan granted to “green 
energy” companies. Thus, the state government has substantial influence over 
SOEs or non SOEs regard to investment funding. Even more investment into 
green energy development is a good thing, one should not forget this is rather 

































                                                             
69 By market capitalization 
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Appendix 3: Two Cases on Investor Education and 
Sophistication 
This appendix review and analyze two major scandals happened in Chinese 
stock market in 2007 and 2013, one before the testing period of this thesis and 
one after. By analyzing these two cases, the author hopes to further advance 
understanding about the Chinese stock market specifically regarding to what had 
been discussed in chapter three: the disclosure regulation system, voluntary 
disclosure guidance, the importance of government and individual investors. 
The HangXiao Steel Structure Scandal-Power of SOEs and 
suspicious investors 
Case Review 
HangXiao Steel Structure (HXSS, listing code 60047) listed on Shanghai Stock 
Exchange on 10th of November 2003, a leading company in steel structure 
manufacturing and design, its annual processing capability was around 1 million 
tons at the time, it also has top Chinese certificate in project engineering.  
 
In February 2007, during the 2006 annual commendatory meeting, the Chairman 
of the Board of HXSS told the participants that 2007 would be a great year, if 
the big foreign project proceeds as schedule, the group’s 2007 revenue could 
reach 15 billion RMB. This foreign project was supposed to be this contract with 
the Angola government to build residential homes, contract value of 30 billion 
RMB. On the same day of the meeting, 12th of February 2007, the share price of 
HXSS surged to fluctuation limit within hours. It wasn’t until 15th of the same 
month the group announced anything about this contract, nor did it report this to 
the authorities. And from 12th of February to 16th of March 2007, the share price 
of HXSS surged to fluctuation limit 10 times rise to 10.75 RMB from 4.14 RMB, 
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an increase of 159%. By the 19th of March, the CSRC stepped in, halted HXSS’s 
shares from getting trade, the investigation continued until the 30th of March and 
then CSRC actually allowed HXSS share trading to resume at the 2nd of April. 
The share surged to fluctuation limit again right the next day and emergency halt 
was issued again by the CSRC on the 4th of April. After the CSRC issued 
administrative punishment to HXSS, HXSS share trading resumed after 14th of 
May and reached history highest by the 25th of may with 31.57 RMB per share. 
HXSS share price remained in violent fluctuation after that until it hit 4.54 RMB 
per share on the 28th of August 2008. 
 
On the 3rd of February 2008, three suspects were found guilty of inside 
information leak and insider trading and were sentenced 18 month and 30 month 
in jail. The illegal profit gained from this which totaled 40 million RMB was 
recovered and turned to the state. 
Case Analysis 
While the information leaked does not relate to voluntary disclosure in annual 
reports since such information could impact company performance significantly 
and thus is required to be disclose to the public on time by the Security Law, it 
still offers some interesting points. 
 
The first would be the individual investors reaction to the contact came from 
Angola. There were major doubts raised by individual investors about whether 
or not this is real because they had doubts if a private company could get such a 
huge contact, this contract value was 4% of Angola’s national GDP at that time. 
It appears in the mind of the mass population, only SOE can gain access to such 
big contract direct with another nation’s government. This demonstrates the 
power and influence of SOE. 
 
The second would be CSRC’s actions and power in this matter. As mentioned in 
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chapter two, from the establishment of a case until CSRC can carry out an 
official action, the case has to go through a long chain of authorities. This 
practically forced CSRC to let HXSS share trading to resume before the truth 
could be officially announced to the public. Even though the contract was 
proven real, CSRC could not make an official announcement to cease the doubts 
in people’s mind and such investigation authority is of a criminal case nature 
thus by the chain of legal authority can not be completed by CSRC alone. This 
caused lost of trust among individual investors. 
The ChangJiu Bio-Chemical Co Ltd Scandal, 2013-History 
repeats 
Case Review 
One day, one notice and fully stated owned SOE dropped many Chinese 
investors from heaven right down to hell. ChangJiu Bio-Chemical Co Ltd 
(CJBC), is a company with the following status: 
2012 had a total loss of 145 million RMB 
First three quarters of 2013, loss of 55 million RMB 
A seven quarter loss streak since the first quarter in 2012 
Total Net Asset just 52.31 million RMB 
Total Debt of 794 million RMB 
Only two quarters out of the seven quarters since the start of 2012 the company 
had a positive cashflow 
 
No doubt there are serious issues with this company, but its share price rise from 
15 RMB/share at 27th of December 2012 to 40.6 RMB/share at May 2013 and it 
dropped right back to where it was within 10 days. This was labeled as “the 
biggest disaster since the opening” by many financial analysts and 
commentators. So how did this all happen and what does voluntary disclosure 
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got to do with it? 
 
It all started with the GanZhou (a city of the JiangXi province) Rare Earth 
(GZRE), a fully stated owned SOE under the direct control of GanZhou SASAC. 
This SOE hold 43 mining grants and control 60% national extraction and 
processing of a specific type of rare earth. This type of heavy rare earth is the 
source of [Dysprosium], which is needed for laser devices, nuclear reactors, 
computer hard drives, hybrid motors and much more. Almost all this type of 
heavy rare earth concentrate in China, so in other words, this SOE is responsible 
for 60% of global extraction and processing. During March 2011, the JiangXi 
provincial government put the listing of this SOE on the top of its timetable. 
And rumors spread like wildfire about which company it is going to use to go 
back door listing, as far as the author counted, there are nearly 20 listed 
companies involved in the rumor during March 2011 to April 2011 alone.  
 
So how did CJBC got involved in this? First, the investors used what they think 
“Screening Method” to isolate which company is the most likely one, CJBC was 
one of them. And 8 months after the rumor first spreaded, even the GanZhou 
SASAC officially announced it wasn’t going to go back door listing yet, the 
JiangXi provincial SASAC, the pronvincial SASAC controls the local GanZhou 
SASAC, sold 85% ChangJiu Group (this is the mother company of CJBC) 
shares it held to GanZhou Industrial Investment. This GanZhou industrial 
investment is also actually controlled by GanZhou SASAC. 
 
The investors soon started to think of this as a sign that the GanZhou SASAC is 
making room for CJBC share acquisition. And then a notice voluntarily 
disclosed by CJBC added fuel to the fire after the rumors brewed for 10 month. 
At 28th of December 2012, CJBC issued a public notice stating: After asking the 
GanZhou SASAC about the rare earth resource, the GanZhou SASAC told them 
due to national policy it is unclear whether or not the rare earth resource is going 
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to be listed on stock exchange and  
“…thus there is no plan at this stage to make such SOE to be listed” 
 
Many investors interpreted the message this way: when policy clears out, they 
will proceed with listing by using back door listing through CJBC. Share prices 
started to rise despite the poor performance of CJBC, and during this rising 
period, CJBC sold 18 million shares to three parties, total value of 350 million 
RMB with average share price between 18.9 to 21.4.  
 
The avalanche came at 3rd of November 2013, GuangDong Weihua publicly 
announced its restructuring plan stated the company is going to issue 1.476 
billion shares to GanZhou Rare Earth with share price of 5.14 RMB. After this, 
GanZhou SASAC will become the actual controller of GuangDong Weihua with 
a shareholding of 75%. The rumor bubble vanished, CJBC was not the one. And 
there is what happened: 
 
 
By the 11th of November 2013, investors were gathering outside of CSRC 
headquater or on the way to Jiangxi to protest, and the three parties that acquired 
18 million CJBC shares remained unharm because they sold them all because 
the avalanche came crashing down. By the 11th of November 2013, CSRC still 
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haven’t halted this share, the loss of investors especially individual investors 
continued. CJBC denied misleading investors by false information and the 
GanZhou SASAC stated the only thing they have for investors is “sympathy” 
and that investors can’t blame loss on them because they haven’t said anything 
about back door listing through CJBC. The CSRC started investigation, but the 
author could not see a conclusion to all this before the due date of this thesis, so 
this is the end of the story. 
Case Analysis. 
First, the power of SOE is well demonstrated in case, especially those strategic 
SOEs, what they are telling the market is crucial and they are opportunities to 
private companies. The negotiations with GuangDong Weihua of course could 
not have happened overnight and they could not be publicly announced, this is 
not the SOE and SASAC’s fault in this sense; but still, their influence over the 
stock market is strong. 
 
Second, CJBC was not required under the law to disclose that “12.28” notice, so 
it is voluntary disclosure. And this one piece of information ignited the whole 
thing. So what the company is telling the market is important, but perhaps what 
is more important is how it is perceived. 
 
Third, the CJBC claimed the investors “twisted the information”, the author 
does not wish to comment on that yet. However, this does show some investors 
operate in the Chinese stock market have a gambling mindset. Perhaps a rational 
investor would not invest in a company with that kind of bad performance, at 
least not because of a piece of information that unclear? 
 
Fourth, the CSRC’s actions. This whole thing has not yet ended, so it is 
impossible to see how efficient the CSRC is in this matter. However, from the 
reactions so far, perhaps the CSRC could have stopped it earlier, perhaps the 
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CSRC could have spotted the anomaly sooner and warned the investors, perhaps 
they could have educated them better? 
 
This latest scandal demonstrated well enough how powerful the SOE influence 
is, how shrouded and inefficient the chain of authority is in both SASAC term 
and stock market regulation term and how some Chinese investors lack basic 
rationality. 
Appendix 4: Comparability Concerns 
In some previous studies, banks and security trading companies were excluded 
from sample because it was considered: 
    “Firms must belong to an industry classification other than banking and 
financial institutions, which are subject to a different accounting system and 
disclosure requirements in China” (Wen et al, 2012, pg 35) 
These two categories were usually not included in the sample (Wen et al, 2012; 
Qiao, 2003; Wang and Jiang, 2004; Fan, 2006; Yu and Zhang, 2007). This study 
does not exclude these companies from the sample due to two reasons. First, the 
extra information “suggested” does not collide with voluntary disclosure, they 
wouldn’t affect comparability. Second, banks and security trading companies are 
important forces in Chinese stock market. 
 
The author examined <Standards for the Content and Format of Information 
Disclosure by Companies that Offer Securities to the Public No. 7> and No.8, 
the two documents that give extra “guide” on information disclosure in annual 
reports by banks and security trading companies. The first thing banks were 
specifically suggested to disclose was Capital Adequacy Ratio (Capital to Risk 
Assets Ratio, CRAR if one prefers). They were asked to do this because in the 
<Commercial Banking Law> enacted in 1995 required this ratio is not to be 
lower than 8%, but there were two banks (The Pudong Development Bank and 
the Shenzhen Development Bank) did not disclose this ratio in annual reports, 
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thus special standards were issued to repair this legal loophole “must not be 
lower than 8% but we forgot to tell you that you have to disclose it”. This is 
directly linked to unconditionally enforceable legislation, therefore this is 
mandatory. 
 
By 1998, the China central bank published guiding principle on loan risk 
classification, a duplicate of USA relevant standards. However, before year 2000, 
there was only one bank disclosed their loan risk classification information (The 
MinSheng Bank). Thus this article in the special standard aids the central bank’s 
policy statement and become unconditionally enforceable, this is mandatory as 
well. 
 
There are three disclosure sector can be considered as voluntary due to the 
wording as discussed in chapter three. Banks and security trading companies 
were suggested to quantify several risk factors and analyze them as much as 
possible, if quantitative analysis is impossible to perform, qualitative analysis 
“should (Ying-Dang)” be provided. The main aim of this special sector is to let 
investor see the banks and security trading companies’ liquidity. Second, these 
two types of companies were suggested to have an accounting firm to evaluate 
whatever risk control mechanisms they have. Should accounting firms detect 
fault in these mechanisms, board of directors will be asked to explain and the 
supervisory panel will need to step in. Third, these two types of companies were 
asked to hire international accounting firms to conduct additional auditing by 
following international accounting and auditing standards. 
 
It is true that the CSRC emphasized risk control and internal control for these 
two types of companies, but as analyzed, two of these additional suggestions are 
basically mandatory (CRAR and loan risk). As for quantitative analysis of risk, 
the risk factors that they were asked to quantitatively discussed as much as they 
can are industry special figure such as saving/load ratio, mid-term 
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loan/long-term load ratio. Despite they were suggested to have extra monitoring 
from accounting firms on their risk control mechanisms, they were not 
suggested in any way in these Standards to disclose that they set up an extra risk 
management mechanism or they have a separate risk management committee. 
And companies may employ an international accounting firm regardless of these 
Standards if they see there is a reason, such reason could be anything not just 
suggestions from the CSRC. 
 
Therefore, comparability damage from including these two industries in the 
sample is really not as much as some previous studies declared and it would be 
interesting to test if these “suggestions” that came from the regulatory power did 






























Appendix 5: Unconditionally Enforceable Disclosure Laws 
Article 13, 59, 161, 58, 
47,48,61,60,62,79,80,83,89,93,64,66,110,167,63,175,177 of the Security Law. 
Article 61 focus on Annual Report; Article 64,66,110,167 focus on information 
disclosure regulation; Article 63,175,177 focus on legal responsibilities 
regarding information disclosure 
 
Article 87,88,140,153,156,175,176,156,149,184,185,186,206,207,212,217,218 
of the Company Law. Article 156,175,176 focus on annual reports; article 
206,207,211,212,217,218 focus on legal responsibilities regarding information 
disclosure 
 
Article 15,19,33,34,57,59,58,47,48,49,60,61,62,74,77,78 of the Interim 
Provisions on the Management of the Issuing and Trading of Stocks. Article 
57,59 focus on annual report; article 74,77,78 focus on legal responsibilities 

















Appendix 6: Initial Disclosure Check List and Screening 
General/Overall Corporate Information Removal Re-Categorization 
Corporate History Y-As required by The 
Company Law  
 
Corporate Structure Y-AS required by The 
Company Law 
 
Statement of financial strategy and 
objectives 
 Re-categorized into VD1-Financial Information, under item [Advantage 
and Difficulties] 
Statement of marketing strategy and 
objectives 
 Re-categorized into VD4-Management and Strategy under item 
[Branding] 
Statement of social strategy and 
objectives 
 Re-categorized into VD6-Society and Environment, under item 
[Corporate culture] 
Strategic plan and barriers may 
encounter 





Selling Prices analysis  Re-categorized into VD1-financial information, under 
any item 
Raw Material price 
analysis 
 Re-categorized into VD1-financial information, under 
any item 
Labour Cost analysis  Re-categorized into VD1-financial information, under 
any item 
Impact of policy and 
Law 
 Re-categorized into VD1-financial information, under 
item impact of macro economic or policy risk on 
financial 
Industry trend analysis  Re-categorized into VD1-financial information, under 
item impact market risk on financials 
Competitor analysis  Re-categorized into VD4-management and strategy, 
under item competitor analysis 
Impact of environment 
on business 









Why Income has 
changed  
Review/Analysis of major change 
removed due to premise check 
discussed in Chapter 5 under section 
5.2.1; Review/Analysis of non major 




investor sophistication discussed under 
5.2.2 
Why cost has 
changed  
Review/Analysis of major change 
removed due to premise check 
discussed in Chapter 5 under section 
5.2.1; Review/Analysis of non major 
change removed due to concern of 
investor sophistication discussed under 
5.2.2 
 
Why sales have 
changed  
Review/Analysis of major change 
removed due to premise check 
discussed in Chapter 5 under section 
5.2.1; Review/Analysis of non major 
change removed due to concern of 
investor sophistication discussed under 
5.2.2 
 
Why margins have 
changed  
Review/Analysis of major change 
removed due to premise check 
discussed in Chapter 5 under section 
5.2.1; Review/Analysis of non major 
change removed due to concern of 
investor sophistication discussed under 
5.2.2 
 
Why net profit has 
changed  
Review/Analysis of major change 
removed due to premise check 
discussed in Chapter 5 under section 
5.2.1; Review/Analysis of non major 
change removed due to concern of 
investor sophistication discussed under 
5.2.2 
 




 Re-categorized into VD-4 
management and strategy, 
under item continuity and 
stability and item impact of 
strategy on current 
performance 
Why inventory 
level changed  
Review/Analysis of major change 
removed due to premise check 
discussed in Chapter 5 under section 
5.2.1; Review/Analysis of non major 
change removed due to concern of 
investor sophistication discussed under 
5.2.2 and this item affects comparability 
for service centered companies 
 
Why accounts Review/Analysis of major change  
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receivable changed  removed due to premise check 
discussed in Chapter 5 under section 
5.2.1; Review/Analysis of non major 
change removed due to concern of 
investor sophistication discussed under 
5.2.2 
Why accounts 
payable changed  
Review/Analysis of major change 
removed due to premise check 
discussed in Chapter 5 under section 
5.2.1; Review/Analysis of non major 
change removed due to concern of 






 Re-categorized into VD-4 
management and strategy, 
under item continuity and 
stability and item impact of 
strategy on current 
performance 




 Re-categorized into VD-5 
Product and service 
development, under item 
development initiatives 
Why market share 
changed  
 Re-categorized into VD-4 
management strategy, 
under any item except item 
strategic time frame 
Why cash flow 
changed  
Review/Analysis of major change 
removed due to premise check 
discussed in Chapter 5 under section 
5.2.1; Review/Analysis of non major 
change removed due to concern of 





Review/Analysis of major change 
removed due to premise check 
discussed in Chapter 5 under section 
5.2.1; Review/Analysis of non major 
change removed due to concern of 
investor sophistication discussed under 
5.2.2 
 
Why debt changed Review/Analysis of major change 
removed due to premise check 
discussed in Chapter 5 under section 




change removed due to concern of 
investor sophistication discussed under 
5.2.2 
Why total asset 
changed 
Review/Analysis of major change 
removed due to premise check 
discussed in Chapter 5 under section 
5.2.1; Review/Analysis of non major 
change removed due to concern of 




(long and short 
term) changed 
 Re-categorized into VD-4 
management and strategy, 
under any item except item 
competitor analysis and 
client analysis 
Gear ratio and 
analysis or 
comments 
Review/Analysis of major change 
removed due to premise check 
discussed in Chapter 5 under section 
5.2.1; Review/Analysis of non major 
change removed due to concern of 
investor sophistication discussed under 
5.2.2 
 
Current ratio and 
analysis or 
comments 
Review/Analysis of major change 
removed due to premise check 
discussed in Chapter 5 under section 
5.2.1; Review/Analysis of non major 
change removed due to concern of 
investor sophistication discussed under 
5.2.2 
 
ROE analysis or 
comments 
Review/Analysis of major change 
removed due to premise check 
discussed in Chapter 5 under section 
5.2.1; Review/Analysis of non major 
change removed due to concern of 
investor sophistication discussed under 
5.2.2 
 
ROA analysis or 
comment 
Review/Analysis of major change 
removed due to premise check 
discussed in Chapter 5 under section 
5.2.1; Review/Analysis of non major 
change removed due to concern of 





Review/Analysis of major change 




forecast and actual 
forecast 
changes 
Forecast of cash 
flow 
N/A N/A 
Forecast of Capital 
Expenditure 
N/A N/A 
Forecast of R&D 
expenditures 
 Re-categorized into VD-5 
product and service 





Forecast of sales N/A N/A 
Forecast of costs N/A N/A 
Forecast of turn 
over 
N/A N/A 




 Re-categorized into VD-4 
management and strategy, 
under item impact of 
strategy on current 
performance 
 
Non-Financial Information Removal Re-Categorization 
Discussion or Analysis or 
product/service 
development 
 Re-categorized VD5- Product 
and Service development, 
under any item 
Discussion or Analysis or 
marketing/networking 
effort 
 Re-categorized into VD-4 
management and strategy, 
under item branding 
Difficult issues facing 
and/or possible solutions 
 Re-categorized into VD-4 
management strategy, under 
item advantage and difficulty 
Structure of board of 
directors 
Removed due to CSRC 
corporate governance code 
and premise check discussed 
in Chapter 5 under section 
5.2.1 
 
General information about 
directors 
Removed due to CSRC 
corporate governance code 
and premise check discussed 
in Chapter 5 under section 
5.2.1 
 
Shares held by directors Removed due to CSRC 
corporate governance code 




in Chapter 5 under section 
5.2.1 
Remuneration plan Removed due to Chinese 
Accounting Standard for 
Business Enterprise, the 
Security Law and the 
Company Law 
 
Top shareholders Removed due to premise 
check discussed in Chapter 5 
under section 5.2.1 and lack 
of investor demand discussed 
under 5.2.2 
 
Ultimate controller Removed due to required by 
The Company Law and 
premise check discussed in 
Chapter 5 under section 5.2.1 
 
Change in dividend policy Removed due to required by 
The Company Law and 
premise check discussed in 




Removed due to required by 
The Company Law and 
Chinese Accounting Standard 
for Business Enterprise 
 
Employee training   
Employee Welfare   
Safety concerns and plans  Re-categorized into VD-2 HR, 




















Appendix 7: Scoring Standard 
VD1-Forward Looking Financial Information 
Item-1 Revenue Forecast: 
1 Simply Indicating Revenue could have 
a certain trend in the future 
2 If such claim made above is supported 
by reasons 
3 If such claim is supported by reasons 
and described in quantitative terms 
 
Note: There does not need to be a strong 
logic link between the reasons and the 
quantitative description 
 
Item-2 Cost/Capital Investment Forecast: Apply the Revenue Forecast 
Rule 
Item-3 Profit Forecast: Apply the Revenue Forecast Rule 
Item-4 Cash Flow Forecast: Apply the Revenue Forecast Rule 
Item-5 Turn Over/Production/Service Volume Forecast: Apply the 
Revenue Forecast Rule 
Item-6 Impact of Macro Economics/Policy Risk on Company 
Performance: 
1. Simply mention macro economic risk or 
policy risk could impact company 
performance. 
Example: “2011 will be the start of the 
new five year project, this will likely 
lead to more sales...(no support to back 
up this claim”---<China SANY group 
2010 annual report> 
2. Such claim above made above is 
supported by reasons. Example: “In the 
new five year plan, the national 
government plans to build ….miles of 
new rail roads, thus the company expect 
an increase in the company’s transport 
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capabilities…”---<China Rail 2010 
annual report> 
3. Such claim is supported by reasons and 
described in quantitative terms. 
 
Note 1—Qualifying Conditions: To 
qualify a score 3, there has to be a 
reasonable strong logic connection 
between the quantitative descriptions 
and qualitative descriptions. 
 
Example 
Qualify: The State Assets 
Administration Committee decided to 
increase the Molybdenum extraction cap 
in 2011, thus the company expect to see 
the company molybdenum production 
level of 2011 increase by roughly 10 
percent ---<Jinzhui City Molybdenum 
Co 2010 Annual Report> 
 
Note 2 Avoid Double Counting  with 
scores of Item1-5: Should Macro 
Economics risk or policy risks impact on 
items (1)-(5), and when the influencing 
factors and the company performance 
figure influenced both are described in 
quantitative terms and logically linked 
together, a 3 point is given to this item 
but not items 1-5. 
 
 
Item 7: Apply the rules set in Item 6 for 1 point and 2 points. 
3. A 3 point will be given as long as the market risk is described in quantatitive 
terms. Example: The house price in Tier 2 cities is expect to drop by 3.5% in the 








Item-8 Training/Career Progression 
1 Simply mention there are training 
programs 
2 Provide details of the programs 
including: program content, what did 
the participants gain  
3 Further details in quantitative terms, 
including: hours devoted to the 
program; results of the training 
(qualifications gained); awards received 
with the awarding date; number of 
participants 
 
Note : Avoid double counting with 
Item-Quality/Safety 
 
If the training’s purposes was to 
improve production/service safety and 
quality, a 3 point will be awarded to that 
item not this one. 
 
Item 9 Employee Welfare: 
1 Simply mention they care about 
employees’ wellbeing 
2 Support the above claim with details 
including: actions took; specific aims of 
specific programs; awards received in 
this field 
3 Further support with quantitative 
information, including: hours spent, 
number of employees enjoyed the 
benefits 
 
Item 10 Recruitment Layoff 
1 Simply mention they recruited new 
employees or they fired employees this 
year; simply mention recruitment or 
layoff policy 
2 Give information about the reason of 
recruitment or layoff; mention 
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recruitment events hosted 
3 Give quantitative information about 
number of employees newly recruited 
or fired; number of and time spent on 
recruitment events; number of people 
participated in these events 
 
Item 11 Employment Fairness 
1 Simply mention their policy or attitude 
towards employment fairness 
2 Further qualitative information about 
employment fairness issues within the 
company or group, including: minority 
races, female/male 
3 Provide quantitative information about 





Item 12 Auditing Committee 
1 Mention the members of the committee 
2 More qualitative information on the 
members, including: qualifications, 
work experience, area of expertise 
3 Provide quantitative information about: 
members’ participation rate; their 
activities on any other committees 
within or outside the company 
 
Item 13 Risk Management Committee (or a monitoring group within 
the company go with different names) 
Apply Item 12’s Rules and/or : 
 
1 Mention the activities of the committee 
2 Further qualitative details on the 
committee’s activities 
3 Provide quantitative details about the 
committee’s activities: date, hours 
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Item 14 Independent Directors 
Apply Item 12’s Rules 
 
Item 15 Disclosure Policy 
1 Simply mention the company cares 
about information disclosure 
transparency and clarity 
2 Further qualitative information about 
the actions they took besides have a 
regular disclose website or newspaper 
3 Quantitative information about the 
effort, including: monetary effort, hours 
devoted to it, people participated 
 
Note: Due to the fact that companies are 
“Strongly suggested” by the CSRC to 
state their regular disclosure platforms, 
this is considered not voluntary. 
 
Item 16 Investor Relation 
1 Simply state the company cares about 
investor relation 
2 Provide further qualitative information 
about the above claim, including: 
campaigns, events hosted, hotlines 
opened, internet based answering 
mechanisms 
3 Provide quantitative information about 
sub-items mentioned in the above 
section 
 
Note: Awards received for investor 
relation management are excluded 
 
 
VD4 Management Strategy 
Item 17 Branding 
1 Simply state the company cares about 
its brand image 
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2 Provide qualitative information about 
the actions company took to preserve or 
improve its brands 
3 Provide quantitative information about 
those actions, including: money spent; 
time spent on campaign or events or 
advertising or other actions.  
 
Item 18 Management Advantages/Difficulties 
1 Simply mention the management 
advantages the company have or soon 
will have; or difficulties company faced 
or likely to face in its normal course of 
business 
 
Note: Advantages and difficulties do not 
have to mention together here to earn a 
1 
2 Provide further qualitative discussion of 
the above claim, and any actions 
took/will be taken to preserve/remove 
the advantages/difficulties 
3 Further support with quantitative 
evidence including: number of 
management personnel involved; 
financial resources devoted; time spent 
or time frame 
 
Item 19 Competitor Analysis 
1 Simply mention existing or potential 
competitors 
2 Further qualitative discussion on such 
competitors, including: product/service 
comparisons; product/services’ 
geographic coverage comparison 
3 Further quantitative suport about above 
information 
Item 20 Client Analysis 
1 Simply mention the clients and the 
company cares about its clients base 
2 Provide further qualitative discussion 
about the clients including: their 
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product/service coverage range; clients’ 
importance to the company 
3 Provide quantitative support for the 
above qualitative information 
 
Item 21 Strategic Time Frame 
1 Simply mention a blurry strategic time 
frame, for example ( we expect it will 
be completed in 5 years) 
2 Further discussion on this time frame 
about the reason behind why set such a 
time frame and any possible stages 
within the time frame 
3 Provide dates about the time frame as a 
whole and stages’ achieving dates if 
there are any 
 
Item 22 Continuity 
1 Simply mention the company is aware 
or care about its ability to continue its 
current course of business; or is 
aware/care about its ability to continue 
in generating returns for 
shareholders/stakeholders 
2 Qualitative discussion about the above 
information 
3 Further quantitative support about the 
above information 
 
Item 23 Impact of strategy on current performances 
1 Mention the company strategy impact 
on its current performance 
2 Qualitative discussion about how and 
why the strategy impact current 
performance 
3 Further quantitative support including; 
performance figures impacted 
VD5 Research/Developments 
Item 24 Research/Development Initiatives 
1 Simply mention has such initiatives 
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2 Qualitative information about such 
initiatives such as: what it actually 
develop; how will the company benefit; 
dates of the initiatives 
3 Further quantitative support for above 
information 
 
Item 25 Research/Development Results 
1 Simply mention the company have or 
will have some research/development 
results 
2 Shed further qualitative information 
about such results such as: what will 
they enhance 
3 Further quantitative information about 
such results: how much improvement in 
quantitative terms; operational time 
 
Item 26 Advantages 
1 Simply mention the results of R&D 
initiatives will give the company an 
advantage in the market over other 
companies in the same industry 
2 Qualitative information on how the 
above is possible 




VD6 Society and Environment 
Item 27 Product/service’s quality and safety 
1 Simply stating the company care about 
product/service quality/safety’s impact 
on the society 
2 Further qualitative information about 
the above claim, including actions took 
or about to take 
3 Quantitative information to further 






Item 28 Environmental Protection 
1 Simply mention the company cares 
about environmental protection or they 
have any environmental protection 
initiatives 
2 Provide more detail qualitative details 
about the above claim or initiatives 
3 Provide quantitative details including 
but not limit to: financial resource 
devoted, technical results; number of 
personnel involved 
 
Item 29 Corporate Culture 
1 Simply mention the corporate culture 
and it benefit the society or the 
company’s defined stakeholder group 
2 Provide qualitative and logical 
discussion for the above claim 
3 Provide quantitative information, 
include but not limit to: personnel and 




Item 30 Community Relation 
1 Simply mention the company cares 
about its relation to community as a 
whole or a particular local community 
2 Further qualitative information 
including: actions took or plan to take; 
awards; local feedback; media exposure 
3 Provide quantitative information 
support for the above qualitative 
discussion 
 
Item 31 Donations 
1 Simply mention the company donate to 
organizations that dedicate to public 
wellbeing 
2 Further discussion about the use of the 
 144 
  
donations and possible benefits may 
come from it 
3 Quantitative information about the 
amount of the donations, date of the 










































Appendix 8: CSRC Industry Classification Code 
Classification structure and codes 
Code Industries 
Description 




animal husbandry and 
fishery 
This category 
includes classes from 
01 to 05. 
  
01 
Agriculture The cultivation of 
various kinds of farm 
crops. 
  02 Forestry   
  
  03  
   
04  
05 
Animal husbandry  
   
Fishery  
Service industry for 
agriculture, forestry, 
animal husbandry and 
fishery 
Animal breeding and 
capture activities to 
obtain various kinds 




Mining industry This category 
includes classes from 
06 to 12. The mining 
industry means the 
extraction of naturally 
produced minerals, 
whether solid (such as 
coal and minerals), 
liquid (such as crude 
oil) or gaseous (such 
as natural gas); 
includes underground 
or ground mining, 
operation of mines, 
and all auxiliary work 
generally conducted 
at or around mine 
sites to process raw 
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materials, such as 
milling, ore dressing 
and processing; also 
includes preparations 
necessary for selling 
raw materials; and 
excludes the storage, 
purification and 





  06 Coal mining and 
dressing industry 
Production activities 
including but not 
limited to the mining, 
dressing and 
classification of a 
variety of coals; 
excluding the 
production of coal 
products and coal 
exploration.                         
  07  
   
   
   
   
   
   
  
Oil and natural gas 
exploitation industry  
   
   
   
   
   
   
  
The exploitation of 
natural crude oil and 
liquid or gaseous 
natural gas as well as 
the exploitation of 
coal mine gas 
(coal-bed methane) in 
land or at sea; 
liquefaction of natural 
gas and production of 
liquefied hydrocarbon 
from natural gas fields 





bituminous shale or 
kerogen shale ores 
and similar operations 
on tar sands ores. 
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  08 Ferrous metal ore 
mining and dressing 
industry 
  
  09 Non-ferrous metal ore 
mining and dressing 
industry 
The mining and 
dressing of commonly 
used non-ferrous 
metal ores, noble 
metal ores and rare 
rare-earth metal ores. 
  10 Non-metallic ore 
mining and dressing 
industry 
  
  11 Exploitation auxiliary 
activities 
Services provided for 
the exploitation of 
coal, oil, natural gas 
and other minerals. 
  12 Other mining 
industries 
  
C   Manufacturing 
industry 
This category 
includes classes from 
13 to 43. It shall be 
deemed manufacture 
that new products are 
made after physical or 
chemical changes, 




whether the products 
are wholesaled or 
retailed.  
The production of 
various finished 
products and spare 
parts of buildings 
shall be deemed 
manufacture, but the 
assembling activities 
on the building 
preform sites, such as 





railways and overhead 






and the installation of 
lights and electrical 
wiring, as well as 
building installation, 








means the production 
process in batch 
where the components 




tools and so on are 
professionally 
repaired and the 
re-manufactured 
products have the 
same quality and 
performance as the 
original new products. 
  13 Agricultural and 
sideline food 
processing industry 
The grain milling, 
feed processing, 
vegetable oil and 
sugar processing, 





and processing of 
vegetables, fruits, nuts 
and other food, which 
directly take the 
products of 
agriculture, forestry, 
animal husbandry and 
fishery as raw 
materials. 
  14 Food manufacturing   




  16 Tobacco 
manufacturing 
  
  17 Textile industry   
  18 Textile garment and 
apparel industry 
  
  19 Leathers, furs, 
feathers and related 
products and footwear 
industry 
  
  20 Wood processing and 
wood, bamboo, rattan, 
Palm fiber, and straw 
product industry 
  
  21 Furniture 
manufacturing 
The manufacture of 
various furniture 
which are made of 
wood, metal, plastic, 
bamboo, rattan and 
other materials for 
such functions as 
sitting, lying, leaning, 
storage and separation 
and can be used in 




theaters, parks, ships, 
 150 
  
aircrafts and motor 
vehicles. 
  22 Papermaking and 
paper product industry 
  




  24 Manufacturing of 
stationery, industrial 
arts, sports and 
entertainment supplies 
  
  25 Industries of 
petroleum processing, 
coking, and nuclear 
fuel processing  
  
  26 Manufacturing of 
chemical raw 
materials and 
chemical products  
  
  27 Pharmaceutical 
industry  
  
  28 Chemical fiber 
manufacturing  
  
  29 Industry of rubber and 
plastic products 
  




  31 Industry of ferrous 
metal smelting and 
rolling processing  
  
  32 Industry of 
non-ferrous metal 
smelting and rolling 
processing  
  
  33 Metal product 
industry 
  









  36 Automobile 
manufacturing 
  

















  40 Instrument and meter 
manufacturing  
  
  41 Other manufacturing 
industries 
  
  42 Industry of 
comprehensive 
utilization of waste 
resources 
The recycling and 
processing of waste 
resources and waste 
materials. 
  43 Industry of metal 
product, machinery 
and equipment repair 
  
D   Industry of electric 
power, heat, gas and 
water production and 
supply 
This category 
includes classes from 
44 to 46. 
  44 Industry of electric 
power and heat 
production and supply  
  





  46 Water production and 
supply industry 
  
E   Construction industry  This category 
includes classes from 
47 to 50. 
  47 Building construction 
industry 
  
  48 Civil engineering 
construction industry 
The construction of 






  49 Construction 
installation industry 
The installation of 
various equipment in 
the buildings after the 
completion of 
construction of the 
main bodies of 
buildings and the line 





at the end of a project, 
such as the finishing 
of walls, floors, 
ceilings, doors and 
windows. 
  50 Architectural 




F   Wholesale and retail 
industry 
This category 
includes classes 51 
and 52, meaning the 
wholesale and retail 





  51 Wholesale industry The selling of 
household goods and 
means of production 
in bulk to other 
wholesale or retail 
entities (including 
sole proprietors), 
other enterprises and 
public institutions, 
government agencies, 
social groups and so 
on, as well as import 
and export trade and 
trade brokerage and 
agency, including 
both the trading by 
entities (companies) 
in their own names 
which own the goods 
and the commodity 
agency and 
commissioned sale of 
commodities by 
entities which charge 
commissions and do 
not own the goods; 
and also including the 
wholesale activities of 




for the purpose of 
sale. 






vending stalls and so 
on mainly to end 
consumers (such as 
residents), the sales 
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activities through the 
Internet, postal 
service, telephone, 
vending machines and 
other channels, also 
including the 
activities of shops 
(such as bakeries) 
which conduct 
processing and 
production at the back 
and sell products in 
the front at the same 
site; the sale of grain, 
seed, feed, livestock, 










equipment) and other 
means of production 
are not deemed retail 
activities; most 
retailers own the 
goods they sold, but 
some conduct 
commissioned sale or 
sell goods to charge 
commissions as 
agents of the 
principals. 
G   Transport, storage and 
postal service industry 
This category 
includes classes from 
53 to 60. 
  53 Railway 
transportation 
industry 
The passenger and 
cargo transportation 





















hospitals and so on 
affiliated to the 
railway system.  
  54 Road transport 
industry 
  
  55 Waterway transport 
industry 
  
  56 Air transport industry   
  57 Pipeline transport 
industry 
  
  58 Industry of 
loading/unloading 
handling and transport 
agency 
  
  59 Storage industry The specialized cargo 
storage and freightage 
transit storage, the 
cargo delivery 
activities mainly 
including storage, and 
acquisition activities 
for the purpose of 
storage.  
  60 Postal service industry   
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H   Accommodation and 
catering industry 
This category 
includes classes 61 
and 62. 
  61 Accommodation 
industry 
The provision of 
short-term lodging 
places for travelers. 
Some entities only 
provide 
accommodation, 






services. This class 
excludes long-term 
house leasing mainly 
on a monthly or 
yearly basis.  
  62 Catering industry The services to 
provide consumers 
with food and 
consumption places 
and facilities through 
instant production and 
processing, 
commercial sale, 
service labor and so 
on.  




technology services  
This category 
includes classes from 
63 to 65. 
  63 Telecommunications, 
radio and television 
and satellite 
transmission services  
  
  64 Internet and related 
services 
  





services for the 
technical problems or 
technical 
requirements arising 








J   Financial industry This category 
includes classes from 
66 to 69. 
  66 Monetary and 
financial services 
  
  67 Capital market 
services 
  
  68 Insurance industry   
  69 Other financial 
industries 
  
K   Real estate industry This category 
includes class 70. 
  70 Real estate industry   




includes classes 71 
and 72. 
  71 Leasing industry   
  72 Commercial service 
industry 
  
M   Scientific research 
and technical service 
industry 
This category 
includes classes from 
73 to 75. 
  
  73 Research and 
experimental 
development 
The systematic and 
creative activities 
conducted for the 




knowledge on nature, 
engineering, human 
being, culture and 
society) and using 
such knowledge to 
create new 
applications; such 
activities shall be only 
limited to the research 
on new discoveries 




development of new 
technologies, new 
products and new 
processes, including 
basic research, 
applied research and 
experimental 
development. 
  74 Professional technical 
service industry 
  
  75 Industry of science 
and technology 
popularization and 
application services  
  
N   Water conservancy, 
environment and 
public facility 
management industry  
This category 
includes classes from 
76 to 78. 
  76 Water conservancy 
management industry 
  




  78 Public facility 
management industry 
  
O   Industry of resident 
service, repair and 
This category 
includes classes from 
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other services  79 to 81. 
  79 Resident service 
industry 
  






  81 Other service 
industries 
  
P   Education This category 
includes class 82. 
  82 Education   
Q   Health and social 
work 
This category 
includes classes 83 
and 84. 
  83 Health   
  84 Social work The provision of 
charity, relief, 
welfare, care, 
assistance and other 
social work. 




includes classes from 
85 to 89. 
  85 Press and publishing 
industry 
  
  86 Radio, television, 








and projecting of the 
contents of radio, 
television, film, and 




reception of radio and 
television signals.  
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  87 Industry of culture 
and arts 
  
  88 Sports   
  89 Entertainment 
industry 
  
S   Diversified industries This category 
includes class 90. 
  90 Diversified industries   
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Appendix 10: 2009-2010 Disclosure Anomaly  
The author found a possible but not directly related reason. The reason is the 
combination of an old piece of SSE’s guiding notice and the <Rules for the 
Determination of Administrative Responsibilities for Information 
Disclosure-related Offenses-Trial> issued by the CSRC on 27th of December 
20127071. Traditionally, the SSE issues guiding notice about improving the 
quality of annual reports every year, and companies are usually suggested to 
“ disclose their CSR reports at the same time they disclose their annual reports”. 
I am of the opinion, this indicates the SSE had been suggesting annual reports 
and CSR reports should be separated and these two reports are not one object. 
And in the rules mentioned above, Article 6 under Chapter 2 <Identification of 
Information Disclosure-related Offenses>, it stated: 
 
“Failure by any information disclosure obligor to disclosure information 
according to the time and manner72 of such disclosure (including information 
reports, hereinafter the same) as prescribed by applicable laws, administrative 
regulations, rules and other regulatory documents as well as the business rules 
of relevant securities exchanges”73 
 
In this way, the “manner” suggested by SSE “rules” was strengthened, thus such 
“manner” would include separation of CSR reports from annual reports and 
separate disclosure. However, it is not certain if those guiding notices count as 
rules, thus this is not strictly a perfect match reason but only the closest reason 
the author could find.  
 
While the most SOEs possibly responded to this change swiftly, the private 
companies continued to include their CSR or sustainability reports in their 
                                                             
70 http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/shenzhen/xxfw/tzzsyd/ssgs/ssxxpl/ssplxx/201101/t20110106_190219.htm 
71 Please note, these offences are subject to administrative punishments, not criminal 
72 The original Chinese word is “Fang Shi 方式“ which also means “the way to do something; how to do 




annual reports, they simply cut down the length of these reports. For example, 
the MinSheng Banking Corp Ltd, a private controlled commercial bank had 39 
pages of CSR report in their 2009 annual reports; in 2010 annual report, the 
CSR report is still there, just the size shrink down to 3 pages. On the other hand, 
PetroChina Company Limited, the state own oil giant had 53 pages of 
sustainability report in their 2009 annual report;  and in their 2010 annual 
report, this sustainability report is completely gone; this led to PetroChina 
scored the year minimum of 0.133. However, not SOEs behaved like PetroChina. 
China Railway Construction Corporation Limited continued to have CSR report 
in their annual report and scored 0.933 for this category. The author briefly 
compared this company with PetroChina , both companies had dominating state 
ownership, both had good profit figures, key financial ratios such as ROE or 
Debt/Asset ratio looked good for both companies, they both have a lot of 
business activities outside of China; these common factors seem unable to 


























Appendix 11: Top 50 Listed Companies’ Market Capitalization 
as % to All Listed Companies’ Market Capitalization Year 2012  
 














































26 600837 0.52 
27 601169 0.52 
28 600031 0.51 
29 600011 0.47 
30 600050 0.47 
31 600585 0.46 
32 601898 0.45 
33 600015 0.45 
34 601989 0.44 
35 601800 0.39 
36 601899 0.38 
37 601186 0.38 
38 601336 0.38 
39 600018 0.38 
40 601766 0.37 
41 600256 0.36 
42 601688 0.35 
43 600547 0.34 
44 600188 0.34 
45 601390 0.33 
46 601699 0.32 
47 601111 0.31 
48 600362 0.31 
49 600999 0.31 
50 601600 0.31 











1 601857 9.22 
2 601398 6.87 
3 601288 5.19 
4 601988 3.6 
5 600028 3.05 
6 601628 2.81 
7 601088 2.63 
8 600036 1.53 
9 600519 1.37 
10 601318 1.37 
11 600104 1.23 
12 601328 1.22 
13 600000 1.17 
14 601166 1.13 
15 600016 1.12 
16 601601 0.89 
17 601998 0.86 
18 600030 0.83 
19 601818 0.78 
20 601668 0.74 
21 600900 0.71 
22 601006 0.63 
23 600048 0.61 
24 600111 0.57 
25 600019 0.53 
 164 
  





















































































1 中国石油 601857 B Mining 1 1 0 3 0 2 2 0.428571429 3 2 1 3 0.75 3 2 1 1 1 0.533333 1 2 2 1 3 1 2 0.571429 1 3 3 0.77778 3 2 1 3 3 0.8 0.6129
2 工商银行 601398 J Financial 2 0 2 1 2 3 2 0.571428571 3 2 1 3 0.75 3 3 3 1 1 0.733333 3 3 1 3 0 2 0 0.571429 3 3 2 0.88889 2 3 2 3 3 0.8667 0.69892
3 中国银行 601988 J Financial 1 0 3 1 3 3 2 0.619047619 3 2 1 2 0.6667 3 2 3 2 3 0.866667 3 2 2 2 0 2 1 0.571429 2 2 2 0.66667 1 2 2 3 3 0.7333 0.67742
4 中国石化 600028 B Mining 1 0 0 3 0 2 2 0.380952381 3 3 0 3 0.75 3 1 2 2 1 0.6 1 1 1 1 2 1 0 0.333333 2 3 3 0.88889 3 3 2 3 3 0.9333 0.5914
5 中国人寿 601628 J Financial 2 2 1 1 0 3 2 0.523809524 2 2 2 3 0.75 3 2 3 3 2 0.866667 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 0.571429 2 3 1 0.66667 3 2 0 1 3 0.6 0.64516
6 中国神华 601088 B Mining 0 3 1 1 0 2 2 0.428571429 1 2 0 1 0.3333 3 1 3 2 3 0.8 1 3 1 3 0 3 2 0.619048 1 3 1 0.55556 3 2 1 1 1 0.5333 0.54839
7 招商银行 600036 J Financial 1 0 3 0 3 3 2 0.571428571 2 2 0 3 0.5833 3 3 3 1 2 0.8 3 1 0 3 0 2 0 0.428571 3 3 2 0.88889 2 2 1 3 3 0.7333 0.63441
8 长江电力 600900 D
Electric Power, Heat, 
Gas and Water 
Production and Supply 0 1 1 0 1 2 2 0.333333333 1 2 1 3 0.5833 3 2 2 1 1 0.6 0 2 0 2 0 1 0 0.238095 2 3 0 0.55556 3 3 1 2 3 0.8 0.48387
9 中国平安 601318 J Financial 1 2 3 0 0 3 2 0.523809524 2 2 2 3 0.75 3 1 3 3 2 0.8 2 2 1 2 0 2 0 0.428571 2 2 1 0.55556 2 3 1 2 3 0.7333 0.6129
10 交通银行 601328 J Financial 1 0 3 0 3 3 3 0.619047619 3 3 0 3 0.75 3 2 3 1 1 0.666667 2 0 0 3 0 2 1 0.380952 2 2 3 0.77778 3 3 1 3 3 0.8667 0.64516
11 中信证券 600030 J Financial 0 1 0 0 0 2 2 0.238095238 3 2 1 3 0.75 2 2 2 2 2 0.666667 3 0 0 3 0 2 1 0.428571 1 1 2 0.44444 3 3 2 2 3 0.8667 0.53763





Technology 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 0.19047619 1 2 1 3 0.5833 2 1 3 2 1 0.6 3 3 2 1 2 3 1 0.714286 3 2 3 0.88889 3 3 2 1 3 0.8 0.5914
13 大秦铁路 601006 G
Transport, Storage and 
Postal Service 1 3 2 2 1 2 2 0.619047619 3 2 1 1 0.5833 3 2 3 2 3 0.866667 3 2 3 3 3 2 0 0.761905 1 2 1 0.44444 3 2 1 2 3 0.7333 0.68817
14 中国铁建 601186 E Construction 0 3 0 1 1 3 2 0.476190476 2 2 1 3 0.6667 3 1 3 2 3 0.8 2 2 3 3 3 2 0 0.714286 1 1 1 0.33333 3 3 1 1 3 0.7333 0.63441
15 中信银行 601998 J Financial 2 0 3 0 2 3 3 0.619047619 2 2 1 3 0.6667 3 3 3 2 2 0.866667 3 3 1 3 0 1 0 0.52381 2 3 2 0.77778 2 3 1 2 3 0.7333 0.67742
16 贵州茅台 600519 C Manufacturing 1 2 1 0 3 2 2 0.523809524 1 2 1 2 0.5 1 3 3 2 2 0.733333 3 2 3 3 1 2 0 0.666667 2 1 2 0.55556 3 1 1 1 1 0.4667 0.58065
17 中国中铁 601390 E Construction 1 2 1 0 0 2 2 0.380952381 3 2 1 3 0.75 3 0 3 1 2 0.6 1 2 2 3 3 2 0 0.619048 2 1 1 0.44444 3 3 1 2 3 0.8 0.5914
18 中国太保 601601 J Financial 2 2 0 1 1 3 3 0.571428571 2 2 1 2 0.5833 3 1 3 3 2 0.8 2 2 1 3 0 2 1 0.52381 2 2 2 0.66667 2 2 1 2 3 0.6667 0.62366
19 宝钢股份 600019 C Manufacturing 1 3 0 1 1 2 3 0.523809524 3 2 2 3 0.8333 3 3 3 2 2 0.866667 3 2 2 2 1 2 0 0.571429 3 3 2 0.88889 3 3 2 3 3 0.9333 0.73118
20 民生银行 600016 J Financial 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 0.238095238 3 2 2 2 0.75 3 1 3 2 2 0.733333 3 2 1 3 0 0 0 0.428571 2 1 1 0.44444 2 3 2 2 3 0.8 0.53763
21 浦发银行 600000 J Financial 0 0 3 0 3 2 2 0.476190476 3 3 2 3 0.9167 3 2 3 2 3 0.866667 3 2 1 2 2 1 0 0.52381 3 2 0 0.55556 0 3 2 3 3 0.7333 0.65591
22 兴业银行 601166 J Financial 0 1 3 0 3 2 1 0.476190476 1 1 0 3 0.4167 3 1 3 2 3 0.8 3 1 1 1 1 2 0 0.428571 1 0 1 0.22222 2 3 1 3 3 0.8 0.53763
23 上港集团 600018 G
Transport, Storage and 
Postal Service 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 0.19047619 3 2 2 3 0.8333 2 2 2 2 2 0.666667 2 1 2 2 1 1 0 0.428571 1 1 1 0.33333 3 3 2 3 3 0.9333 0.53763
24 海通证券 600837 J Financial 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0.142857143 1 1 0 3 0.4167 3 1 2 2 1 0.6 2 0 1 2 0 1 0 0.285714 1 1 0 0.22222 2 2 1 2 1 0.5333 0.35484
25 华能国际 600011 D
Electric Power, Heat, 
Gas and Water 
Production and Supply 1 1 0 0 1 2 2 0.333333333 1 2 0 3 0.5 3 1 2 1 1 0.533333 0 2 1 1 0 1 0 0.238095 3 3 1 0.77778 3 3 1 1 1 0.6 0.45161
26 中煤能源 601898 B Mining 1 3 1 0 1 2 2 0.476190476 2 3 0 1 0.5 3 1 3 2 3 0.8 3 2 2 3 2 2 2 0.761905 2 3 1 0.66667 3 3 2 2 3 0.8667 0.67742
27 中国铝业 601600 C Manufacturing 1 0 1 0 1 2 1 0.285714286 1 1 1 1 0.3333 3 2 3 3 3 0.933333 1 2 1 2 0 2 0 0.380952 1 2 1 0.44444 3 3 1 2 1 0.6667 0.49462
28 中国远洋 601919 G
Transport, Storage and 
Postal Service 0 1 0 0 3 2 1 0.333333333 1 1 1 0 0.25 3 2 3 1 3 0.8 2 2 3 3 3 1 0 0.666667 3 2 2 0.77778 1 3 1 0 0 0.3333 0.51613
29 北京银行 601169 J Financial 0 0 2 0 3 2 2 0.428571429 2 1 1 2 0.5 3 1 3 3 3 0.866667 3 1 0 1 0 2 0 0.333333 2 2 1 0.55556 2 3 2 3 3 0.8667 0.56989
30 上海电气 601727 C Manufacturing 0 0 0 2 1 2 1 0.285714286 2 2 2 2 0.6667 3 1 3 3 3 0.866667 2 2 1 2 0 0 0 0.333333 2 3 1 0.66667 3 3 1 2 2 0.7333 0.54839
31 大唐发电 601991 D
Electric Power, Heat, 
Gas and Water 
Production and Supply 3 1 1 0 3 2 2 0.571428571 1 1 0 0 0.1667 3 0 2 1 1 0.466667 0 2 1 2 1 1 1 0.380952 1 1 1 0.33333 2 2 0 1 1 0.4 0.4086
32 紫金矿业 601899 B Mining 2 0 0 0 2 2 2 0.380952381 1 2 0 3 0.5 2 0 3 2 2 0.6 2 2 1 1 0 0 0 0.285714 3 3 2 0.88889 2 3 1 3 3 0.8 0.52688
33 中国南车 601766 C Manufacturing 1 1 0 0 2 2 1 0.333333333 2 2 0 3 0.5833 3 0 3 2 3 0.733333 2 1 2 2 0 1 0 0.380952 2 3 2 0.77778 3 3 2 1 3 0.8 0.55914
34 武钢股份 600005 C Manufacturing 2 3 1 0 3 2 2 0.619047619 1 1 2 1 0.4167 3 1 3 1 2 0.666667 2 2 1 1 0 2 0 0.380952 2 3 0 0.55556 3 3 1 2 1 0.6667 0.54839
35 华夏银行 600015 J Financial 0 0 2 0 3 2 1 0.380952381 1 2 1 3 0.5833 3 1 3 3 3 0.866667 2 2 1 2 0 1 0 0.380952 1 1 0 0.22222 2 3 2 1 3 0.7333 0.52688
36 保利地产 600048 K Real Estate 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.142857143 1 1 3 0 0.4167 3 0 3 2 3 0.733333 3 2 2 2 0 0 0 0.428571 1 0 0 0.11111 1 1 2 1 1 0.4 0.37634
37 中海油服 601808 B Mining 1 0 0 0 1 3 3 0.380952381 1 3 0 0 0.3333 3 0 2 2 2 0.6 2 3 0 2 0 1 0 0.380952 2 3 3 0.88889 1 1 1 1 2 0.4 0.46237
38 上海汽车 600104 C Manufacturing 3 3 1 0 3 2 3 0.714285714 1 2 3 3 0.75 3 2 1 2 3 0.733333 3 3 3 3 0 2 0 0.666667 3 3 3 1 3 3 2 2 3 0.8667 0.76344
39 海螺水泥 600585 C Manufacturing 0 3 1 0 3 2 2 0.523809524 3 2 3 2 0.8333 2 2 3 1 2 0.666667 2 2 0 2 1 1 0 0.380952 2 1 0 0.33333 3 3 1 1 3 0.7333 0.56989
40 建设银行 601939 J Financial 0 0 3 0 3 3 3 0.571428571 2 3 1 2 0.6667 3 1 3 2 0 0.6 2 1 0 3 0 2 1 0.428571 2 2 3 0.77778 3 3 1 3 3 0.8667 0.62366
41 中国国航 601111 G
Transport, Storage and 
Postal Service 0 1 0 0 3 2 2 0.380952381 2 2 0 1 0.4167 3 2 3 1 1 0.666667 2 2 2 3 1 1 1 0.571429 3 3 1 0.77778 3 3 1 2 3 0.8 0.58065
42 国电电力 600795 D
Electric Power, Heat, 
Gas and Water 
Production and Supply 0 0 3 0 2 1 2 0.380952381 1 3 1 3 0.6667 3 1 1 2 1 0.533333 0 1 1 1 0 2 2 0.333333 2 1 2 0.55556 3 3 2 2 3 0.8667 0.52688
43 海油工程 600583 B Mining 1 0 0 0 2 2 2 0.333333333 3 3 1 3 0.8333 3 1 3 1 2 0.666667 1 2 0 2 2 2 2 0.52381 3 2 2 0.77778 3 2 1 1 3 0.6667 0.5914
44 特变电工 600089 C Manufacturing 3 0 3 0 0 1 2 0.428571429 3 1 1 0 0.4167 2 0 3 1 1 0.466667 3 1 2 1 0 0 0 0.333333 3 3 1 0.77778 2 3 2 1 3 0.7333 0.49462
45 金钼股份 601958 B Mining 1 0 0 0 3 3 3 0.476190476 2 3 0 2 0.5833 3 1 2 2 3 0.733333 1 1 1 2 0 0 0 0.238095 3 3 3 1 2 1 0 0 1 0.2667 0.49462
46 S上石化 600688 C Manufacturing 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 0.19047619 1 3 0 0 0.3333 3 1 3 2 1 0.666667 2 2 1 3 1 2 0 0.52381 3 2 2 0.77778 1 3 0 1 2 0.4667 0.46237
47 中国船舶 600150 C Manufacturing 3 0 0 0 3 1 0 0.333333333 1 1 0 2 0.3333 3 2 1 1 2 0.6 2 1 2 2 0 0 0 0.333333 1 2 2 0.55556 1 0 1 0 0 0.1333 0.36559
48 兖州煤业 600188 B Mining 1 1 0 0 2 2 2 0.380952381 3 3 2 3 0.9167 3 0 3 1 2 0.6 2 2 2 1 1 1 0 0.428571 2 2 1 0.55556 3 2 3 2 3 0.8667 0.5914
49 天威保变 600550 C Manufacturing 1 0 2 0 0 1 2 0.285714286 3 2 1 0 0.5 2 0 3 2 2 0.6 2 1 1 2 0 1 0 0.333333 3 2 0 0.55556 2 3 1 1 0 0.4667 0.43011




Management 2 0 0 0 0 3 3 0.380952381 0 1 0 0 0.0833 0 0 1 2 3 0.4 3 1 0 3 0 2 0 0.428571 3 3 2 0.88889 2 0 1 0 0 0.2 0.37634
Count of Companies 
Scored 3 4 8 10 2 17 14 9 0 17 11 3 26 0 41 5 36 7 17 0 18 6 5 19 5 2 0 0 16 21 8 0 27 33 1 13 34
Count of Companies 
Scored 2 7 5 5 2 7 30 30 0 13 28 9 10 0 7 15 9 27 19 0 21 28 14 20 5 24 5 0 21 16 16 0 16 11 17 17 3
Count of Companies 
Scored 1 21 11 11 7 12 5 10 0 19 11 21 6 0 1 20 5 16 13 0 7 13 21 11 10 17 9 0 13 11 18 2 6 4 28 16 9
Count of Companies 
Scored 0 18 26 24 39 14 1 1 0 1 0 17 8 0 1 10 0 0 1 0 4 3 10 0 30 7 36 0 0 2 8 0 1 2 4 4 4
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Code Industry Name VD1-Financia l VD2-HR VD3-CG VD4-MS VD5-DEV VD6-SE VDT
1 中国石油 601857 B Mining 0.428571429 0.75 0.5333333 0.5714286 0.777777778 0.8 0.6129
4 中国石化 600028 B Mining 0.380952381 0.75 0.6 0.3333333 0.888888889 0.933333 0.5914
6 中国神华 601088 B Mining 0.428571429 0.3333333 0.8 0.6190476 0.555555556 0.533333 0.54839
26 中煤能源 601898 B Mining 0.476190476 0.5 0.8 0.7619048 0.666666667 0.866667 0.67742
37 中海油服 601808 B Mining 0.380952381 0.3333333 0.6 0.3809524 0.888888889 0.4 0.46237
43 海油工程 600583 B Mining 0.333333333 0.8333333 0.6666667 0.5238095 0.777777778 0.666667 0.5914
45 金钼股份 601958 B Mining 0.476190476 0.5833333 0.7333333 0.2380952 1 0.266667 0.49462
48 兖州煤业 600188 B Mining 0.380952381 0.9166667 0.6 0.4285714 0.555555556 0.866667 0.5914
32 紫金矿业 601899 B Mining 0.380952381 0.5 0.6 0.2857143 0.888888889 0.8 0.52688
16 贵州茅台 600519 C Manufacturing 0.523809524 0.5 0.7333333 0.6666667 0.555555556 0.466667 0.58065
19 宝钢股份 600019 C Manufacturing 0.523809524 0.8333333 0.8666667 0.5714286 0.888888889 0.933333 0.73118
27 中国铝业 601600 C Manufacturing 0.285714286 0.3333333 0.9333333 0.3809524 0.444444444 0.666667 0.49462
30 上海电气 601727 C Manufacturing 0.285714286 0.6666667 0.8666667 0.3333333 0.666666667 0.733333 0.54839
33 中国南车 601766 C Manufacturing 0.333333333 0.5833333 0.7333333 0.3809524 0.777777778 0.8 0.55914
34 武钢股份 600005 C Manufacturing 0.619047619 0.4166667 0.6666667 0.3809524 0.555555556 0.666667 0.54839
38 上海汽车 600104 C Manufacturing 0.714285714 0.75 0.7333333 0.6666667 1 0.866667 0.76344
39 海螺水泥 600585 C Manufacturing 0.523809524 0.8333333 0.6666667 0.3809524 0.333333333 0.733333 0.56989
46 S上石化 600688 C Manufacturing 0.19047619 0.3333333 0.6666667 0.5238095 0.777777778 0.466667 0.46237
47 中国船舶 600150 C Manufacturing 0.333333333 0.3333333 0.6 0.3333333 0.555555556 0.133333 0.36559
49 天威保变 600550 C Manufacturing 0.285714286 0.5 0.6 0.3333333 0.555555556 0.466667 0.43011
8 长江电力 600900 D
Electric Power, Heat, 
Gas  and Water 
Production and Supply 0.333333333 0.5833333 0.6 0.2380952 0.555555556 0.8 0.48387
25 华能国际 600011 D
Electric Power, Heat, 
Gas  and Water 
Production and Supply 0.333333333 0.5 0.5333333 0.2380952 0.777777778 0.6 0.45161
31 大唐发电 601991 D
Electric Power, Heat, 
Gas  and Water 
Production and Supply 0.571428571 0.1666667 0.4666667 0.3809524 0.333333333 0.4 0.4086
42 国电电力 600795 D
Electric Power, Heat, 
Gas  and Water 
Production and Supply 0.380952381 0.6666667 0.5333333 0.3333333 0.555555556 0.866667 0.52688
14 中国铁建 601186 E Construction 0.476190476 0.6666667 0.8 0.7142857 0.333333333 0.733333 0.63441
17 中国中铁 601390 E Construction 0.380952381 0.75 0.6 0.6190476 0.444444444 0.8 0.5914
13 大秦铁路 601006 G
Transport, Storage and 
Posta l  Service 0.619047619 0.5833333 0.8666667 0.7619048 0.444444444 0.733333 0.68817
23 上港集团 600018 G
Transport, Storage and 
Posta l  Service 0.19047619 0.8333333 0.6666667 0.4285714 0.333333333 0.933333 0.53763
28 中国远洋 601919 G
Transport, Storage and 
Posta l  Service 0.333333333 0.25 0.8 0.6666667 0.777777778 0.333333 0.51613
41 中国国航 601111 G
Transport, Storage and 
Posta l  Service 0.380952381 0.4166667 0.6666667 0.5714286 0.777777778 0.8 0.58065
2 工商银行 601398 J Financia l 0.571428571 0.75 0.7333333 0.5714286 0.888888889 0.866667 0.69892
3 中国银行 601988 J Financia l 0.619047619 0.6666667 0.8666667 0.5714286 0.666666667 0.733333 0.67742
5 中国人寿 601628 J Financia l 0.523809524 0.75 0.8666667 0.5714286 0.666666667 0.6 0.64516
11 中信证券 600030 J Financia l 0.238095238 0.75 0.6666667 0.4285714 0.444444444 0.866667 0.53763
15 中信银行 601998 J Financia l 0.619047619 0.6666667 0.8666667 0.5238095 0.777777778 0.733333 0.67742
18 中国太保 601601 J Financia l 0.571428571 0.5833333 0.8 0.5238095 0.666666667 0.666667 0.62366
21 浦发银行 600000 J Financia l 0.476190476 0.9166667 0.8666667 0.5238095 0.555555556 0.733333 0.65591
40 建设银行 601939 J Financia l 0.571428571 0.6666667 0.6 0.4285714 0.777777778 0.866667 0.62366
36 保利地产 600048 K Real  Estate 0.142857143 0.4166667 0.7333333 0.4285714 0.111111111 0.4 0.37634
50 东方明珠 600832 N
Water Conservancy, 
Environment and 
Publ ic Faci l i ty 
Management 0.380952381 0.0833333 0.4 0.4285714 0.888888889 0.2 0.37634





Technology 0.19047619 0.5833333 0.6 0.7142857 0.888888889 0.8 0.5914
44 特变电工 600089 C Manufacturing 0.428571429 0.4166667 0.4666667 0.3333333 0.777777778 0.733333 0.49462
7 招商银行 600036 J Financia l 0.571428571 0.5833333 0.8 0.4285714 0.888888889 0.733333 0.63441
9 中国平安 601318 J Financia l 0.523809524 0.75 0.8 0.4285714 0.555555556 0.733333 0.6129
10 交通银行 601328 J Financia l 0.619047619 0.75 0.6666667 0.3809524 0.777777778 0.866667 0.64516
20 民生银行 600016 J Financia l 0.238095238 0.75 0.7333333 0.4285714 0.444444444 0.8 0.53763
22 兴业银行 601166 J Financia l 0.476190476 0.4166667 0.8 0.4285714 0.222222222 0.8 0.53763
24 海通证券 600837 J Financia l 0.142857143 0.4166667 0.6 0.2857143 0.222222222 0.533333 0.35484
29 北京银行 601169 J Financia l 0.428571429 0.5 0.8666667 0.3333333 0.555555556 0.866667 0.56989

























































































1 中国石油 601857 B Mining 1 3 0 0 2 2 1 0.428571429 3 3 0 1 0.58333 3 2 1 1 1 0.5333 1 2 1 1 3 1 1 0.47619 2 2 2 0.66667 3 2 2 3 3 0.8667 0.5699
2 工商银行 601398 J Financial 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0.19047619 3 2 0 0 0.41667 3 3 1 2 2 0.7333 3 2 2 3 0 2 0 0.57143 3 3 2 0.88889 3 1 1 2 3 0.6667 0.5376
3 中国石化 601988 B Mining 0 3 0 0 2 1 1 0.333333333 1 1 0 0 0.16667 3 2 3 1 1 0.6667 2 2 1 1 0 1 0 0.33333 2 1 1 0.44444 1 3 0 0 0 0.2667 0.3656
4 中国银行 600028 J Financial 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 0.238095238 2 1 1 2 0.5 3 3 2 2 2 0.8 2 1 0 3 2 2 0 0.47619 2 1 1 0.44444 3 3 0 1 2 0.6 0.4946
5 中国人寿 601628 J Financial 3 0 0 0 0 1 2 0.285714286 3 3 0 3 0.75 3 2 3 1 3 0.8 3 1 0 0 0 1 0 0.2381 2 2 1 0.55556 3 3 2 3 3 0.9333 0.5484
6 中国神华 601088 B Mining 0 3 1 0 3 2 2 0.523809524 1 1 1 0 0.25 3 0 3 2 3 0.7333 1 2 0 3 0 2 0 0.38095 1 1 1 0.33333 1 1 0 1 0 0.2 0.4194
7 招商银行 600036 J Financial 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 0.19047619 3 1 0 0 0.33333 3 3 3 2 2 0.8667 1 1 0 2 0 2 0 0.28571 2 2 1 0.55556 1 1 0 1 3 0.4 0.4086
8 中国平安 600900 J Financial 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.047619048 0 1 0 0 0.08333 0 3 3 0 1 0.4667 3 2 0 3 0 2 0 0.47619 2 1 0 0.33333 1 1 1 1 0 0.2667 0.2796
9 交通银行 601318 J Financial 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.095238095 2 2 1 1 0.5 3 3 3 2 2 0.8667 2 2 2 3 0 2 0 0.52381 3 2 2 0.77778 3 3 2 2 3 0.8667 0.5591
10 中信银行 601328 J Financial 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0.19047619 3 3 2 1 0.75 3 3 2 2 3 0.8667 2 1 0 3 0 2 0 0.38095 2 2 3 0.77778 3 3 2 2 3 0.8667 0.5806
11 中信证券 600030 J Financial 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 0.19047619 3 3 0 2 0.66667 3 2 2 2 2 0.7333 3 2 0 2 0 0 0 0.33333 1 1 1 0.33333 2 1 1 2 3 0.6 0.4516
12 兴业银行 600050 J Financial 0 0 3 0 0 1 2 0.285714286 2 1 0 0 0.25 3 3 3 2 2 0.8667 3 2 1 3 0 1 0 0.47619 3 2 2 0.77778 3 1 1 1 3 0.6 0.5161
13 浦发银行 601006 J Financial 0 0 3 0 0 2 1 0.285714286 3 3 3 3 1 3 3 3 3 2 0.9333 3 2 0 2 0 2 0 0.42857 2 3 1 0.66667 3 2 2 2 3 0.8 0.6344
14 上海汽车 601186 C Manufacturing 3 3 0 0 3 3 3 0.714285714 2 3 1 1 0.58333 3 1 1 1 2 0.5333 3 2 2 3 0 2 0 0.57143 3 3 2 0.88889 3 3 2 3 3 0.9333 0.6882
15 宝钢股份 601998 C Manufacturing 3 3 3 0 3 2 3 0.80952381 3 2 3 3 0.91667 3 2 3 2 3 0.8667 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 0.57143 3 3 3 1 3 3 2 1 3 0.8 0.7957
16 中国太保 600519 J Financial 3 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.238095238 0 1 0 0 0.08333 3 3 3 2 2 0.8667 3 2 0 3 0 1 0 0.42857 2 2 0 0.44444 1 1 0 1 1 0.2667 0.3871
17 贵州茅台 601390 C Manufacturing 0 0 1 0 0 2 2 0.238095238 3 3 0 1 0.58333 3 1 3 1 3 0.7333 3 1 2 2 0 0 0 0.38095 3 3 2 0.88889 3 2 2 1 3 0.7333 0.5376
18 海通证券 601601 J Financial 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0.142857143 1 1 0 3 0.41667 3 1 2 2 1 0.6 2 0 1 2 0 1 0 0.28571 1 1 0 0.22222 2 2 1 2 1 0.5333 0.3548
19 中国联通 600019 I
Information 
Transmission, 
Software and 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 0.19047619 3 1 0 0 0.33333 1 2 1 2 1 0.4667 2 2 1 1 0 2 0 0.38095 3 3 3 1 3 3 2 1 3 0.8 0.4731
20 民生银行 600016 J Financial 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0.19047619 2 3 0 3 0.66667 3 3 3 2 1 0.8 3 1 1 3 0 2 0 0.47619 3 3 1 0.77778 3 1 2 1 1 0.5333 0.5269
21 长江电力 600000 D
Electric Power, Heat, 
Gas and Water 
Production and 0 0 0 0 3 3 2 0.380952381 1 1 0 2 0.33333 3 2 3 1 2 0.7333 2 3 2 2 2 2 1 0.66667 3 2 2 0.77778 1 1 0 1 3 0.4 0.5376
22 中国建筑 601166 E Construction 3 1 1 0 3 2 3 0.619047619 3 3 3 3 1 3 2 3 1 3 0.8 2 2 2 3 3 2 0 0.66667 2 2 3 0.77778 3 2 2 2 3 0.8 0.7527
23 中国铝业 600018 C Manufacturing 1 0 1 0 1 2 1 0.285714286 1 1 1 1 0.33333 3 2 3 3 3 0.9333 1 2 1 2 0 2 0 0.38095 1 2 1 0.44444 3 3 1 2 1 0.6667 0.4946
24 大秦铁路 600837 G
Transport, Storage 
and Postal Service 3 0 0 0 3 2 2 0.476190476 1 3 0 0 0.33333 2 1 3 1 2 0.6 2 2 2 1 3 1 0 0.52381 2 2 2 0.66667 3 1 1 1 1 0.4667 0.5054
25 中煤能源 600011 B Mining 0 3 0 0 1 1 1 0.285714286 1 3 0 1 0.41667 2 1 3 2 3 0.7333 1 1 1 2 0 2 0 0.33333 1 1 1 0.33333 2 3 0 1 3 0.6 0.4409
26 上港集团 601898 G
Transport, Storage 
and Postal Service 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.095238095 3 3 1 3 0.83333 3 1 3 1 2 0.6667 2 1 2 3 0 2 0 0.47619 2 3 3 0.88889 3 3 2 3 3 0.9333 0.5806
27 北京银行 601600 J Financial 0 0 1 0 1 2 1 0.238095238 3 1 3 3 0.83333 3 3 3 2 2 0.8667 3 2 3 2 0 1 0 0.52381 2 3 1 0.66667 2 3 0 2 3 0.6667 0.5914
28 中国中铁 601919 E Construction 3 3 1 0 3 1 2 0.619047619 3 3 3 0 0.75 2 2 3 2 3 0.8 1 2 2 3 0 2 0 0.47619 3 3 3 1 3 3 1 3 3 0.8667 0.7097
29 中国远洋 601169 G
Transport, Storage 
and Postal Service 0 0 0 0 3 1 1 0.238095238 1 1 0 1 0.25 2 1 3 1 3 0.6667 1 1 1 2 0 1 0 0.28571 1 3 1 0.55556 2 3 1 1 1 0.5333 0.3978
30 招商证券 601727 J Financial 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.095238095 3 1 1 1 0.5 3 2 3 2 1 0.7333 1 2 1 3 0 1 0 0.38095 3 3 3 1 2 1 1 2 3 0.6 0.4839
31 紫金矿业 601991 B Mining 0 3 0 0 3 1 1 0.380952381 3 3 3 0 0.75 1 1 3 1 2 0.5333 3 2 0 3 0 0 0 0.38095 3 2 0 0.55556 3 3 1 2 1 0.6667 0.5161
32 中国铁建 601899 E Construction 3 0 0 0 3 1 1 0.380952381 3 3 3 0 0.75 1 1 2 2 1 0.4667 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0.2381 2 1 1 0.44444 3 2 1 2 3 0.7333 0.4731
33 上海电气 601766 C Manufacturing 2 0 0 0 0 2 2 0.285714286 2 3 0 1 0.5 3 2 2 3 3 0.8667 2 2 1 1 0 2 0 0.38095 3 3 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 0.7333 0.5699
34 中国中冶 600005 E Construction 0 0 0 0 3 1 1 0.238095238 3 2 2 3 0.83333 3 1 3 2 2 0.7333 2 2 1 3 0 0 0 0.38095 3 3 2 0.88889 3 2 1 3 3 0.8 0.5806
35 光大证券 600015 J Financial 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.095238095 3 1 3 0 0.58333 2 3 3 3 2 0.8667 3 2 0 3 0 0 0 0.38095 3 2 3 0.88889 2 1 1 1 1 0.4 0.4731
36 保利地产 600048 K Real Estate 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.142857143 1 1 3 0 0.41667 3 0 3 2 3 0.7333 3 2 2 2 0 0 0 0.42857 1 0 0 0.11111 1 1 2 1 1 0.4 0.3763
37 大唐发电 601808 D
Electric Power, Heat, 
Gas and Water 
Production and 1 1 0 0 3 1 2 0.380952381 3 1 3 0 0.58333 1 2 3 1 2 0.6 3 1 1 1 2 3 0 0.52381 3 3 3 1 3 3 2 3 3 0.9333 0.6237
38 中国国航 600104 G
Transport, Storage 
and Postal Service 0 0 0 0 3 1 1 0.238095238 3 3 3 3 1 2 0 3 2 1 0.5333 3 1 2 3 0 2 0 0.52381 3 3 2 0.88889 3 3 1 3 3 0.8667 0.6129
39 华能国际 600585 D
Electric Power, Heat, 
Gas and Water 
Production and 0 1 0 0 3 1 2 0.333333333 3 1 1 0 0.41667 2 1 3 1 1 0.5333 2 2 1 2 0 2 0 0.42857 1 1 0 0.22222 2 1 0 1 3 0.4667 0.4086
40 兖州煤业 601939 B Mining 0 1 0 0 3 0 2 0.285714286 3 3 1 2 0.75 3 1 3 3 1 0.7333 2 2 1 2 0 2 0 0.42857 3 3 2 0.88889 3 3 1 1 3 0.7333 0.5806
41 海螺水泥 601111 C Manufacturing 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.142857143 1 1 0 0 0.16667 2 1 3 1 2 0.6 1 1 2 2 0 2 0 0.38095 3 3 3 1 2 3 1 1 1 0.5333 0.4194
42 江西铜业 600795 C Manufacturing 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.047619048 3 1 0 0 0.33333 3 1 2 2 1 0.6 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 0.28571 2 1 1 0.44444 2 3 1 1 0 0.4667 0.3333
43 武钢股份 600583 C Manufacturing 3 3 0 0 3 1 1 0.523809524 1 1 1 0.25 1 1 2 1 2 0.4667 2 1 1 2 0 1 0 0.33333 2 3 1 0.66667 3 1 1 1 1 0.4667 0.4409
44 华夏银行 600089 J Financial 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 0.285714286 2 3 1 2 0.66667 3 3 3 3 2 0.9333 3 1 1 2 1 1 0 0.42857 1 2 1 0.44444 3 2 2 2 3 0.8 0.5699
45 金钼股份 601958 B Mining 3 3 3 0 3 2 2 0.761904762 1 3 1 1 0.5 2 1 2 1 2 0.5333 2 3 2 1 0 3 0 0.52381 3 3 3 1 3 3 0 1 3 0.6667 0.6452
46 潞安环能 600688 B Mining 3 3 3 3 2 2 0.761904762 3 2 1 1 0.58333 3 1 2 2 2 0.6667 2 1 0 1 0 2 0 0.28571 3 3 2 0.88889 3 3 2 3 3 0.9333 0.6559
47 山东黄金 600150 B Mining 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.095238095 0 1 0 0 0.08333 2 2 2 1 1 0.5333 2 1 0 2 0 2 0 0.33333 1 2 1 0.44444 1 1 0 0 0 0.1333 0.2581
48 中国南车 600188 C Manufacturing 3 3 0 0 0 1 2 0.428571429 2 3 0 0 0.41667 3 2 2 2 3 0.8 2 2 2 3 0 1 0 0.47619 3 3 3 1 2 2 1 1 3 0.6 0.5806
49 建设银行 600550 J Financial 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.095238095 3 3 3 3 1 3 3 3 3 3 1 3 2 1 3 0 0 0 0.42857 2 3 2 0.77778 3 3 3 2 3 0.9333 0.6344
50 三一重工 600832 C Manufacturing 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.095238095 2 2 0 0 0.33333 2 1 2 1 2 0.5333 2 1 1 2 0 2 0 0.38095 3 3 3 1 2 2 1 1 3 0.6 0.4301
Count of Companies 
Scored 3 12 13 5 0 18 2 3 0 26 22 12 11 0 33 14 33 7 14 0 18 2 1 20 3 2 0 0 23 24 14 0 29 24 1 9 33
Count of Companies 
Scored 2 1 0 0 0 4 18 20 0 9 6 2 5 0 11 15 13 24 23 0 21 28 15 18 4 27 0 0 17 15 13 0 13 10 16 15 1
Count of Companies 
Scored 1 4 5 6 0 5 26 27 0 12 22 13 12 4 5 18 4 18 13 1 11 19 21 11 1 14 3 0 10 10 17 10 8 16 22 24 11
Count of Companies 
Scored 0 33 32 39 49 23 4 0 0 3 0 23 21 0 1 3 0 1 0 0 0 1 13 1 42 7 47 0 0 1 6 0 0 0 11 2 5
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Code Industry Name VD1-Financia l VD2-HR VD3-CG VD4-MS VD5-DEV VD6-SE VDT
1 中国石油 601857 B Mining 0.428571429 0.5833333 0.5333333 0.4761905 0.6666667 0.8666667 0.5698925
3 中国石化 601988 B Mining 0.333333333 0.1666667 0.6666667 0.3333333 0.4444444 0.2666667 0.3655914
6 中国神华 601088 B Mining 0.523809524 0.25 0.7333333 0.3809524 0.3333333 0.2 0.4193548
25 中煤能源 600011 B Mining 0.285714286 0.4166667 0.7333333 0.3333333 0.3333333 0.6 0.4408602
31 紫金矿业 601991 B Mining 0.380952381 0.75 0.5333333 0.3809524 0.5555556 0.6666667 0.516129
40 兖州煤业 601939 B Mining 0.285714286 0.75 0.7333333 0.4285714 0.8888889 0.7333333 0.5806452
45 金钼股份 601958 B Mining 0.761904762 0.5 0.5333333 0.5238095 1 0.6666667 0.6451613
46 潞安环能 600688 B Mining 0.761904762 0.5833333 0.6666667 0.2857143 0.8888889 0.9333333 0.655914
47 山东黄金 600150 B Mining 0.095238095 0.0833333 0.5333333 0.3333333 0.4444444 0.1333333 0.2580645
14 上海汽车 601186 C Manufacturing 0.714285714 0.5833333 0.5333333 0.5714286 0.8888889 0.9333333 0.688172
15 宝钢股份 601998 C Manufacturing 0.80952381 0.9166667 0.8666667 0.5714286 1 0.8 0.7956989
17 贵州茅台 601390 C Manufacturing 0.238095238 0.5833333 0.7333333 0.3809524 0.8888889 0.7333333 0.5376344
23 中国铝业 600018 C Manufacturing 0.285714286 0.3333333 0.9333333 0.3809524 0.4444444 0.6666667 0.4946237
33 上海电气 601766 C Manufacturing 0.285714286 0.5 0.8666667 0.3809524 1 0.7333333 0.5698925
41 海螺水泥 601111 C Manufacturing 0.142857143 0.1666667 0.6 0.3809524 1 0.5333333 0.4193548
42 江西铜业 600795 C Manufacturing 0.047619048 0.3333333 0.6 0.2857143 0.4444444 0.4666667 0.3333333
43 武钢股份 600583 C Manufacturing 0.523809524 0.25 0.4666667 0.3333333 0.6666667 0.4666667 0.4408602
48 中国南车 600188 C Manufacturing 0.428571429 0.4166667 0.8 0.4761905 1 0.6 0.5806452
21 长江电力 600000 D
Electric Power, Heat, 
Gas  and Water 
Production and 
Supply 0.380952381 0.3333333 0.7333333 0.6666667 0.7777778 0.4 0.5376344
37 大唐发电 601808 D
Electric Power, Heat, 
Gas  and Water 
Production and 
Supply 0.380952381 0.5833333 0.6 0.5238095 1 0.9333333 0.6236559
39 华能国际 600585 D
Electric Power, Heat, 
Gas  and Water 
Production and 
Supply 0.333333333 0.4166667 0.5333333 0.4285714 0.2222222 0.4666667 0.4086022
22 中国建筑 601166 E Construction 0.619047619 1 0.8 0.6666667 0.7777778 0.8 0.7526882
32 中国铁建 601899 E Construction 0.380952381 0.75 0.4666667 0.2380952 0.4444444 0.7333333 0.4731183
34 中国中冶 600005 E Construction 0.238095238 0.8333333 0.7333333 0.3809524 0.8888889 0.8 0.5806452
28 中国中铁 601919 E Construction 0.619047619 0.75 0.8 0.4761905 1 0.8666667 0.7096774
24 大秦铁路 600837 G
Transport, Storage 
and Posta l  Service 0.476190476 0.3333333 0.6 0.5238095 0.6666667 0.4666667 0.5053763
26 上港集团 601898 G
Transport, Storage 
and Posta l  Service 0.095238095 0.8333333 0.6666667 0.4761905 0.8888889 0.9333333 0.5806452
29 中国远洋 601169 G
Transport, Storage 
and Posta l  Service 0.238095238 0.25 0.6666667 0.2857143 0.5555556 0.5333333 0.3978495
38 中国国航 600104 G
Transport, Storage 
and Posta l  Service 0.238095238 1 0.5333333 0.5238095 0.8888889 0.8666667 0.6129032





Technology 0.19047619 0.3333333 0.4666667 0.3809524 1 0.8 0.4731183
36 保利地产 600048 K Real  Estate 0.142857143 0.4166667 0.7333333 0.4285714 0.1111111 0.4 0.3763441
2 工商银行 601398 J Financia l 0.19047619 0.4166667 0.7333333 0.5714286 0.8888889 0.6666667 0.5376344
4 中国银行 600028 J Financia l 0.238095238 0.5 0.8 0.4761905 0.4444444 0.6 0.4946237
5 中国人寿 601628 J Financia l 0.285714286 0.75 0.8 0.2380952 0.5555556 0.9333333 0.5483871
10 中信银行 601328 J Financia l 0.19047619 0.75 0.8666667 0.3809524 0.7777778 0.8666667 0.5806452
11 中信证券 600030 J Financia l 0.19047619 0.6666667 0.7333333 0.3333333 0.3333333 0.6 0.4516129
13 浦发银行 601006 J Financia l 0.285714286 1 0.9333333 0.4285714 0.6666667 0.8 0.6344086
16 中国太保 600519 J Financia l 0.238095238 0.0833333 0.8666667 0.4285714 0.4444444 0.2666667 0.3870968
49 建设银行 600550 J Financia l 0.095238095 1 1 0.4285714 0.7777778 0.9333333 0.6344086
30 招商证券 601727 J Financia l 0.095238095 0.5 0.7333333 0.3809524 1 0.6 0.483871
7 招商银行 600036 J Financia l 0.19047619 0.3333333 0.8666667 0.2857143 0.5555556 0.4 0.4086022
8 中国平安 600900 J Financia l 0.047619048 0.0833333 0.4666667 0.4761905 0.3333333 0.2666667 0.2795699
9 交通银行 601318 J Financia l 0.095238095 0.5 0.8666667 0.5238095 0.7777778 0.8666667 0.5591398
20 民生银行 600016 J Financia l 0.19047619 0.6666667 0.8 0.4761905 0.7777778 0.5333333 0.5268817
12 兴业银行 600050 J Financia l 0.285714286 0.25 0.8666667 0.4761905 0.7777778 0.6 0.516129
18 海通证券 601601 J Financia l 0.142857143 0.4166667 0.6 0.2857143 0.2222222 0.5333333 0.3548387
27 北京银行 601600 J Financia l 0.238095238 0.8333333 0.8666667 0.5238095 0.6666667 0.6666667 0.5913978
44 华夏银行 600089 J Financia l 0.285714286 0.6666667 0.9333333 0.4285714 0.4444444 0.8 0.5698925
35 光大证券 600015 J Financia l 0.095238095 0.5833333 0.8666667 0.3809524 0.8888889 0.4 0.4731183
























































































1 中国石油 601857 B Mining 0 3 0 0 0 1 2 0.285714286 0 1 0 0 0.08333 3 1 3 1 2 0.666667 1 2 0 1 1 2 2 0.428571 1 0 0 0.111111 1 1 0 0 0 0.1333 0.3118
2 工商银行 601398 J Financial 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0.19047619 1 3 0 0 0.33333 3 3 3 2 3 0.933333 3 1 0 2 1 1 0 0.380952 3 3 1 0.777778 2 1 1 1 3 0.5333 0.4839
3 农业银行 601988 J Financial 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0.142857143 1 1 0 3 0.41667 3 3 2 2 2 0.8 3 2 1 3 1 0 0 0.47619 2 3 2 0.777778 3 2 0 1 3 0.6 0.4946
4 中国银行 600028 J Financial 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0.142857143 3 1 0 0 0.33333 3 2 3 1 2 0.733333 1 2 1 3 0 0 0 0.333333 3 3 2 0.888889 3 1 1 2 3 0.6667 0.4624
5 中国石化 601628 B Mining 0 3 0 0 3 1 2 0.428571429 1 1 1 0 0.25 3 1 3 3 3 0.866667 2 2 2 3 3 2 3 0.809524 3 3 3 1 1 2 0 0 1 0.2667 0.5914
6 中国人寿 601088 J Financial 3 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.238095238 1 1 0 0 0.16667 3 3 3 2 3 0.933333 2 1 0 3 1 1 0 0.380952 1 1 0 0.222222 1 1 0 0 3 0.3333 0.3871
7 中国神华 600036 B Mining 0 0 0 0 3 1 2 0.285714286 1 1 0 0 0.16667 3 0 2 2 3 0.666667 3 0 0 3 1 2 0 0.428571 1 1 0 0.222222 3 1 0 1 0 0.3333 0.3656
8 中国平安 600900 J Financial 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.19047619 3 3 3 0 0.75 3 3 3 2 2 0.866667 3 1 1 3 1 1 0 0.47619 3 3 1 0.777778 3 3 2 2 3 0.8667 0.6022
9 招商银行 601318 J Financial 3 0 0 0 0 2 3 0.380952381 0 1 1 0 0.16667 3 1 3 3 3 0.866667 3 1 1 2 2 0 0 0.428571 3 2 3 0.888889 3 3 1 3 3 0.8667 0.5699
10 浦发银行 601328 J Financial 0 0 3 0 0 1 2 0.285714286 0 1 1 0 0.16667 3 2 3 2 2 0.8 2 1 1 3 2 0 0 0.428571 2 1 1 0.444444 2 1 0 0 0 0.2 0.3871
11 贵州茅台 600030 C Manufacturing 3 0 0 0 3 1 1 0.380952381 1 1 0 0 0.16667 1 1 3 1 0 0.4 2 1 2 2 3 2 0 0.571429 1 1 1 0.333333 3 3 1 1 1 0.6 0.4301
12 交通银行 600050 J Financial 3 0 0 0 0 1 2 0.285714286 1 1 0 0 0.16667 3 3 3 2 1 0.8 2 2 2 3 1 1 0 0.52381 3 3 2 0.888889 3 2 0 1 3 0.6 0.5161
13 光大银行 601006 J Financial 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0.142857143 0 1 0 0 0.08333 3 1 2 1 2 0.6 2 1 1 2 0 2 0 0.380952 1 2 1 0.444444 2 1 0 1 3 0.4667 0.3441
14 兴业银行 601186 J Financial 3 0 3 0 0 2 2 0.476190476 3 3 3 1 0.83333 3 2 3 3 3 0.933333 2 2 1 3 1 1 1 0.52381 2 2 1 0.555556 3 3 2 3 3 0.9333 0.6882
15 中国太保 601998 J Financial 3 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.238095238 1 1 0 0 0.16667 3 1 3 2 2 0.733333 2 1 1 2 0 1 0 0.333333 2 2 1 0.555556 1 1 0 1 1 0.2667 0.3656
16 中信银行 600519 J Financial 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.095238095 3 3 1 0 0.58333 3 1 3 3 3 0.866667 2 1 0 2 0 2 0 0.333333 2 2 1 0.555556 1 3 1 0 3 0.5333 0.4516
17 上海汽车 601390 C Manufacturing 3 3 3 0 3 1 2 0.714285714 1 1 0 0 0.16667 2 2 3 1 3 0.733333 3 2 2 3 0 1 0 0.52381 3 3 1 0.777778 2 1 0 0 0 0.2 0.5269
18 中信证券 601601 J Financial 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0.142857143 1 0 0 0 0.08333 3 1 3 3 1 0.733333 2 1 1 2 0 0 0 0.285714 2 2 1 0.555556 0 1 0 1 0 0.1333 0.3011
19 长江电力 600019 D
Electric Power, Heat, 
Gas and Water 
Production and 
Supply 0 0 0 0 3 1 3 0.333333333 3 0 0 0 0.25 2 1 3 1 1 0.533333 1 2 0 3 2 2 0 0.47619 2 2 1 0.555556 3 1 0 1 1 0.4 0.4194
20 大秦铁路 600016 G
Transport, Storage 
and Postal Service 3 1 0 0 3 2 2 0.523809524 1 1 1 0 0.25 2 1 2 1 1 0.466667 1 3 2 3 1 2 0 0.571429 3 3 2 0.888889 3 1 0 0 0 0.2667 0.4839
21 中国国航 600000 G
Transport, Storage 
and Postal Service 0 0 0 0 3 2 2 0.333333333 0 1 0 0 0.08333 2 1 3 1 1 0.533333 3 1 0 1 0 1 0 0.285714 2 1 1 0.444444 2 3 1 1 1 0.5333 0.3656





Technology 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.095238095 1 0 0 0 0.08333 3 2 3 1 2 0.733333 2 2 0 3 0 1 0 0.380952 3 3 3 1 3 1 1 1 0 0.4 0.3978
23 民生银行 600018 J Financial 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.095238095 1 2 0 0 0.25 3 1 2 2 3 0.733333 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0.238095 2 2 2 0.666667 2 1 1 1 3 0.5333 0.3763
24 宝钢股份 600837 C Manufacturing 3 3 3 0 3 3 2 0.80952381 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 2 1 3 0.6 1 2 1 3 2 2 0 0.52381 3 3 3 1 1 1 0 1 1 0.2667 0.5376
25 三一重工 600011 C Manufacturing 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.047619048 2 2 3 1 0.66667 2 1 1 1 3 0.533333 3 2 1 3 0 0 0 0.428571 3 3 3 1 2 2 1 2 3 0.6667 0.4839
26 中国建筑 601898 E Construction 3 3 3 0 3 1 2 0.714285714 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 3 1 3 0.733333 2 2 0 2 1 1 1 0.428571 2 2 1 0.555556 3 1 0 1 0 0.3333 0.4839
27 中煤能源 601600 B Mining 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.047619048 1 1 1 1 0.33333 3 1 2 1 1 0.533333 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 0.428571 2 1 1 0.444444 3 1 0 1 0 0.3333 0.3333
28 中国铝业 601919 C Manufacturing 1 0 1 0 1 2 1 0.285714286 1 1 1 1 0.33333 3 2 3 3 3 0.933333 1 2 1 2 0 2 0 0.380952 1 2 1 0.444444 3 3 1 2 1 0.6667 0.4946
29 江西铜业 601169 C Manufacturing 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.19047619 1 1 0 0 0.16667 1 0 3 1 1 0.4 1 2 2 2 0 0 0 0.333333 1 1 0 0.222222 3 1 0 0 0 0.2667 0.2688
30 紫金矿业 601727 B Mining 0 0 0 0 3 1 2 0.285714286 0 1 0 0 0.08333 3 3 3 1 3 0.866667 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 0.190476 1 1 0 0.222222 2 3 2 1 1 0.6 0.3763
31 兖州煤业 601991 B Mining 3 0 0 0 3 1 1 0.380952381 0 3 0 0 0.25 2 1 1 2 1 0.466667 1 0 0 2 1 2 0 0.285714 2 2 0 0.444444 3 1 0 0 0 0.2667 0.3441
32 上海电气 601899 C Manufacturing 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0.142857143 1 1 1 0 0.25 1 0 3 1 1 0.4 2 2 2 3 0 0 0 0.428571 3 3 1 0.777778 3 0 0 1 0 0.2667 0.3441
33 上港集团 601766 G
Transport, Storage 
and Postal Service 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.047619048 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 2 1 3 0.6 1 2 0 3 1 2 0 0.428571 1 0 0 0.111111 1 1 0 1 0 0.2 0.2473
34 海通证券 600005 J Financial 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0.142857143 1 1 0 3 0.41667 3 1 2 2 1 0.6 2 0 1 2 0 1 0 0.285714 1 1 0 0.222222 2 2 1 2 1 0.5333 0.3548
35 海螺水泥 600015 C Manufacturing 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.047619048 1 1 0 0 0.16667 1 1 2 2 1 0.466667 2 0 1 2 0 1 0 0.285714 3 3 2 0.888889 2 1 0 1 0 0.2667 0.3011
36 中国重工 600048 C Manufacturing 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.095238095 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 3 1 1 0.466667 1 2 0 3 1 2 0 0.428571 2 2 1 0.555556 0 1 0 1 0 0.1333 0.2688
37 金钼股份 601808 B Mining 3 0 3 0 3 1 1 0.523809524 0 3 0 0 0.25 2 0 2 1 1 0.4 2 1 1 2 0 1 0 0.333333 3 3 2 0.888889 3 3 0 0 0 0.4 0.4409
38 华泰证券 600104 J Financial 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.095238095 1 0 0 0 0.08333 3 3 3 2 1 0.8 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 0.190476 1 2 1 0.444444 1 1 0 0 2 0.2667 0.2903
39 中海油服 600585 B Mining 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0.142857143 3 3 2 1 0.75 1 2 2 2 2 0.6 1 3 2 2 0 2 0 0.47619 2 2 1 0.555556 3 3 1 3 3 0.8667 0.5269
40 山东黄金 601939 B Mining 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.047619048 1 1 0 0 0.16667 1 0 2 1 1 0.333333 2 1 0 1 0 1 0 0.238095 1 0 0 0.111111 3 1 0 0 0 0.2667 0.1935
41 中国南车 601111 C Manufacturing 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 0.19047619 1 1 0 0 0.16667 2 1 3 1 3 0.666667 2 1 0 2 0 1 0 0.285714 3 3 3 1 3 3 0 1 0 0.4667 0.4086
42 中国中铁 600795 E Construction 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.047619048 1 1 1 0 0.25 3 0 2 1 1 0.466667 2 1 0 1 0 1 0 0.238095 3 2 1 0.666667 3 3 0 1 3 0.6667 0.3441
43 中国远洋 600583 G
Transport, Storage 
and Postal Service 0 0 0 0 3 2 2 0.333333333 2 3 1 1 0.58333 3 1 3 2 2 0.733333 2 1 1 1 0 2 0 0.333333 1 1 0 0.222222 3 3 1 1 1 0.6 0.4624
44 北京银行 600089 J Financial 3 0 0 0 0 2 2 0.333333333 0 1 0 0 0.08333 3 1 3 3 2 0.8 2 1 2 3 0 0 0 0.380952 2 2 1 0.555556 1 3 0 0 0 0.2667 0.3978
45 中国铁建 601958 E Construction 3 3 0 0 3 1 2 0.571428571 3 3 3 3 1 3 2 3 2 3 0.866667 3 1 1 2 0 2 0 0.428571 3 3 3 1 3 3 2 3 3 0.9333 0.7419
46 国阳新能 600688 C Manufacturing 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0.142857143 1 1 0 0 0.16667 2 0 2 1 2 0.466667 2 1 2 2 0 1 0 0.380952 3 3 3 1 1 1 0 1 0 0.2 0.3441
47 潞安环能 600150 B Mining 3 0 3 0 3 1 2 0.571428571 1 1 1 0 0.25 2 0 2 2 1 0.466667 1 2 1 2 0 2 0 0.380952 3 3 1 0.777778 2 3 1 1 0 0.4667 0.4731
48 南方航空 600188 G
Transport, Storage 
and Postal Service 0 0 0 0 3 1 1 0.238095238 0 1 0 0 0.08333 2 1 3 1 1 0.533333 3 2 1 2 1 2 0 0.52381 1 2 1 0.444444 3 3 0 0 0 0.4 0.3763
49 招商证券 600550 J Financial 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.095238095 1 1 1 1 0.5 3 2 3 2 1 0.733333 1 2 1 3 0 1 0 0.380952 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0.6 0.3763
50 中国中冶 600832 E Construction 0 0 0 0 3 1 1 0.238095238 1 1 2 1 0.41667 3 1 3 2 2 0.733333 2 2 1 3 0 0 0 0.380952 3 3 2 0.888889 1 1 0 1 2 0.3333 0.4516
Count of Companies 
Scored 3 17 7 7 0 17 1 2 0 7 9 4 3 0 30 7 32 7 17 0 10 2 0 21 2 0 1 0 20 19 8 0 25 17 0 4 15
Count of Companies 
Scored 2 0 0 0 0 0 10 22 0 2 2 2 0 0 14 10 16 19 13 0 23 23 10 21 4 19 1 0 16 17 8 0 12 5 4 5 2
Count of Companies 
Scored 1 1 1 2 0 1 30 26 0 27 31 12 8 1 6 23 2 24 19 0 17 21 23 8 15 19 3 0 14 11 24 8 11 27 15 27 11
Count of Companies 
Scored 0 32 42 41 50 32 9 0 0 14 8 32 39 4 0 10 0 0 1 0 0 4 17 0 29 12 45 0 0 3 10 0 2 1 31 14 22
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Code Industry Name VD1-Financia l VD2-HR VD3-CG VD4-MS VD5-DEV VD6-SE VDT
1 中国石油 601857 B Mining 0.285714286 0.0833333 0.6666667 0.4285714 0.1111111 0.1333333 0.311828
5 中国石化 601628 B Mining 0.428571429 0.25 0.8666667 0.8095238 1 0.2666667 0.5913978
7 中国神华 600036 B Mining 0.285714286 0.1666667 0.6666667 0.4285714 0.2222222 0.3333333 0.3655914
27 中煤能源 601600 B Mining 0.047619048 0.3333333 0.5333333 0.4285714 0.4444444 0.3333333 0.3333333
30 紫金矿业 601727 B Mining 0.285714286 0.0833333 0.8666667 0.1904762 0.2222222 0.6 0.3763441
31 兖州煤业 601991 B Mining 0.380952381 0.25 0.4666667 0.2857143 0.4444444 0.2666667 0.344086
37 金钼股份 601808 B Mining 0.523809524 0.25 0.4 0.3333333 0.8888889 0.4 0.4408602
39 中海油服 600585 B Mining 0.142857143 0.75 0.6 0.4761905 0.5555556 0.8666667 0.5268817
40 山东黄金 601939 B Mining 0.047619048 0.1666667 0.3333333 0.2380952 0.1111111 0.2666667 0.1935484
47 潞安环能 600150 B Mining 0.571428571 0.25 0.4666667 0.3809524 0.7777778 0.4666667 0.4731183
11 贵州茅台 600030 C Manufacturing 0.380952381 0.1666667 0.4 0.5714286 0.3333333 0.6 0.4301075
17 上海汽车 601390 C Manufacturing 0.714285714 0.1666667 0.7333333 0.5238095 0.7777778 0.2 0.5268817
24 宝钢股份 600837 C Manufacturing 0.80952381 0 0.6 0.5238095 1 0.2666667 0.5376344
28 中国铝业 601919 C Manufacturing 0.285714286 0.3333333 0.9333333 0.3809524 0.4444444 0.6666667 0.4946237
29 江西铜业 601169 C Manufacturing 0.19047619 0.1666667 0.4 0.3333333 0.2222222 0.2666667 0.2688172
32 上海电气 601899 C Manufacturing 0.142857143 0.25 0.4 0.4285714 0.7777778 0.2666667 0.344086
35 海螺水泥 600015 C Manufacturing 0.047619048 0.1666667 0.4666667 0.2857143 0.8888889 0.2666667 0.3010753
36 中国重工 600048 C Manufacturing 0.095238095 0 0.4666667 0.4285714 0.5555556 0.1333333 0.2688172
41 中国南车 601111 C Manufacturing 0.19047619 0.1666667 0.6666667 0.2857143 1 0.4666667 0.4086022
46 国阳新能 600688 C Manufacturing 0.142857143 0.1666667 0.4666667 0.3809524 1 0.2 0.344086
19 长江电力 600019 D
Electric Power, Heat, 
Gas  and Water 
Production and 
Supply 0.333333333 0.25 0.5333333 0.4761905 0.5555556 0.4 0.4193548
42 中国中铁 600795 E Construction 0.047619048 0.25 0.4666667 0.2380952 0.6666667 0.6666667 0.344086
45 中国铁建 601958 E Construction 0.571428571 1 0.8666667 0.4285714 1 0.9333333 0.7419355
50 中国中冶 600832 E Construction 0.238095238 0.4166667 0.7333333 0.3809524 0.8888889 0.3333333 0.4516129
26 中国建筑 601898 E Construction 0.714285714 0 0.7333333 0.4285714 0.5555556 0.3333333 0.483871
20 大秦铁路 600016 G
Transport, Storage 
and Posta l  Service 0.523809524 0.25 0.4666667 0.5714286 0.8888889 0.2666667 0.483871
21 中国国航 600000 G
Transport, Storage 
and Posta l  Service 0.333333333 0.0833333 0.5333333 0.2857143 0.4444444 0.5333333 0.3655914
33 上港集团 601766 G
Transport, Storage 
and Posta l  Service 0.047619048 0 0.6 0.4285714 0.1111111 0.2 0.2473118
43 中国远洋 600583 G
Transport, Storage 
and Posta l  Service 0.333333333 0.5833333 0.7333333 0.3333333 0.2222222 0.6 0.4623656
48 南方航空 600188 G
Transport, Storage 
and Posta l  Service 0.238095238 0.0833333 0.5333333 0.5238095 0.4444444 0.4 0.3763441





Technology 0.095238095 0.0833333 0.7333333 0.3809524 1 0.4 0.3978495
2 工商银行 601398 J Financia l 0.19047619 0.3333333 0.9333333 0.3809524 0.7777778 0.5333333 0.483871
3 农业银行 601988 J Financia l 0.142857143 0.4166667 0.8 0.4761905 0.7777778 0.6 0.4946237
4 中国银行 600028 J Financia l 0.142857143 0.3333333 0.7333333 0.3333333 0.8888889 0.6666667 0.4623656





ate CSR) 601998 J Financia l 0.238095238 0.1666667 0.7333333 0.3333333 0.5555556 0.2666667 0.3655914
16 中信银行 600519 J Financia l 0.095238095 0.5833333 0.8666667 0.3333333 0.5555556 0.5333333 0.4516129
18 中信证券 601601 J Financia l 0.142857143 0.0833333 0.7333333 0.2857143 0.5555556 0.1333333 0.3010753
10 浦发银行 601328 J Financia l 0.285714286 0.1666667 0.8 0.4285714 0.4444444 0.2 0.3870968
38 华泰证券 600104 J Financia l 0.095238095 0.0833333 0.8 0.1904762 0.4444444 0.2666667 0.2903226
49 招商证券 600550 J Financia l 0.095238095 0.5 0.7333333 0.3809524 1 0.6 0.3763441
13 光大银行 601006 J Financia l 0.142857143 0.0833333 0.6 0.3809524 0.4444444 0.4666667 0.344086
9 招商银行 601318 J Financia l 0.380952381 0.1666667 0.8666667 0.4285714 0.8888889 0.8666667 0.5698925
8 中国平安 600900 J Financia l 0.19047619 0.75 0.8666667 0.4761905 0.7777778 0.8666667 0.6021505
12 交通银行 600050 J Financia l 0.285714286 0.1666667 0.8 0.5238095 0.8888889 0.6 0.516129
23 民生银行 600018 J Financia l 0.095238095 0.25 0.7333333 0.2380952 0.6666667 0.5333333 0.3763441
14 兴业银行 601186 J Financia l 0.476190476 0.8333333 0.9333333 0.5238095 0.5555556 0.9333333 0.688172
34 海通证券 600005 J Financia l 0.142857143 0.4166667 0.6 0.2857143 0.2222222 0.5333333 0.3548387
44 北京银行 600089 J Financia l 0.333333333 0.0833333 0.8 0.3809524 0.5555556 0.2666667 0.3978495
25 三一重工 600011 C Manufacturing 0.047619048 0.6666667 0.5333333 0.4285714 1 0.6666667 0.483871
国
max 0.80952381 1 0.9333333 0.8095238 1 0.9333333 0.7419355
min 0.047619048 0 0.3333333 0.1904762 0.1111111 0.1333333 0.1935484
avg 0.268707483 0.2400794 0.6428571 0.393424 0.6005291 0.4031746 0.4047619





















































































1 中国石油 601857 B Mining 1 3 0 0 3 1 0 0.380952381 0 1 0 0 0.08333 2 1 3 1 0 0.466667 1 1 0 1 3 1 0 0.333333 1 1 0 0.222222 1 1 0 0 0 0.1333 0.2903
2 工商银行 601398 J Financial 0 0 1 0 1 2 2 0.285714286 3 3 3 1 0.83333 3 3 3 3 2 0.933333 2 1 1 3 0 1 0 0.380952 3 2 0 0.555556 3 3 1 1 3 0.7333 0.5806
3 农业银行 601988 J Financial 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0.142857143 3 1 1 1 0.5 3 3 3 3 1 0.866667 1 2 0 2 1 1 0 0.333333 2 1 3 0.666667 3 3 1 2 3 0.8 0.5054
4 中国银行 600028 J Financial 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 0.19047619 3 2 1 0 0.5 3 3 2 2 2 0.8 3 3 0 3 0 0 0 0.428571 2 2 2 0.666667 3 1 0 1 3 0.5333 0.4839
5 中国石化 601628 B Mining 0 3 0 0 3 1 2 0.428571429 1 1 0 0 0.16667 3 0 2 1 1 0.466667 3 2 1 2 1 2 1 0.571429 3 3 3 1 3 1 0 1 3 0.5333 0.5054
6 中国神华 601088 B Mining 0 0 0 0 2 1 2 0.238095238 3 2 1 0 0.5 2 1 3 3 1 0.666667 3 1 1 2 3 2 0 0.571429 2 2 1 0.555556 3 2 1 1 1 0.5333 0.4946
7 中国人寿 600036 J Financial 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.047619048 1 1 0 0 0.16667 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 0 2 0 1 0 0.238095 1 1 0 0.222222 1 1 0 2 3 0.4667 0.3441
8 招商银行 600900 J Financial 1 0 1 0 0 1 2 0.238095238 1 1 1 0 0.25 3 3 2 3 3 0.933333 3 2 1 3 0 1 0 0.47619 3 2 1 0.666667 3 3 1 3 3 0.8667 0.5484
9 贵州茅台 601318 C Manufacturing 0 3 0 0 3 0 1 0.333333333 0 1 0 0 0.08333 3 0 1 1 0 0.333333 2 1 1 1 3 0 0 0.380952 1 1 1 0.333333 1 0 0 1 0 0.1333 0.2796
10 中国平安 601328 J Financial 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.095238095 3 3 3 0 0.75 3 3 3 3 3 1 3 1 1 2 0 1 0 0.380952 2 2 1 0.555556 3 3 2 3 3 0.9333 0.5699
11 浦发银行 600030 J Financial 0 0 3 0 1 1 1 0.285714286 1 1 0 0 0.16667 3 2 3 2 3 0.866667 2 1 0 1 0 1 0 0.238095 3 3 1 0.777778 3 1 1 1 0 0.4 0.4194
12 交通银行 600050 J Financial 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.047619048 1 3 1 0 0.41667 3 3 3 2 3 0.933333 2 2 1 3 0 1 0 0.428571 3 2 1 0.666667 3 3 2 3 3 0.9333 0.5269
13 兴业银行 601006 J Financial 0 0 3 0 0 1 1 0.238095238 1 1 0 0 0.16667 3 3 3 1 3 0.866667 2 1 0 2 0 2 0 0.333333 1 2 1 0.444444 1 3 1 3 3 0.7333 0.4516
14 民生银行 601186 J Financial 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.047619048 1 1 0 0 0.16667 3 3 3 2 3 0.933333 1 1 1 2 1 0 0 0.285714 2 2 1 0.555556 2 3 1 2 3 0.7333 0.4194
15 上海汽车 601998 C Manufacturing 1 3 0 0 0 1 2 0.333333333 1 1 1 0 0.25 3 0 3 2 3 0.733333 3 2 0 1 0 2 0 0.380952 3 3 2 0.888889 1 1 0 1 0 0.2 0.4301
16 中信银行 600519 J Financial 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.19047619 3 3 3 0 0.75 3 3 3 3 3 1 2 1 1 2 0 1 0 0.333333 3 3 3 1 3 3 1 2 3 0.8 0.6022
17 中国太保 601390 J Financial 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.142857143 2 1 1 0 0.33333 3 3 3 1 0 0.666667 1 1 1 2 0 2 0 0.333333 1 1 0 0.222222 1 1 0 1 3 0.4 0.3441
18 光大银行 601601 J Financial 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.095238095 1 2 1 0 0.33333 3 3 2 2 1 0.733333 1 1 0 2 0 1 0 0.238095 3 3 1 0.777778 2 1 1 2 3 0.6 0.4086





Technology 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.047619048 1 0 0 0 0.08333 3 1 3 1 3 0.733333 2 1 0 1 0 1 0 0.238095 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 0 0 0.2 0.3226
20 大秦铁路 600016 G
Transport, Storage 
and Postal Service 3 2 0 0 3 2 2 0.571428571 1 1 1 0 0.25 2 1 2 1 2 0.533333 2 1 1 2 1 2 0 0.428571 2 2 1 0.555556 3 1 0 1 0 0.3333 0.4516
21 长江电力 600000 D
Electric Power, Heat, 
Gas and Water 
Production and 
Supply 1 3 0 0 3 1 1 0.428571429 3 1 3 0 0.58333 3 2 2 1 1 0.6 0 1 0 3 3 2 1 0.47619 3 3 1 0.777778 3 3 1 1 3 0.7333 0.5699
22 中信证券 601166 J Financial 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.095238095 2 1 1 0 0.33333 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 2 0 3 0 1 0 0.333333 1 1 0 0.222222 2 1 1 1 1 0.4 0.3871
23 三一重工 600018 C Manufacturing 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.047619048 1 1 1 0 0.25 2 0 3 1 3 0.6 3 2 2 3 0 2 0 0.571429 3 3 3 1 3 0 1 1 0 0.3333 0.4194
24 中国建筑 600837 E Construction 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 0.19047619 1 1 0 0 0.16667 2 1 3 2 2 0.666667 2 0 0 2 1 2 0 0.333333 2 2 1 0.555556 3 0 0 1 0 0.2667 0.3441
25 宝钢股份 600011 C Manufacturing 1 0 0 0 1 1 2 0.238095238 3 0 0 0 0.25 2 3 2 2 3 0.8 3 1 1 2 0 2 0 0.428571 3 3 1 0.777778 3 1 0 1 0 0.3333 0.4409
26 中煤能源 601898 B Mining 1 0 0 0 0 2 2 0.238095238 3 3 2 1 0.75 3 1 2 1 2 0.6 1 1 2 3 1 2 0 0.47619 2 2 1 0.555556 3 1 1 1 0 0.4 0.4731
27 华夏银行 601600 J Financial 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0.142857143 1 0 0 0 0.08333 3 3 3 2 3 0.933333 2 1 0 3 0 1 0 0.333333 3 3 1 0.777778 1 1 1 1 0 0.2667 0.3871
28 中国重工 601919 C Manufacturing 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.095238095 1 1 1 0 0.25 2 1 2 2 3 0.666667 3 1 0 2 0 2 1 0.428571 3 3 1 0.777778 3 1 0 1 0 0.3333 0.3871
29 兖州煤业 601169 B Mining 0 1 0 0 3 1 1 0.285714286 3 3 1 0 0.58333 2 2 2 1 2 0.6 2 1 0 1 1 2 0 0.333333 2 1 1 0.444444 3 3 0 1 1 0.5333 0.4409
30 海螺水泥 601727 C Manufacturing 1 3 0 0 1 1 1 0.333333333 2 1 1 0 0.33333 2 1 3 1 3 0.666667 2 1 1 3 1 2 0 0.47619 2 2 1 0.555556 3 3 1 1 0 0.5333 0.4731
31 中国铝业 601991 C Manufacturing 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.095238095 0 1 0 0 0.08333 2 1 3 1 0 0.466667 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0.190476 1 1 1 0.333333 1 1 0 1 0 0.2 0.2151
32 海通证券 601899 J Financial 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.047619048 1 0 0 0 0.08333 3 3 3 1 1 0.733333 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0.142857 2 2 1 0.555556 0 1 1 1 0 0.2 0.2581
33 紫金矿业 601766 B Mining 0 0 0 0 3 1 2 0.285714286 3 1 1 0 0.41667 1 0 3 1 1 0.4 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 0.285714 1 1 0 0.222222 2 1 0 2 3 0.5333 0.3548
34 保利地产 600005 K Real Estate 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.047619048 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 3 1 1 0.666667 0 1 1 0 0 0 0.095238 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.0667 0.1505
35 上港集团 600015 G
Transport, Storage 
and Postal Service 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0.142857143 1 1 0 0 0.16667 2 1 3 1 1 0.533333 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0.190476 2 2 0 0.444444 3 3 0 1 3 0.6667 0.3333
36 新华保险 600048 J Financial 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0.095238095 3 3 3 1 0.83333 3 3 3 2 3 0.933333 3 2 1 3 0 1 0 0.47619 2 2 1 0.555556 3 3 1 3 3 0.8667 0.5806
37 北京银行 601808 J Financial 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0.142857143 1 1 0 0 0.16667 3 3 3 1 2 0.8 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0.190476 2 1 0 0.333333 2 0 1 1 0 0.2667 0.3011
38 华能国际 600104 D
Electric Power, Heat, 
Gas and Water 
Production and 
Supply 0 3 0 0 3 1 3 0.476190476 3 3 2 1 0.75 2 0 3 3 1 0.6 1 2 0 3 3 2 1 0.571429 3 3 3 1 3 3 1 2 3 0.8 0.6559
39 中国国航 600585 G
Transport, Storage 
and Postal Service 0 0 0 0 3 1 1 0.238095238 1 1 1 0 0.25 2 1 2 1 1 0.466667 3 1 1 1 0 2 0 0.380952 2 2 9 1.444444 3 1 1 1 0 0.4 0.4516
40 大唐发电 601939 D
Electric Power, Heat, 
Gas and Water 
Production and 
Supply 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.047619048 1 1 0 0 0.16667 2 1 3 1 2 0.6 0 1 0 1 3 2 0 0.333333 1 2 0 0.333333 3 1 0 1 0 0.3333 0.2903
41 上海电气 601111 C Manufacturing 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.047619048 1 1 0 0 0.16667 1 1 3 1 3 0.6 3 1 1 2 0 2 0 0.428571 3 3 3 1 3 1 1 1 0 0.4 0.3871
42 潞安环能 600795 B Mining 3 0 0 0 3 1 2 0.428571429 1 3 0 0 0.33333 2 1 2 1 1 0.466667 1 1 0 2 1 2 0 0.333333 3 3 3 1 3 3 1 1 0 0.5333 0.4731
43 招商证券 600583 J Financial 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.047619048 1 0 0 0 0.08333 3 3 3 2 3 0.933333 0 1 0 3 0 0 0 0.190476 1 1 0 0.222222 0 0 0 0 3 0.2 0.2688
44 包钢稀土 600089 C Manufacturing 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.095238095 0 1 0 0 0.08333 3 0 1 1 0 0.333333 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0.142857 2 2 1 0.555556 1 1 1 1 0 0.2667 0.2151
45 江西铜业 601958 C Manufacturing 0 0 0 0 3 1 1 0.238095238 0 1 0 0 0.08333 2 1 2 1 1 0.466667 1 0 0 2 1 2 0 0.285714 2 1 1 0.444444 3 1 1 0 0 0.3333 0.3011
46 华泰证券 600688 J Financial 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.047619048 1 1 0 0 0.16667 3 3 3 2 3 0.933333 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0.095238 1 2 1 0.444444 0 0 0 0 3 0.2 0.2796
47 建设银行 600150 J Financial 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0.142857143 3 3 3 0 0.75 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 0 3 0 2 0 0.333333 3 3 2 0.888889 3 3 1 3 3 0.8667 0.5914
48 中国中铁 600188 E Construction 3 0 0 0 3 1 1 0.380952381 2 1 1 0 0.33333 2 1 2 1 2 0.533333 1 1 1 3 1 1 0 0.380952 3 3 2 0.888889 2 1 1 1 3 0.5333 0.4731
49 国电电力 600550 D
Electric Power, Heat, 
Gas and Water 
Production and 
Supply 3 3 0 0 3 1 3 0.619047619 1 1 0 0 0.16667 2 0 3 1 0 0.4 0 1 0 1 1 2 0 0.238095 2 1 1 0.444444 1 3 1 0 1 0.4 0.3871
50 中海油服 600832 B Mining 3 0 0 0 2 1 1 0.333333333 3 3 3 0 0.75 2 1 2 3 1 0.6 2 1 1 1 0 2 1 0.380952 3 3 3 1 3 3 2 3 3 0.9333 0.6022
Count of Companies 
Scored 3 5 8 2 0 13 0 2 0 15 11 7 0 0 29 21 33 11 21 0 12 1 0 15 6 0 0 0 20 17 9 0 29 18 0 7 23
Count of Companies 
Scored 2 1 1 0 0 3 3 15 0 4 3 2 0 0 19 4 15 13 9 0 14 9 2 18 0 25 0 0 18 19 4 0 6 1 3 7 0
Count of Companies 
Scored 1 8 1 5 0 4 35 31 0 25 30 17 5 0 2 17 2 26 14 5 16 38 21 15 12 16 5 0 11 13 25 8 11 24 28 30 4
Count of Companies 
Scored 0 36 40 43 50 30 12 2 0 6 6 24 45 1 0 8 0 0 6 0 8 2 27 1 32 9 45 0 1 1 11 1 4 7 19 6 23
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Code Industry Name VD1-Financia l VD2-HR VD3-CG VD4-MS VD5-DEV VD6-SE VDT
1 中国石油 601857 B Mining 0.380952381 0.08333333 0.46666667 0.33333333 0.22222222 0.13333333 0.29032258
5 中国石化 601628 B Mining 0.428571429 0.16666667 0.46666667 0.57142857 1 0.53333333 0.50537634
6 中国神华 601088 B Mining 0.238095238 0.5 0.66666667 0.57142857 0.55555556 0.53333333 0.49462366
26 中煤能源 601898 B Mining 0.238095238 0.75 0.6 0.47619048 0.55555556 0.4 0.47311828
29 兖州煤业 601169 B Mining 0.285714286 0.58333333 0.6 0.33333333 0.44444444 0.53333333 0.44086022
33 紫金矿业 601766 B Mining 0.285714286 0.41666667 0.4 0.28571429 0.22222222 0.53333333 0.35483871
42 潞安环能 600795 B Mining 0.428571429 0.33333333 0.46666667 0.33333333 1 0.53333333 0.47311828
50 中海油服 600832 B Mining 0.333333333 0.75 0.6 0.38095238 1 0.93333333 0.60215054
9 贵州茅台 601318 C Manufacturing 0.333333333 0.08333333 0.33333333 0.38095238 0.33333333 0.13333333 0.27956989
15 上海汽车 601998 C Manufacturing 0.333333333 0.25 0.73333333 0.38095238 0.88888889 0.2 0.43010753
25 宝钢股份 600011 C Manufacturing 0.238095238 0.25 0.8 0.42857143 0.77777778 0.33333333 0.44086022
28 中国重工 601919 C Manufacturing 0.095238095 0.25 0.66666667 0.42857143 0.77777778 0.33333333 0.38709677
30 海螺水泥 601727 C Manufacturing 0.333333333 0.33333333 0.66666667 0.47619048 0.55555556 0.53333333 0.47311828
31 中国铝业 601991 C Manufacturing 0.095238095 0.08333333 0.46666667 0.19047619 0.33333333 0.2 0.21505376
41 上海电气 601111 C Manufacturing 0.047619048 0.16666667 0.6 0.42857143 1 0.4 0.38709677
44 包钢稀土 600089 C Manufacturing 0.095238095 0.08333333 0.33333333 0.14285714 0.55555556 0.26666667 0.21505376
45 江西铜业 601958 C Manufacturing 0.238095238 0.08333333 0.46666667 0.28571429 0.44444444 0.33333333 0.30107527
21 长江电力 600000 D
Electric Power, Heat, 
Gas  and Water 
Production and Supply 0.428571429 0.58333333 0.6 0.47619048 0.77777778 0.73333333 0.56989247
38 华能国际 600104 D
Electric Power, Heat, 
Gas  and Water 
Production and Supply 0.476190476 0.75 0.6 0.57142857 1 0.8 0.65591398
40 大唐发电 601939 D
Electric Power, Heat, 
Gas  and Water 
Production and Supply 0.047619048 0.16666667 0.6 0.33333333 0.33333333 0.33333333 0.29032258
49 国电电力 600550 D
Electric Power, Heat, 
Gas  and Water 
Production and Supply 0.619047619 0.16666667 0.4 0.23809524 0.44444444 0.4 0.38709677
24 中国建筑 600837 E Construction 0.19047619 0.16666667 0.66666667 0.33333333 0.55555556 0.26666667 0.34408602
48 中国中铁 600188 E Construction 0.380952381 0.33333333 0.53333333 0.38095238 0.88888889 0.53333333 0.47311828
20 大秦铁路 600016 G
Transport, Storage and 
Posta l  Service 0.571428571 0.25 0.53333333 0.42857143 0.55555556 0.33333333 0.4516129
35 上港集团 600015 G
Transport, Storage and 
Posta l  Service 0.142857143 0.16666667 0.53333333 0.19047619 0.44444444 0.66666667 0.33333333
39 中国国航 600585 G
Transport, Storage and 
Posta l  Service 0.238095238 0.25 0.46666667 0.38095238 1.44444444 0.4 0.4516129





Technology 0.047619048 0.08333333 0.73333333 0.23809524 1 0.2 0.32258065
2 工商银行 601398 J Financia l 0.285714286 0.83333333 0.93333333 0.38095238 0.55555556 0.73333333 0.58064516
3 农业银行 601988 J Financia l 0.142857143 0.5 0.86666667 0.33333333 0.66666667 0.8 0.50537634
4 中国银行 600028 J Financia l 0.19047619 0.5 0.8 0.42857143 0.66666667 0.53333333 0.48387097
7 中国人寿 600036 J Financia l 0.047619048 0.16666667 1 0.23809524 0.22222222 0.46666667 0.34408602
47 建设银行 600150 J Financia l 0.142857143 0.75 1 0.33333333 0.88888889 0.86666667 0.59139785
11 浦发银行 600030 J Financia l 0.285714286 0.16666667 0.86666667 0.23809524 0.77777778 0.4 0.41935484
16 中信银行 600519 J Financia l 0.19047619 0.75 1 0.33333333 1 0.8 0.60215054
17 中国太保 601390 J Financia l 0.142857143 0.33333333 0.66666667 0.33333333 0.22222222 0.4 0.34408602
22 中信证券 601166 J Financia l 0.095238095 0.33333333 1 0.33333333 0.22222222 0.4 0.38709677
18 光大银行 601601 J Financia l 0.095238095 0.33333333 0.73333333 0.23809524 0.77777778 0.6 0.40860215
43 招商证券 600583 J Financia l 0.047619048 0.08333333 0.93333333 0.19047619 0.22222222 0.2 0.2688172
46 华泰证券 600688 J Financia l 0.047619048 0.16666667 0.93333333 0.0952381 0.44444444 0.2 0.27956989
34 保利地产 600005 K Real  Estate 0.047619048 0 0.66666667 0.0952381 0 0.06666667 0.15053763
36 新华保险 600048 J Financia l 0.095238095 0.83333333 0.93333333 0.47619048 0.55555556 0.86666667 0.58064516
8 招商银行 600900 J Financia l 0.238095238 0.25 0.93333333 0.47619048 0.66666667 0.86666667 0.5483871
10 中国平安 601328 J Financia l 0.095238095 0.75 1 0.38095238 0.55555556 0.93333333 0.56989247
12 交通银行 600050 J Financia l 0.047619048 0.41666667 0.93333333 0.42857143 0.66666667 0.93333333 0.52688172
13 兴业银行 601006 J Financia l 0.238095238 0.16666667 0.86666667 0.33333333 0.44444444 0.73333333 0.4516129
14 民生银行 601186 J Financia l 0.047619048 0.16666667 0.93333333 0.28571429 0.55555556 0.73333333 0.41935484
27 华夏银行 601600 J Financia l 0.142857143 0.08333333 0.93333333 0.33333333 0.77777778 0.26666667 0.38709677
32 海通证券 601899 J Financia l 0.047619048 0.08333333 0.73333333 0.14285714 0.55555556 0.2 0.25806452
37 北京银行 601808 J Financia l 0.142857143 0.16666667 0.8 0.19047619 0.33333333 0.26666667 0.30107527



















































































1 中国石油 601857 B Mining 0 3 0 0 3 1 1 0.380952381 3 1 0 0 0.33333 2 1 2 1 1 0.46667 1 1 0 0 3 2 1 0.38095 1 1 1 0.333333 3 1 1 1 0 0.4 0.3871
2 工商银行 601398 J Financial 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.095238095 3 3 3 1 0.83333 3 3 3 1 3 0.86667 3 2 0 3 0 1 0 0.42857 3 3 2 0.888889 3 3 1 2 3 0.8 0.5806
3 农业银行 601988 J Financial 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.095238095 3 3 2 0 0.66667 3 3 3 2 3 0.93333 3 2 0 3 0 0 0 0.38095 3 3 2 0.888889 1 1 0 1 0 0.2 0.4624
4 中国银行 600028 J Financial 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0.142857143 3 2 2 1 0.66667 3 3 3 2 2 0.86667 3 1 0 3 0 0 0 0.33333 3 2 0 0.555556 3 2 0 1 3 0.6 0.4839
5 中国石化 601628 B Mining 0 3 0 0 3 1 2 0.428571429 1 1 0 0 0.16667 2 0 2 3 1 0.53333 2 1 2 3 1 2 0 0.52381 3 3 3 1 3 3 0 1 3 0.6667 0.5269
6 中国人寿 601088 J Financial 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0.142857143 2 1 0 0 0.25 3 3 3 1 3 0.86667 2 0 0 2 0 1 0 0.2381 1 0 0 0.111111 1 1 1 1 3 0.4667 0.3441
7 中国神华 600036 B Mining 0 0 0 0 3 2 2 0.333333333 1 1 0 0 0.16667 2 1 2 1 1 0.46667 1 2 1 2 0 2 0 0.38095 2 1 0 0.333333 2 1 0 1 3 0.4667 0.3656
8 招商银行 600900 J Financial 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.095238095 2 1 2 1 0.5 3 3 2 3 3 0.93333 2 1 0 3 0 2 0 0.38095 2 3 3 0.888889 1 1 0 1 3 0.4 0.4731
9 贵州茅台 601318 C Manufacturing 3 0 0 0 1 1 2 0.333333333 3 1 0 0 0.33333 2 1 2 1 0 0.4 3 2 2 0 0 0 0 0.33333 1 0 0 0.111111 1 1 1 0 3 0.4 0.3333
10 中国平安 601328 J Financial 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.142857143 2 2 1 0 0.41667 3 3 3 1 1 0.73333 2 0 0 2 0 1 0 0.2381 3 3 1 0.777778 2 3 1 1 3 0.6667 0.4409
11 上汽集团 600030 C Manufacturing 3 3 0 3 1 2 0.571428571 2 2 1 1 0.5 2 1 2 1 2 0.53333 3 2 2 2 0 2 0 0.52381 3 3 0 0.666667 3 3 0 1 3 0.6667 0.5699
12 交通银行 600050 J Financial 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.095238095 3 1 3 0 0.58333 3 3 3 3 3 1 2 1 0 1 0 1 0 0.2381 3 3 1 0.777778 3 3 1 2 3 0.8 0.5161
13 浦发银行 601006 J Financial 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.095238095 3 2 1 0 0.5 3 3 3 1 3 0.86667 1 1 0 3 0 0 0 0.2381 2 1 0 0.333333 2 1 0 1 1 0.3333 0.3656
14 兴业银行 601186 J Financial 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.095238095 3 3 3 0 0.75 3 3 2 1 2 0.73333 3 1 0 1 0 2 0 0.33333 3 3 0 0.666667 2 3 1 2 3 0.7333 0.4946
15 民生银行 601998 J Financial 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.142857143 3 1 1 0 0.41667 3 3 3 3 3 1 2 1 0 3 0 2 0 0.38095 2 1 1 0.444444 3 3 2 1 3 0.8 0.5054
16 中国太保 600519 J Financial 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.095238095 1 0 0 0 0.08333 3 3 3 1 3 0.86667 2 1 0 2 0 1 0 0.28571 1 1 0 0.222222 2 1 0 1 0 0.2667 0.3011
17 中信银行 601390 J Financial 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0.19047619 3 1 3 0 0.58333 3 3 3 2 3 0.93333 3 1 0 1 0 1 0 0.28571 2 3 3 0.888889 3 3 0 2 3 0.7333 0.5376
18 中信证券 601601 J Financial 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.095238095 2 1 1 0 0.33333 3 3 2 1 2 0.73333 1 1 1 2 0 1 0 0.28571 3 3 0 0.666667 1 1 1 1 3 0.4667 0.3871
19 光大银行 600019 J Financial 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.095238095 1 2 1 0 0.33333 3 3 2 2 1 0.73333 1 1 0 2 0 1 0 0.2381 3 3 1 0.777778 2 1 1 2 3 0.6 0.4086
20 中国建筑 600016 E Construction 3 3 0 0 0 1 1 0.380952381 1 1 0 0 0.16667 2 1 3 1 1 0.53333 2 1 1 1 0 2 1 0.38095 2 2 1 0.555556 3 1 1 1 0 0.4 0.3978
21 长江电力 600000 D
Electric Power, Heat, 
Gas and Water 
Production and 
Supply 3 3 0 3 3 1 3 0.761904762 3 1 0 0 0.33333 3 1 2 1 3 0.66667 1 2 0 0 3 2 3 0.52381 2 2 1 0.555556 3 1 0 1 0 0.3333 0.5484
22 大秦铁路 601166 G
Transport, Storage 
and Postal Service 3 3 0 0 3 1 3 0.619047619 2 1 1 0 0.33333 3 0 2 1 1 0.46667 2 1 3 2 1 2 1 0.57143 2 2 1 0.555556 3 1 1 0 0 0.3333 0.4946
23 保利地产 600018 K Real Estate 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.047619048 3 1 0 0 0.33333 2 1 2 1 2 0.53333 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0.2381 1 1 0 0.222222 3 3 1 1 0 0.5333 0.3011
24 包钢稀土 600837 C Manufacturing 3 3 0 0 0 2 2 0.476190476 1 1 0 0 0.16667 2 0 3 1 1 0.46667 2 1 1 0 3 2 1 0.47619 2 2 0 0.444444 1 1 0 1 0 0.2 0.3871
25 宝钢股份 600011 C Manufacturing 3 3 0 0 3 1 1 0.523809524 3 1 0 0 0.33333 2 0 2 1 1 0.4 3 1 1 0 0 2 0 0.33333 3 2 1 0.666667 3 2 1 1 0 0.4667 0.4409
26 海通证券 601898 J Financial 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.095238095 1 1 0 0 0.16667 3 3 1 1 2 0.66667 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0.2381 2 2 0 0.444444 0 0 1 2 3 0.4 0.3118
27 北京银行 601600 J Financial 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0.142857143 3 1 1 0 0.41667 3 3 3 2 3 0.93333 3 1 0 3 0 1 0 0.38095 3 3 1 0.777778 1 3 0 2 3 0.6 0.4946
28 三一重工 601919 C Manufacturing 3 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.238095238 3 1 0 0 0.33333 2 1 2 1 3 0.6 3 1 2 2 0 2 0 0.47619 3 3 3 1 3 1 1 1 3 0.6 0.4946
29 华能国际 601169 D
Electric Power, Heat, 
Gas and Water 
Production and 
Supply 0 3 0 0 0 1 1 0.238095238 1 1 0 0 0.16667 2 1 2 1 0 0.4 1 1 0 1 0 2 0 0.2381 2 2 2 0.666667 1 2 0 0 0 0.2 0.2903





Technology 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.047619048 2 1 0 0 0.25 3 1 3 1 1 0.6 3 2 0 1 0 2 0 0.38095 3 3 3 1 1 3 1 1 3 0.6 0.4194
31 海螺水泥 601991 C Manufacturing 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.142857143 1 0 0 0 0.08333 3 0 2 1 1 0.46667 2 1 0 0 3 2 1 0.42857 2 2 1 0.555556 1 1 1 1 0 0.2667 0.3118
32 中煤能源 601899 B Mining 0 3 0 0 3 1 1 0.380952381 3 2 1 1 0.58333 3 2 3 3 3 0.93333 2 1 1 2 1 2 0 0.42857 2 2 1 0.555556 3 2 1 1 3 0.6667 0.5699
33 华夏银行 601766 J Financial 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.047619048 1 0 0 0 0.08333 3 3 3 3 1 0.86667 3 1 0 2 0 0 0 0.28571 2 2 1 0.555556 1 3 0 0 0 0.2667 0.3226
34 中国重工 600005 C Manufacturing 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.19047619 2 2 1 0 0.41667 2 1 3 3 3 0.8 3 1 0 1 0 2 0 0.33333 3 3 3 1 3 2 1 1 3 0.6667 0.5054
35 中国交建 600015 E Construction 3 3 0 0 0 1 1 0.380952381 1 1 1 0 0.25 2 0 3 1 2 0.53333 3 1 0 2 0 2 0 0.38095 2 2 0 0.444444 2 1 0 1 1 0.3333 0.3871
36 紫金矿业 600048 B Mining 0 3 0 0 3 1 2 0.428571429 1 3 0 0 0.33333 2 1 2 1 1 0.46667 1 1 1 2 0 2 0 0.33333 2 2 2 0.666667 3 3 1 3 3 0.8667 0.4946
37 中国铁建 601808 E Construction 3 3 3 0 3 1 2 0.714285714 3 3 1 0 0.58333 2 3 3 1 3 0.8 2 2 0 2 0 2 0 0.38095 3 3 3 1 2 3 0 1 3 0.6 0.6452
38 新华保险 600104 J Financial 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.095238095 1 2 0 0 0.25 3 3 2 1 1 0.66667 2 1 0 2 0 1 0 0.28571 3 2 1 0.666667 2 2 1 2 3 0.6667 0.3978
39 上港集团 600585 G
Transport, Storage 
and Postal Service 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.095238095 1 0 0 0 0.08333 2 0 2 1 1 0.4 2 1 0 2 0 1 0 0.28571 1 1 0 0.222222 3 1 1 1 3 0.6 0.2796
40 中国南车 601939 C Manufacturing 3 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.238095238 3 3 1 0 0.58333 3 3 3 2 3 0.93333 3 1 1 3 1 2 0 0.52381 3 3 3 1 3 1 0 1 1 0.4 0.5591
41 广汇能源 601111 S Diversified/General 1 3 0 0 3 1 0.380952381 3 1 0 0 0.33333 1 0 3 1 0 0.33333 1 1 0 2 0 2 0 0.28571 2 1 1 0.444444 3 0 0 0 0 0.2 0.3226
42 华泰证券 600795 J Financial 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.095238095 3 0 0 0 0.25 3 3 3 3 1 0.86667 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0.14286 2 2 1 0.555556 2 0 0 0 3 0.3333 0.3333
43 山东黄金 600583 B Mining 3 1 3 0 3 1 1 0.571428571 3 0 0 0 0.25 2 0 2 1 1 0.4 2 1 1 2 0 2 0 0.38095 3 3 1 0.777778 2 1 1 0 0 0.2667 0.4301
44 兖州煤业 600089 B Mining 0 3 0 0 3 2 2 0.476190476 3 3 1 0 0.58333 2 1 2 1 2 0.53333 1 1 0 3 0 2 0 0.33333 2 2 0 0.444444 3 3 0 1 3 0.6667 0.4946
45 中国中铁 601958 E Construction 3 3 3 0 0 1 2 0.571428571 3 1 0 0 0.33333 3 1 2 1 0 0.46667 2 1 0 1 0 1 0 0.2381 3 3 3 1 3 3 0 0 0 0.4 0.4624
46 潞安环能 600688 B Mining 3 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.238095238 3 0 0 0 0.25 1 0 1 0 0 0.13333 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0.14286 2 1 0 0.333333 2 3 0 1 3 0.6 0.2688
47 中国国航 600150 G
Transport, Storage 
and Postal Service 0 0 0 0 3 1 1 0.238095238 2 1 0 0 0.25 2 0 2 1 0 0.33333 3 1 2 1 0 2 0 0.42857 3 2 0 0.555556 2 3 1 1 3 0.6667 0.3978
48 江西铜业 600188 C Manufacturing 0 0 0 0 3 1 1 0.238095238 1 1 0 0 0.16667 1 0 2 0 0 0.2 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0.19048 1 1 0 0.222222 1 2 1 1 3 0.5333 0.2581
49 招商证券 600550 J Financial 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.095238095 3 1 0 0 0.33333 3 3 3 2 3 0.93333 2 1 0 2 0 2 0 0.33333 2 2 1 0.555556 3 3 1 2 3 0.8 0.4731
50 中国铝业 600832 C Manufacturing 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.047619048 1 1 0 0 0.16667 3 0 2 1 0 0.4 1 0 0 2 0 2 0 0.2381 2 1 0 0.333333 3 3 1 2 3 0.8 0.3118
Count of Companies 
Scored 3 14 16 3 1 15 0 2 0 25 7 4 0 0 28 22 23 8 17 0 16 0 1 10 4 0 1 0 21 19 9 0 24 20 0 1 32
Count of Companies 
Scored 2 0 0 0 0 0 4 11 0 9 8 3 0 0 19 1 25 7 8 0 19 8 5 20 0 28 0 0 22 18 4 0 13 7 1 10 0
Count of Companies 
Scored 1 4 1 2 0 3 42 36 0 16 28 14 5 0 3 14 2 33 17 2 14 38 11 13 5 16 5 0 7 11 18 7 12 20 27 31 3
Count of Companies 
Scored 0 32 33 44 49 32 4 0 0 0 7 29 45 0 0 13 0 2 8 0 1 4 33 7 41 6 44 0 0 2 19 0 1 3 22 8 15
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Code Industry Name VD1-Financia l VD2-HR VD3-CG VD4-MS VD5-DEV VD6-SE VDT
1 中国石油 601857 B Mining 0.380952381 0.3333333 0.4666667 0.3809524 0.3333333 0.4 0.3870968
5 中国石化 601628 B Mining 0.428571429 0.1666667 0.5333333 0.5238095 1 0.6666667 0.5268817
7 中国神华 600036 B Mining 0.333333333 0.1666667 0.4666667 0.3809524 0.3333333 0.4666667 0.3655914
32 中煤能源 601899 B Mining 0.380952381 0.5833333 0.9333333 0.4285714 0.5555556 0.6666667 0.5698925
36 紫金矿业 600048 B Mining 0.428571429 0.3333333 0.4666667 0.3333333 0.6666667 0.8666667 0.4946237
43 山东黄金 600583 B Mining 0.571428571 0.25 0.4 0.3809524 0.7777778 0.2666667 0.4301075
44 兖州煤业 600089 B Mining 0.476190476 0.5833333 0.5333333 0.3333333 0.4444444 0.6666667 0.4946237
46 潞安环能 600688 B Mining 0.238095238 0.25 0.1333333 0.1428571 0.3333333 0.6 0.2688172
9 贵州茅台 601318 C Manufacturing 0.333333333 0.3333333 0.4 0.3333333 0.1111111 0.4 0.3333333
11 上汽集团 600030 C Manufacturing 0.571428571 0.5 0.5333333 0.5238095 0.6666667 0.6666667 0.5698925
24 包钢稀土 600837 C Manufacturing 0.476190476 0.1666667 0.4666667 0.4761905 0.4444444 0.2 0.3870968
25 宝钢股份 600011 C Manufacturing 0.523809524 0.3333333 0.4 0.3333333 0.6666667 0.4666667 0.4408602
31 海螺水泥 601991 C Manufacturing 0.142857143 0.0833333 0.4666667 0.4285714 0.5555556 0.2666667 0.311828
34 中国重工 600005 C Manufacturing 0.19047619 0.4166667 0.8 0.3333333 1 0.6666667 0.5053763
40 中国南车 601939 C Manufacturing 0.238095238 0.5833333 0.9333333 0.5238095 1 0.4 0.5591398
48 江西铜业 600188 C Manufacturing 0.238095238 0.1666667 0.2 0.1904762 0.2222222 0.5333333 0.2580645
50 中国铝业 600832 C Manufacturing 0.047619048 0.1666667 0.4 0.2380952 0.3333333 0.8 0.311828
21 长江电力 600000 D
Electric Power, Heat, 
Gas  and Water 
Production and 
Supply 0.761904762 0.3333333 0.6666667 0.5238095 0.5555556 0.3333333 0.5483871
29 华能国际 601169 D
Electric Power, Heat, 
Gas  and Water 
Production and 
Supply 0.238095238 0.1666667 0.4 0.2380952 0.6666667 0.2 0.2903226
20 中国建筑 600016 E Construction 0.380952381 0.1666667 0.5333333 0.3809524 0.5555556 0.4 0.3978495
35 中国交建 600015 E Construction 0.380952381 0.25 0.5333333 0.3809524 0.4444444 0.3333333 0.3870968
37 中国铁建 601808 E Construction 0.714285714 0.5833333 0.8 0.3809524 1 0.6 0.6451613
45 中国中铁 601958 E Construction 0.571428571 0.3333333 0.4666667 0.2380952 1 0.4 0.4623656
22 大秦铁路 601166 G
Transport, Storage 
and Posta l  Service 0.619047619 0.3333333 0.4666667 0.5714286 0.5555556 0.3333333 0.4946237
39 上港集团 600585 G
Transport, Storage 
and Posta l  Service 0.095238095 0.0833333 0.4 0.2857143 0.2222222 0.6 0.2795699
47 中国国航 600150 G
Transport, Storage 
and Posta l  Service 0.238095238 0.25 0.3333333 0.4285714 0.5555556 0.6666667 0.3978495





Technology 0.047619048 0.25 0.6 0.3809524 1 0.6 0.4193548
2 工商银行 601398 J Financia l 0.095238095 0.8333333 0.8666667 0.4285714 0.8888889 0.8 0.5806452
3 农业银行 601988 J Financia l 0.095238095 0.6666667 0.9333333 0.3809524 0.8888889 0.2 0.4623656
4 中国银行 600028 J Financia l 0.142857143 0.6666667 0.8666667 0.3333333 0.5555556 0.6 0.483871
6 中国人寿 601088 J Financia l 0.142857143 0.25 0.8666667 0.2380952 0.1111111 0.4666667 0.344086
13 浦发银行 601006 J Financia l 0.095238095 0.5 0.8666667 0.2380952 0.3333333 0.3333333 0.3655914
16 中国太保 600519 J Financia l 0.095238095 0.0833333 0.8666667 0.2857143 0.2222222 0.2666667 0.3010753
17 中信银行 601390 J Financia l 0.19047619 0.5833333 0.9333333 0.2857143 0.8888889 0.7333333 0.5376344
18 中信证券 601601 J Financia l 0.095238095 0.3333333 0.7333333 0.2857143 0.6666667 0.4666667 0.3870968
19 光大银行 600019 J Financia l 0.095238095 0.3333333 0.7333333 0.2380952 0.7777778 0.6 0.4086022
42 华泰证券 600795 J Financia l 0.095238095 0.25 0.8666667 0.1428571 0.5555556 0.3333333 0.3333333
49 招商证券 600550 J Financia l 0.095238095 0.3333333 0.9333333 0.3333333 0.5555556 0.8 0.4731183
23 保利地产 600018 K Real  Estate 0.047619048 0.3333333 0.5333333 0.2380952 0.2222222 0.5333333 0.3010753
8 招商银行 600900 J Financia l 0.095238095 0.5 0.9333333 0.3809524 0.8888889 0.4 0.4731183
10 中国平安 601328 J Financia l 0.142857143 0.4166667 0.7333333 0.2380952 0.7777778 0.6666667 0.4408602
12 交通银行 600050 J Financia l 0.095238095 0.5833333 1 0.2380952 0.7777778 0.8 0.516129
14 兴业银行 601186 J Financia l 0.095238095 0.75 0.7333333 0.3333333 0.6666667 0.7333333 0.4946237
15 民生银行 601998 J Financia l 0.142857143 0.4166667 1 0.3809524 0.4444444 0.8 0.5053763
26 海通证券 601898 J Financia l 0.095238095 0.1666667 0.6666667 0.2380952 0.4444444 0.4 0.311828
27 北京银行 601600 J Financia l 0.142857143 0.4166667 0.9333333 0.3809524 0.7777778 0.6 0.4946237
33 华夏银行 601766 J Financia l 0.047619048 0.0833333 0.8666667 0.2857143 0.5555556 0.2666667 0.3225806
38 新华保险 600104 J Financia l 0.095238095 0.25 0.6666667 0.2857143 0.6666667 0.6666667 0.3978495
28 三一重工 601919 C Manufacturing 0.238095238 0.3333333 0.6 0.4761905 1 0.6 0.4946237
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